Expel the Pretender. Eve Wiederhold

and mentioned that thousands of pages from investigating attorneys had been made available for review, he suggested that the pages themselves should be regarded as an unprejudiced object of scrutiny. But many had doubts about the impartiality of that evidence and what it represented. The objectivity of the Special Prosecutor who collected “the facts” was also rendered suspicious, and that sense implicated feelings about whether a straightforward look at the evidence would instigate an unbiased review. Further, the question about how much time to give to debate posed a secondary question of whether we can know, for sure, whose look has been critically engaged rather than cursory—the mere show that aimed to validate a foregone conclusion. How to tell the difference between the look that would truly deliberate from that which only appeared to do so?

      The suspicions of Democratic congressional leaders about the legitimacy of the inquiry were articulated by U.S. Rep William Delahunt (D-MA), who, at the House debate about the impeachment inquiry, objected to the restrictions being placed upon the kind of deliberation that was to take place:

      I’m aware of the fact that there is a limited time for this debate. I think that is indeed unfortunate, because I was going on to talk about how we have abdicated our constitutional duties to an unelected prosecutor; how we have released thousands of pages that none of us in good conscience can say that we’ve read; how we’ve violated the sanctity of the grand jury so that we can arrive here today to launch an inquiry without an independent adequate review of the allegations by this body, which is our constitutional mandate. . . . That’s not a process, Mr. Speaker; it’s a blank check. That’s what I was going to talk about. But out of deference to others that want to speak, I will conclude by saying that one hour to begin only the third impeachment inquiry in U.S. history is a travesty, and a disgrace for this institution.

      This was followed by applause.

      Hyde’s reply:

      I just want the record to be clear. My good friend Mr. Delahunt talked about 60,000 pages that were released that weren’t reviewed or looked at. I want him to know and I want everyone listening to know every single page of anything that was released was reviewed and things that weren’t released were reviewed by our staff. . . . Six (Democrats) never came over to see the material. On the Republican side . . . every member came over to look at the material.16

      The actions undertaken in this House inquiry had all of the hallmarks of fairness and yet, from Delahunt’s perspective, what they produced was precisely the opposite—a rush to judgment. The implication here is significant because of what we may extrapolate from it: that the very procedures that seem to demarcate and generate a responsible and ethical democratic process can instead instigate an abuse of power. Indeed, rather than prove that due deliberation should be configured with reference to a mimetic theory of correspondences, the October meetings raised ethical questions about whether to connect Congressional deliberatory practices to the languages that would describe them. Doubts about such connections implicate how to apprehend the relationship between narrative, experience and discourses of authenticity. Do the languages that would represent acts of deliberation adequately and accurately portray a just (and repeatable) political process? If connections between discursivity and event remain tangled and elusive, then an action does not necessarily indicate a “doing” that correlates with a narrative depiction. Not all acts of looking will realize the ideal of fairness or constitute proper attentiveness. And if concrete practices cannot be fully or precisely described, there are narrative gaps within any judgment of whether a practice such as deliberation has made an appearance. How to fill in those gaps is precisely the ethical question.

      Hyde’s response effectively avoided any consideration of ethics and representational ambiguity and instead asserted an automatic linkage between looking and testimonials to practicing diligence. The review of the sixty thousand collected pages was presented as concrete evidence of an intangible quality that might be called “thoroughness.” In proclaiming that members of his party had taken a look at the evidence, Hyde delineated a specific technology that promised to transform what some had called a “partisan witch hunt” into a model of judicious review. In effect, he suggested that the act of looking itself inaugurates an ethical stance, and that the presence of an amorphous concept such as deliberation will be demonstrated via a testimonial about its importance. Hence the very phrase “due deliberation” would seem to designate in a straightforward way the ethical actions practiced under its name. Presumably, not only will the facts be discernible and recognizable to spectators, so will the methods deployed to engineer their unbiased review. The style used to designate fidelity to the representational processes depicting facts would seem to be of little significance.

      It is important to consider how this model is referenced regularly within political debates as if it does indeed offer a neutral means for adjudicating differences in perspective and as if audiences do follow a neutral order when judging about which positions have substance. The discursive conventions associated with rational argumentation seem to make it possible to cut through stylistic excess and retrieve what is essential about core issues and to deploy truth’s harsh light to excavate what exists, no matter how disturbing or ugly. And, presumably, when language is stripped of its excesses, we should be able to notice when substance is missing. But it is also possible to read those conventions as conventional, a portal to instrumental thinking that gives the appearance of bona fide engagement while instantiating the mechanistic repetition of practices devoid of scrutiny that might be called critical.

      Delahunt’s statement registers the difficulty of knowing whose use of language is, indeed, practicing due diligence. If it is possible to regard the very claims of fairness as an abuse of power, then we may question whether to automatically place a higher premium on the discursive practices that claim to aim towards truth’s revelation. In effect, discourses about the impeachment asked citizens to determine whether having faith in language’s ability to convey truth neutrally should underwrite the nation’s representational agenda.

      Idiosyncratic Action

      Once the President’s use of language was targeted for critique, it became paramount for the GOP to exhibit a mode of representation that did not dissemble and that instead fulfilled moral obligations to be true. One notable attempt to illustrate what “straight talk” looked like could be found in the Articles of Impeachment, the legal document that officially represented what was at issue and in so doing, promised to provide a clear demonstration of how argumentation is structured by correspondences between signs and referents. There were four articles, but I will cite only Article One:

      In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that: On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning: (1) the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action. In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States. Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States.17

      Ostensibly, the Articles of Impeachment offered a legal representation that straightforwardly delineated the charges and their reasoned justifications. But like much of the discourse involved in this event, the very language in these