Observations on the Disturbances in the Madras Army in 1809. John Malcolm

will accuse General M^cDowall of more than want of reflection) led to such consequences, can we say there was much more wisdom on the other, which, if it did not provoke, never made one attempt to prevent, the occurrence of those evils with which it was threatened? A cold, even, mechanic course of action, which gave great attention to the ordinary rules of public business dignified with the name of public principles, but none to human nature, was opposed at this period to the proceedings of the Commander-in-Chief and the army; and had the effect, which was to be expected, of accelerating that crisis which it was so important to avoid.

      It may be here necessary to explain what was meant by the term public principle. It was constantly used at Madras (with some deviation, I conceive, from its highest and most dignified sense) to denote the rules of public business founded either in precedent or in written law, and certainly well adapted for order and convenience in the common course of affairs. But if such rules were sufficient, no talents would be necessary to govern mankind. A copying clerk, or even the regulation-book which he copies, might rule a state. Success in this endeavour (the object of which is to render the task of Government simple and easy) will be always agreeable to the character of the Government. The more despotic that is, the more easily may we preserve inviolate such rules or principles. For though great commotions will occur in the most despotic states, and force their rulers to an occasional deviation from such principles, these deviations will be unfrequent to what must arise in more free and liberal governments, in which that constant attention which it is necessary to pay to men's tempers, and to those pretensions and rights upon which such an order of things is grounded, must produce a much more frequent departure from the exact letter (and sometimes from the spirit) of those unbending rules. It is this fact which renders the task of government so much more difficult in those states than in any others. Any man (who has obsequious slaves to govern) can, if he has memory to recollect the principles of rule, be a despot, or a despot's deputy; but far different qualities are required where the minds of those under authority are of a freer and bolder stamp: over such a society those alone are fit to rule, who, fully informed of all its component parts, can judge the periods when the temporary departure from an established principle will effect more in the cause of authority than its rigid observance; when lenity is more powerful than severity, and mildness and moderation tend more to restore order and to maintain tranquillity, than all the force of a violent government.

      The intelligent reader will perceive, that, in contrasting free and despotic governments, I refer exclusively to rules of administration. Laws are, no doubt, more inflexible in free states than in others. But even respecting laws it may be observed, that the general principle prevails: for the legislative power in free states shows a disposition to repeal or modify laws in reference to the interests, the opinions, sometimes even to the prejudices, of great bodies of the people; while the despot has no maxim, but that all must be subject to the authority of Government. There is, no doubt, a great distinction in every community between civil and military bodies: the laws for the government of the latter are, of course, more arbitrary and unbending; but, even in these bodies there is a national character that will compel attention. The same principles cannot be applied to an English as a Russian army: and it is when such bodies are in an agitated and convulsed state, that these characteristic distinctions are most prominent and discernible. It is on such emergencies that a statesman will succeed in averting a danger, which will only be increased by every measure of the mere rote follower of public rules. Cicero[2] has observed, that "it appears to be the dictate of sound policy, to act in accommodation to particular conjunctures, and not obstinately persevere in one invariable scheme, when the public circumstances, together with the sentiments of the best and wisest members of the community, are evidently changed. In conformity to this notion, the most judicious reasoners on the art of government have universally condemned an inflexible perseverance in one uniform tenor of measures. The skill of the pilot is shown in weathering the storm at least, though he should not gain his port." Public merit (agreeable to the extended view of that great orator and statesman, as expressed afterwards) consists in "having been inflexible in our intentions for the public welfare, and not by a positive perseverance in certain favourite modes of obtaining it."

      It will be unnecessary to trace the petty differences which took place between the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor: the general character and evil effect of these differences have been described. The first act which led to serious discussions, was the former placing the Quarter-Master-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, in arrest. The nature of this case is well known: and few, I imagine, can doubt that Government had a right to command his release: but it will remain a question with many, how far a knowledge of the character and actual temper of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of the army, and other circumstances, would have warranted Government in forbearing to use this right. It is nonsense to say, that it would, by so forbearing and moderate a proceeding, have abandoned an officer entitled to protection. This language, if it means any thing, implies that Government did not conceive there were at that moment thirteen officers, either in the King's or Company's service, on the coast, upon whose honesty and honour it could rely. This is a proposition which appears too extravagant for notice: but, even if this point be conceded, will it be said, if Colonel Munro had suffered an additional injustice by the sentence of a violent and partial court martial, that the Government was, in that extreme case, deprived of the right to protect that officer? On the contrary, would not the necessity for the exercise of that right have been, under such an event, much more apparent and unobjectionable. It may be asked, if any circumstances could justify Government in so pusillanimous a conduct, as that of forbearing to exercise an admitted right, and of allowing a court martial to judge upon a public act which it had recognised and approved? It is to be replied, that such conduct might, on many occasions, be the result of prudence and of fortitude. It is weakness, not firmness, that takes an early alarm at danger, and by showing a want of confidence in all the subordinate aids of its power, creates, by its suspicion, that defection which it apprehends. In the recent case of Sir Francis Burdett, the House of Commons did not abandon its exclusive right, but it forbore the exercise of that right, and, with a confidence and wisdom worthy of so enlightened and august an assembly, allowed a question, which involved its rights and authority, to be discussed in a court of law. There can, I should conceive, be no doubt whatever, that had Colonel Munro been tried on the charges preferred against him, he would have been honourably acquitted; and the influence and reputation of his accusers would have been in no slight degree lessened: an object which, in itself, was of consequence at that period to Government.

      It is a remarkable fact, that the officers who had signed the charges against Colonel Munro, were, on reflection, and from learning the sentiments of the Judge-Advocate-General, so convinced that the charges they had made were either groundless or illegal, that they wrote to the Commander-in-Chief to suspend the prosecution of them. This certainly proves (if any proof was wanting) that there could have been no doubt of the result of a court martial, grounded on the state of general feelings, as far as that regarded the charges against Lieutenant-Colonel Munro; for if the accusers themselves had shown they distrusted the cause they had so rashly adopted, there could, assuredly, be no apprehension of the judgment of thirteen officers of rank (all of whom, if it had been thought necessary, might have been chosen from his Majesty's service) giving a biassed or unjust sentence. The Government of Madras, in their dispatch to the Court of Directors upon this subject, draw a directly opposite conclusion from this fact, which, they say, "proves in itself the inexpediency of their having had recourse to such a proceeding;" but they state no grounds for this conclusion. In the whole course of this affair they appear to have been much, if not solely, guided by the opinion of their law officers: and no man can peruse the letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Leith upon this subject, without a just respect for the talents and extensive legal knowledge of that public officer. But those that think great, numerous, and obvious evils resulted from the decision of Government on the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, will not immediately perceive the necessity of its having been governed by rules of law in its decision on a question which clearly involved the most serious considerations of state policy. They will think, and with justice, this was a question not for lawyers, but statesmen; who, in the exercise of their legitimate discretion, are in the situation in which Mr. Burke has so well described legislators; and therefore, like them, "ought to do what lawyers cannot, for they have no rules to bind them but the great principles