A Left that Dares to Speak Its Name. Slavoj Žižek

a, object-cause of desire. Let’s take a political example. The politically correct prohibition of asserting the particular identity of White Men (as the model of oppression of others), although it presents itself as the admission of their guilt, confers on them a central position: this very prohibition to assert their particular identity turns them into the universal-neutral medium, the place from which the truth about the others’ oppression is accessible. And this is why white liberals indulge so readily in self-flagellation: the true aim of their activity is not really to help the others but to achieve the Lustgewinn brought about by their self-accusations, the feeling of their own moral superiority over others. The problem with the self-denial of white identity is not that it goes too far, but that it does not go far enough: while its enunciated content seems radical, its position of enunciation remains that of a privileged universality. So yes, they declare themselves to be “nothing,” but this very renunciation to a (particular) something is sustained by the surplus enjoyment of their moral superiority, and we can easily imagine the scene from the quoted Jewish joke repeated here: when, say, a black guy says “I am also nothing!” a white guy whispers to his (white) neighbor: “Who does this guy think he is to be able to claim that he is also nothing?” But we can easily move from imagination to reality here. A decade or so ago, at a round table in New York where the politically correct Leftists predominated, I remember a couple of big names among the “critical thinkers” engaging, one after the other, in self-flagellation, blaming the Judeo-Christian tradition for our evils, pronouncing scathing verdicts on “Eurocentrism,” etc. Then, unexpectedly, a black activist joined the debate and also made some critical remarks about the limitations of the black Muslim movement. Hearing this, the white “critical thinkers” exchanged annoyed glances whose message was something like “Who does this guy think he is that he can also claim he is a worthless nothing?” And does something similar not hold for the way “our” proletarians tend to react to the nomadic proletarians? “We are the true nothing – who are they to also claim that they are nothing?”

Back to Platonov: at an abstract level, he thus raises the question of subsumption (of Others into the proletariat), and today we are facing the same problem not just with regard to refugees and other migrants (can they be subsumed into the global capitalist order?), but also at a more formal level of what Balibar calls “total subsumption” as the basic tendency of today’s capitalism.⁶ This term does not cover only the phenomenon of so-called “cultural capitalism” (the growing commodification of the cultural sphere), but, above all, full subsumption under the logic of the capital of the workers themselves and the process of their reproduction:

      Whereas Marx explained that “capital” ultimately could be reduced to (productive) labour or was nothing other than labour in a different form, appropriated by a different class, the theory of human capital explains that labour – more precisely “labouring capacity” [Arbeits vermögen] – can be reduced to capital or become analysed in terms of capitalist operations of credit, investment and profitability. This is, of course, what underlies the ideology of the individual as a “self-entrepreneur,” or an “entrepreneur of oneself.”⁷

      The issue here is “not so much to describe a growth of markets for existing products; it is much more to push the range of the market beyond the limits of the ‘production sphere’ in the traditional sense, therefore to add new sources of permanent ‘extra surplus-value’ that can become integrated into valorization, overcoming its limitations, because capital is valorized both on the ‘objective’ side of labour and production, and on the ‘subjective’ side of consumption and use.”⁸

So it’s not just about making the workforce more productive, it is to conceive of the workforce itself directly as another field of capitalist investment: all aspects of its “subjective” life (health, education, sexual life, psychic state, …) are considered not only as important for the productivity of the workers, but as fields of investment that can generate additional surplus-value. Health services do not only serve the interests of capital by way of making workers more productive; they are themselves an incredibly powerful field of investment, not only for capital (health services comprise the single strongest branch of the US economy, much stronger than defense) but for the workers themselves (who view paying health insurance as an investment for their future). The same goes for education: it does not only get you ready for productive work; it is in itself the field of a profitable investment for institutions as well as for individuals who invest in their future. It is as if, in this way, commodification not only becomes total, but also gets caught up in a kind of self-referential loop: working power as the ultimate “source of (capitalist) wealth,” the origin of surplus-value, becomes itself a moment of capitalist investment. Nowhere is this loop more clearly expressed than in the idea of the worker as a “self-entrepreneur,” a capitalist who decides freely where to invest his (meager) surplus resources (or, mostly, resources acquired through loans): into education, health, housing property … Does this process have a limit? When, in the very last paragraph of his essay, Balibar approaches this question, he strangely resorts to a Lacanian reference, to Lacan’s logic of non-All (from his “formulas of sexuation”):

This is what I call a total subsumption (after “formal” and “real” subsumption) because it leaves nothing outside (no reservation for “natural” life). Or, anything that is left outside must appear as a residue, and a field for further incorporation. Or must it? That is of course the whole question, ethical as much as political: are there limits to commodification? Are there internal and external obstacles? A Lacanian might want to say: every such totalization includes an element of impossibility which belongs to the “real”; it must be pas tout, or not whole. If that were the case, the heterogeneous elements, the intrinsic remainders of the total subsumption, could appear in many different forms, some apparently individualistic, such as pathologies or anarchist resistances, others common or even public. Or they may become manifest in certain difficulties in implementing the neoliberal agenda, such as the difficulty of dismantling a Medicare system once it has been legalized.⁹

      What Balibar says here is, for a Lacanian, very strange. He condenses (or, rather, just confuses) the two sides of Lacan’s formulas of sexuation, and simply reads exception as non-All: the totality of subsumption is non-All since there are exceptions that resist being subsumed to capital. But Lacan precisely opposes non-All and exception: every universality is based on an exception, and when there are no exceptions, the set is non-All, it cannot be totalized. (An interesting example of exception to the politically correct control of public speech are rap lyrics: there you can say it all, celebrate rape, murder, etc., etc. Why this exception? The reason is easy to guess: blacks are considered the privileged image of victimhood, and rap the expression of the misery of black youth, so the brutality of rap lyrics is absolved in advance as the authentic expression of black suffering and frustration.) This opposition should also be applied to the topic of subsumption: one should pass from the search for exception, for those who resist (universal) subsumption and are as such the “site of resistance,” to endorsing subsumption without exception and count on its non-All. The subsumption of individual lives to which Balibar refers cannot be reduced to a particular case of universal capitalist subsumption; they remain a particular case which, on account of its self-relating nature (the workforce itself becomes capital), redoubles the production of surplus-value.

In Marx’s critique of political economy there are two main cases of universality through exception: money, workforce. The field of commodities can only be totalized through a special commodity which functions as a general equivalent of all commodities but is, as such, deprived of use-value; the field of the exchange of commodities only gets totalized when individual producers not only sell their products on the market, but when the workforce (as a commodity whose use-value is to generate surplus-value) is also sold on the market as a commodity. So maybe there is a third case here: when this commodity, which produces surplus-value, itself becomes an object of capital investment bringing surplus-value, so that we get two types of surplus-value: the “normal” surplus-value generated by the products of the workforce, and the surplus generated by the production of the workforce itself. A nice example of Hegel’s insight into how the Absolute always involves self-splitting and is, in this sense, non-All: with the production of workforce itself as a field of capital investment,