The Economic Policies of Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton Alexander

have a right to; the latter enervates government, prevents system in the administration, defeats the most salutary measures, breeds confusion in the State, disgusts and discontents among the people, and may eventually prove as fatal to liberty as the opposite temper.

      It is certainly pernicious to leave any government in a situation of responsibility disproportioned to its power.

      The conduct of the war is intrusted to Congress, and the public expectation turned upon them without any competent means at their command to satisfy the important trust. After the most full and solemn deliberation, under a collective view of all the public difficulties, they recommended a measure which appears to them the corner-stone of the public safety: they see this measure suspended for nearly two years; partially complied with by some of the States; rejected by one of them, and in danger, on that account, to be frustrated; the public embarrassments every day increasing; the dissatisfaction of the army growing more serious; the other creditors of the public clamoring for justice; both irritated by the delay of measures for their present relief or future security; the hopes of our enemies encouraged to protract the war; the zeal of our friends depressed by an appearance of remissness and want of exertion on our part; Congress harassed; the national character suffering; and the national safety at the mercy of events.

      This state of things cannot but be extremely painful to Congress; and appears to your Committee to make it their duty to be urgent, to obviate the evils with which it is pregnant.

      Resolved, That Congress agree to the said report.

      SPEECH ON THE REVENUE SYSTEM

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      There appears to me to have been some confusion in the manner of voting on the two preceding clauses of this bill: the first, for granting the impost to the United States, having been carried by a majority of one; and the last, for making the officers employed in the collection accountable to them, having been lost by a much larger majority. I was induced to hope, from the success of the first question, that the second would have met with equal success, as I presume gentlemen who meant to adhere to the act of the last session would have opposed the whole of the present bill as unnecessary, and those who meant to depart from it would be willing to agree substantially to the system recommended by Congress, as it had been adopted and modified by the other States generally. From the complexion of the votes on the last question, I am obliged to conclude either that I was mistaken in my ideas of the intention of the committee, or that there is some misapprehension, in part, of the members.

      It becomes, therefore, necessary—to obviate such misapprehension, if any exists, and to discharge my duty at all events—to lay the subject fully before the committee, and to detail, at large, my reasons for wishing to see the bill, in its present form, prevail.

      It is a common practice, in entering upon the discussion of an important subject, to endeavor to conciliate the good-will of the audience to the speaker by professions of disinterestedness and zeal for the public good. The example, however frequent, I shall no further imitate than by making one or two general observations. If, in the public stations I have filled, I have acquitted myself with zeal, fidelity, and disinterestedness; if, in the private walk of life, my conduct has been unstained by any dishonorable act, if it has been uniformly consistent with the rules of integrity, I have a right to the confidence of those to whom I address myself; they cannot refuse it to me without injustice. I am persuaded they will not refuse it to me. If, on the other hand, my public conduct has been in any instance marked with perfidy, duplicity, or with sinister views of any kind; if any imputations, founded in fact, can be adduced to the prejudice of my private character, I have no claim to the confidence of the committee; nor should I expect it.

      Even these observations I should have spared myself, did I not know that, in the rage of party, gross calumnies have been propagated. Some I have traced and detected; there may still be others in secret circulation, with which I am unacquainted. Against the influence of such arts I can have no other shield than the general tenor of my past conduct. If that will protect me, I may safely confide in the candor of the committee. To that standard I cheerfully submit.

      But, indeed, of what importance is it who is the speaker? ’T is his reasons only that concern the committee; if these are good, they owe it to themselves and to their constituents to allow them their full weight.

      The first objection (and that which is supposed to have the greatest force) against the principles of the bill is, that it would be unconstitutional to delegate legislative power to Congress. If this objection be founded in truth, there is at once an end of the inquiry. God forbid that we should violate that constitution which is the charter of our rights. But it is our duty to examine dispassionately whether it really stands in our way. If it does not, let us not erect an ideal barrier to a measure which the public good may require.

      The first ground of the objection is deduced from that clause of the constitution which declares “that no power shall be exercised over the people of this State but such as is granted by or derived from them.”

      This, it is plain, amounts to nothing more than a declaration of that fundamental maxim of republican government, “that all power, mediately or immediately, is derived from the consent of the people,” in opposition to those doctrines of despotism which uphold the divine right of kings, or lay the foundations of government in force, conquest, or necessity. It does not at all affect the question how far the Legislature may go in granting power to the United States. A power conferred by the representatives of the people, if warranted by the constitution under which they act, is a power derived from the people. This is not only a plain inference of reason, but the terms of the clause itself seem to have been calculated to let in the principle. The words, “derived from,” are added to the words “granted by,” as if with design to distinguish an indirect derivation of power from an immediate grant of it. This explanation is even necessary to reconcile the constitution to itself, and to give effect to all its parts, as I hope fully to demonstrate in its proper place.

      The next clause of the constitution relied upon, is that which declares that “the supreme legislative power within this State shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly.” This, it is said, excludes the idea of any other legislative power operating within the State. But the more obvious construction of this clause, and that which best consists with the situation and views of the country at this time, with what has been done before and since the formation of our constitution, and with those parts of the constitution itself which acknowledge the Federal Government, is this: “In the distribution of the different parts of the sovereignty in the particular government of this State, the legislative authority shall reside in a Senate and Assembly”; or, in other words, “the legislative authority of the particular government of the State of New York shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly.” The framers of the constitution could have had nothing more in view than to delineate the different departments of power in our own State government, and never could have intended to interfere with the formation of such a Constitution for the Union as the safety of the whole might require. The justness of this construction will be further elucidated by that part of the constitution which prescribes, “that the supreme executive authority of the State shall be vested in a governor.” If the former clause excludes the grant of legislative power, this must equally exclude the grant of the executive power, and the consequence would be that there could be no Federal Government at all.

      It will be of no avail to say, that there is a difference in the two cases in the mode of expression: that, in one, the terms of description are “within the State”; in the other, “of the State.” In grammar, or good sense, the difference in the phrases constitutes no substantial difference in the meaning, or if it does, it concludes against the objection; for the words, within this State, which are applied to the legislative power, have a certain precision that may be supposed to intend a distinction between that legislative power which is to operate within this State only, and that which is to operate upon this State in conjunction with the others. But I lay no stress on this observation. In my opinion the legislative power “within this State” or the legislative power “of this