The Human Factor. Ishmael Jones

      All individuals, unless they are public figures, are obscured in order to make it impossible to identify any CIA employee or agent. Dates and places of non-public events have been obscured or changed. No classified information, sources, or methods are revealed. As a former CIA employee, I was required to submit the book to CIA censors for their approval. I initially sent a copy of the manuscript to the CIAʹs Publications Review Board, asking them to identify any classified information, which I would then take out. I am an expert on what portions of intelligence operations constitute classified information and already knew there were none. Without reviewing the book, the CIA disapproved the publication of every word. During the course of a year, I repeated my request to the CIA that it identify any classified information in the book. The CIA eventually returned it to me with all but a few paragraphs wiped out. Words deemed appropriate for public viewing by the CIA were reduced to less than one percent throughout the book.

      Before writing this book, I exhausted all avenues open to me to improve human intelligence programs. I repeatedly confronted all levels of my chain of command without result. I met with the Inspector General’s office, but found it a broken system—the IG was not up to the task and was under investigation by the FBI for leaks. The Director at the time was sympathetic and cleared the way for my final foreign assignment, but he was soon removed and replaced by managers who represent the status quo. No anti-corruption or whistleblower systems exist in the organization, possibly because the CIAʹs official secrecy makes such checks and balances dead-ends. Only open, public debate will lead to reform.

      I worked with the CIAʹs censors in good faith. During telephone conversations, CIA censors seemed to recognize the manuscript contained no classified information and at one point suggested it might be approved with minor revisions. During each of my many communications with the censors, I repeated: Show me the classified information in this book and I will take it out. In each case they replied, after months of delay, with evasive letters, from anonymous P.O. boxes, signed by people using fictitious names.

      I believe the CIA sought to block publication of this book solely because it is critical of the organization. All of the dozens of books written by ex-CIA officers and approved by the CIA demonstrate that censorship standards are lax and inconsistent. Some of the books, especially the recent Tenet and Drumheller books, reveal what I consider to be a startling amount of classified information. These books criticize the President, however, and not the organization.

      Funds allocated to protect Americans are being stolen or wasted on phony or nonexistent intelligence programs. By attempting to censor this manuscript, the CIA puts Americans at risk. The purpose of the book is to add to the criticism and debate about reform of the organization. Criticism and debate is how we solve things in America and I consider it my duty to publish this manuscript.

       Introduction

      Human sources are those individuals who provide information about terrorist organizations and hostile governments. Gathering intelligence from human sources is the fundamental purpose of the Central Intelligence Agency’s clandestine service. Some of the most important foreign policy decisions made by United States Presidents require this intelligence.

      Lack of good human sources can be a President’s downfall.

      George W. Bush’s presidency was poisoned by a lack of human source intelligence on the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq war, and the issue of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). President Clinton’s legacy was tarnished by the 9/11 attacks, and he was taken by surprise by the arms race on the Asian subcontinent. Presidents Reagan and Carter were humiliated by hostage crises. Lack of reliable information about the Soviet Union nearly led to war on several occasions. The 1973 Arab/Israeli war took President Nixon by surprise. The war in Vietnam ended the Johnson presidency. The Korean War ended the Truman presidency. The handling of the U-2 incident was President Eisenhower’s greatest regret. The Bay of Pigs was President Kennedy’s greatest failure. In each of these cases a lack of good human sources was largely to blame.

      CIA officers are, of course, skilled and well-trained, but the structure of the organization discourages human source operations. In the darkness of secrecy, with unlimited billions of tax dollars, and with little or no accountability, the CIA bureaucracy has mutated into a living, breathing leviathan that serves its own aims. It has grown some very unruly tentacles: layers of unnecessary managers, lucrative pay and benefits packages for current and former employees, obscene contracts for companies run by former employees, and massive expansion of the CIAʹs operations within the continental United States. Very few of the CIAʹs top managers have ever recruited a good human source.

      I joined the CIA in the late 1980’s with one purpose in mind: to serve my country. My service, except for initial training, was in continuous field assignments overseas, in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe while working on WMD targets, and in Iraq while working on terrorist targets during the war. Few have equaled my record of consecutive, successful foreign assignments. My service was unblemished.

      I resigned when I decided further service was pointless and that my best contribution to our nation’s defense would be to enter the debate on the reform of the CIA. This book is the story of a deep cover case officer, the day-to-day obstacles to survival during dangerous operations—and without the benefit of diplomatic immunity—and the challenges of pushing intelligence operations through an unwilling and dysfunctional bureaucracy.

      The CIA, a corrupt, Soviet-style organization, is not serving the purpose for which it was created, and the result is that our lives and the lives of our allies are in jeopardy. The Agency must either be restructured as an American organization—which encourages achievement, creativity, and accountability—or it must be dismantled. I have offered suggestions and solutions informed by the wisdom of experience.

      My profits from the sale of this book will go to the children of American soldiers killed in action.

       Prologue

      The CIA bureaucracy was doing everything in its power to stop me, but I had vowed that morning to find myself at least one good human source of intelligence on enemy nuclear weapons.

      During the winter of 2005, I boarded the No. 1 Metro line at the Louvre and traveled west, getting off at Porte Maillot and walking through underground passages to a scientific conference at the Hotel Concorde Lafayette. I’d seen it advertised on the Internet that morning, and it looked promising. Scientists network with their peers at such conferences, to exchange ideas, learn about the latest developments, and advance their careers.

      In other words, it would be a perfect watering hole for visiting rogue state weapons scientists, who might make for good human intelligence targets.

      Most of the attendees were middle-aged professionals, some dressed in inexpensive suits, others in collared shirts, with a smattering of neckties here and there: Scientists focus on their specialties and ideas, not on dressing up. I paid an entrance fee, pinned on a nametag, and entered the part of the room where people were conversing in scattered small groups.

      I also surveyed the room for anyone who might pose a danger. Any venue that attracts weapons specialists might also attract other intelligence officers. Some might be keeping an eye on their own government’s scientists or looking for intelligence sources, just as I was. If I correctly played my cover, other intelligence services wouldn’t present any threat—at least, not near-term.

      Of even more concern to me were my colleagues from the CIA. We tended to flood events like these with intelligence officers and access agents, i.e., informants. This causes turf friction between different parts of the organization, but I hadn’t had time to tell anyone I’d be there. We wrote up voluminous reports to Headquarters (HQs) back in Langley, Virginia, describing moods, impressions, and observations of events. If I’d crossed one of these guys in the past, or if any of them wasn’t happy with me invading his territory, he might note, “I saw Ishmael there and thought he looked like a spy,” or, “Ishmael was too aggressive and he was attracting attention to himself.” The last thing I wanted was to show up in a colleague’s