Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution Vol V. Hal Draper

a political and international configuration that was long past by 1914. They were dealing with a world dominated by the conflict between the bourgeois revolution and feudal absolutism. The world of 1914 was dominated by the competition of developed capitalist powers fighting over the division of the world’s markets and sources of raw materials.¹⁰

      The first epoch from the Great French Revolution to the Franco-Prussian war is one of the rise of the bourgeoisie, . . . The second epoch is that of the full domination and decline of the bourgeoisie, one of transition from its progressive character toward reactionary and even ultrareactionary finance capital. . . . The Third epoch, which has just set in, places the bourgeoisie in the same “position” as that in which the feudal lords found themselves during the first epoch.¹¹

      Lenin repeated these themes throughout World War I and afterwards. It was his final word on Marx and Engels’ position; and, given this imprimatur, it has been accepted as a definitive, if perhaps oversimplified statement, of their views.

      There is nothing wrong with Lenin’s schema in itself. Its virtue is that it provides a theoretical underpinning for the change in the attitudes of socialists towards war that followed 1871. But the difficulty is that Lenin claims he is expounding Marx and Engels’ views on war. And there is no evidence that this is so. If Lenin (or Kautsky or Potresov) thought they had such evidence they didn’t bother to exhibit it.

      As an outline of Marx and Engels’ views on war and its relation to revolution, there are several problems with Lenin’s schema. Despite his repeated insistence, neither Marx nor Engels anywhere used the criterion “the success of which bourgeoisie is most desirable.” From the time of their earliest writings on the subject, both men saw the dynastic imperialism of the absolute monarchies as the main cause of war in Europe. This relic of the medieval, pre-bourgeois past, naturally, led to wars between the dynasties themselves over the division of the continent into spheres of influence. More important, however, was the military threat the dynasties, especially the Russian one, posed for any renewed revolutionary activity after 1815. It was the conflict between the old world of feudalism and the new world of the bourgeois revolution that was the real source of war. Not only did neither Marx nor Engels ever use the phrase “the success of which bourgeoisie is more desirable,” the concept cannot be found in their writings, public or private. When conflict between the bourgeoisie and the old order broke out in either domestic or international politics, they tended to urge the bourgeoisie forward. At the same time, because of their experience in 1848, they expected the liberal bourgeoisie would shrink from any serious confrontation. On a number of occasions, they tended to accuse liberals of what we today would call “appeasement” in the face of Tsarist, Bonapartist, or Hapsburg provocations.

      Lenin, himself, in the very articles quoted here, recognizes that what characterized his “first epoch” was just this conflict between the old order and the new. His insistence on the formula “the success of which bourgeoisie” can only be explained by his eagerness to enlist Marx and Engels on his side in the contemporary dispute over World War I which, in his view and that of most other opponents of the war, was a conflict between states where the bourgeoisie was effectively master.

      4. “No Other Question Could Have Been Posed”

      Equally unfounded is Lenin’s assertion that, for Marx and Engels, “no other question could have been posed.” It is true that Lenin does not explicitly attribute this formula to Marx and Engels but the drift of his argument implies, indeed requires, such an attribution. It is Lenin’s apologia for Marx and Engels’ reputed prewar politics. But Marx and Engels never asked themselves this question. As early as the Crimean crisis of 1853, they expected the conflict between the old regime and the new to lead to revolution; a continuing revolution in which the working class would soon come to power. Given this perspective, it would have made no sense, in most cases, to support one government against the other. Marx and Engels’ hopes and expectations were not fulfilled as we know. The process of modernization and bourgeoisification eroded the position of the old ruling classes in Europe to the point where medieval relics like absolute monarchy became hollow shells. But this happened without a revolutionary confrontation. There were plenty of pre-revolutionary crises, but a compromise was always found short of a final conflict.

      In this sense, Lenin was right. His schema better reflected what had happened. Marx and Engels, however, were writing in the midst of events. Maybe they should have realized that their expectations for revolution were premature and adopted a policy of supporting the “lesser evil” as Potresov maintained. But it is hard to imagine men of their temperament (or Lenin’s temperament) taking such a contemplative and disinterested view of political events. It would have required them to remain politically passive in one crisis after another because, as we now know and as Lenin knew, none of these crises would actually lead to revolution. But this is something they could not have known. They would have been acting like a trade unionist who, after soberly evaluating the “objective” situation, concludes that the strike cannot win and goes back to work. And, in doing so, helps to defeat the strike.

      If Marx and Engels, and other socialists, had taken this passive attitude the socialist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century would never have come into being. Without defeats and partial victories no final victory is possible. Or, as Luxemburg put it, “every revolution is bound to be defeated except the last.”¹²

      A second problem with this schema is that even the vaguer formulation used by Potresov and Kautsky—“the success of which side is more desirable”—has nothing to do with Marx and Engels. If we were to make explicit the criterion they used in analyzing the wars in question—something they did not do—it would have to be “how can revolutionaries best exploit this conflict.” In the cases examined by Potresov and Kautsky, the record shows that Marx and Engels did not advocate support for either side even when they thought the victory of one side would facilitate revolution. Potresov clearly wishes Marx and Engels had preceded him in advocating a prowar position. Kautsky would have liked them to have reluctantly abstained from political opposition as he did throughout most of World War I. Unfortunately, for people looking for such precedents, Marx and Engels in the instances cited energetically denounced both sides and used what means were available to them to rally the organized working class against support for either side.

      5. Two Barking Dogs

      There is a Sherlock Holmes story in which a key piece of evidence, overlooked, of course, by the bumbling Dr. Watson, is something that is missing. A dog didn’t bark when it should have. In the case we are investigating, practically all participants played the role of Watson. Only, they had less excuse. It wasn’t that the dog didn’t bark; it was that there were two dogs, both barking loudly, and no one noticed them. Neither Kautsky, nor Potresov, nor Lenin, nor, as far as I have been able to determine, any other socialist during Word War I, cited the two wars after 1848 in which Marx and Engels unambiguously took a prowar stand in support of a bourgeois government.

      During the American Civil War, Marx actively campaigned for the Union. His support was unconditional and unqualified. He did not ask himself which side’s victory would be “most desirable.” He came down solidly on the side that was fighting slavery. His activity was not only literary. A significant section of the British bourgeoisie, led by Gladstone’s liberals, favored an alliance with the Confederacy. Marx, together with his friends in the movement, mostly ex-Chartists, carried on a counter campaign, organizing rallies and meetings in support of the Union. Given the economic crisis created in the textile industry by the Union blockade of cotton exports from the slave-holding South, England’s main supplier, this campaign by Marx and the former Chartist leaders required a confrontation with conservative trade unionists in what was a relatively well-organized trade. But Marx’s support of the Union, while unqualified, was not uncritical. The conduct of the war by the Lincoln administration was pilloried in Marx and Engels’ correspondence and their public comments, while more restrained, were also harsh.¹³

      Even more surprising is the failure of any of the participants in the 1914