Judgments of Beauty in Theory Evaluation. Devon Brickhouse-Bryson

of disputes are often confused because realism about phenomenon P does entail that relativism about P is false and vice versa (i.e., realism and relativism are inconsistent). But various kinds of antirealism are compatible with universalism (i.e., these kinds of antirealism deny relativism). For example, Kant’s theory of beauty (see Kant 1790) is not plausibly construed as a realist theory (given Kant’s transcendental idealism). But obviously Kant is a universalist, not a relativist, about beauty (likewise for morality). To give another example, the emotivist theory of beauty is a classic antirealist view. But emotivism can be interpreted as either a relativist view (see Santayana 1896) or a non-relativist view (see Hume 1757). This chapter only means to argue against common kinds of relativism (often found, in my experience, in lay people and philosophers outside of aesthetics). This chapter does not to speak to whether universalism (i.e., non-relativism) about beauty entails realism about beauty. Indeed, the mid-level account of beauty that I will develop in the next chapter will be inherited from Kant and so will easily be compatible with antirealism about beauty. That being said, everything I say about beauty in this book is meant to be agnostic about the realism/antirealism debate. But, as this chapter will make clear, I must (and do) deny relativism about beauty. To be sure, some antirealists about beauty (see Bender 2001; Cova & Pain 2012) are also relativists about beauty and my arguments in this chapter will necessarily cut against their view. But I am rejecting their relativism about beauty, not necessarily their antirealism about beauty. Again, I do not speak to the realism/antirealism debate in this chapter and everything in this book is meant to be agnostic about that debate. The purpose of this chapter is merely to motivate the general philosophical reader to take judgments of beauty seriously enough such that arguments for my thesis in the coming chapters will not be total nonstarters.

      3 By thoroughly relative I mean that judgments of beauty are relativized to each individual believer. That is what is most often meant by this aphorism and the term “relativism.” This kind of relativism is what I’ll mean when I refer to “relativism” throughout this chapter. This kind of relativism is distinct from, say, a view on which judgments of beauty are relativized to the human species as a whole. That species-kind of relativism is not threatening to my thesis, so I do not engage it at all in this book. Everything I say about beauty in this book is meant to be agnostic about whether our judgments of beauty are relativized to our species or not. For thoroughly relativist theories of beauty, see Ayers (1936) and Santayana (1896).

      4 Note that while such relativism is common (in my experience) among contemporary philosophers outside of aesthetics and among lay people, it is the significant minority view in the history of theorizing about beauty. For non-relativist theories of beauty, see Aristotle Poetics, Burke (1765), Collingwood (1945), Danto (2003), Hogarth (1753), Hume (1757), Hutcheson (1725), Kant (1790), Mothersill (1984), Nehamas (2010), Plato Symposium, Plotinus Ennead, Schiller (1795), Shaftesbury (1711), Sircello (1975), and Zangwill (2001). For relativist theories of beauty, see Ayers (1936) and Santayana (1896).

      5 Obviously, there are some theories of color that hold that color is indeed in the object itself. My point is only that subjective color theory shows that subjective non-relativism is a live option. This is another way of emphasizing the point made in footnote 2: antirealist non-relativism is a live option, and so rejecting relativism does not commit one way or the other with respect to the realism/antirealism debate.

      6 Confusing these terms is another version of confusing the realism/antirealism dispute with the universalism/relativism dispute. Subjectivism is a type of antirealism, but is not thereby relativist.

      7 Remember, the main audience of this chapter is a general philosophical audience and interested lay readers, given the general nature of the book’s thesis. I have, in personal experience with philosophers, often encountered the kinds of arguments from disagreement that I will consider in this section. That said, philosophers in the realism/antirealism debate in aesthetics who also endorse relativism often ground their arguments for relativism in disagreement, particularly in intractable or so-called “faultless” disagreement. See Bender (2001) and Cova and Pain (2012). My arguments in this section will cut against these views. See Schafer (2011) for a realist (and thereby non-relativist) interpretation of faultless disagreement. Remember that I am only arguing against relativism, I am not thereby taking a view on realism/antirealism.

      8 I refer of course to the infamous case of “the dress,” in which a large swath of the American internet was gripped by a dispute over the color a pictured dress. Many people perceived it to be blue and black, while many others perceived it to be white and gold.