Congo Diary. Ernesto Che Guevara

      Compañero Tano appeared seven days later. He had been wounded and abandoned by his compañeros. He then dragged himself toward the mountain, where he was found by Rwandan soldiers on patrol. His wound healed and he was able to rejoin the struggle.

      To complete the picture, here is another report [from Moja] from the same day:

       We can report that the Rwandan compañeros retreated in disorder from the front, leaving behind weapons, ammunition, dead and wounded. These were collected by our compañeros, as the compañero Commander Mundandi witnessed.

       Compañero Nne’s mission, which was the principal one, was to occupy the Albertville to [Front de] Force road to prevent the passage of enemy reinforcements, but according to the information we have at present, he didn’t reach the agreed place because the guide said he was lost. Compañero Nne then made a wrong decision to attack the military academy, where, according to the reports from our Rwandan compañeros who took part in the action, the only men still there when it began were our own compañeros and some Rwandan compañeros who died or, in two cases, were wounded. Right at the start of the action, Compañero Nne asked them to deploy the cannon, but the Rwandan compañeros who had been carrying it took off in the direction of the camp and left the shells and other pieces which were collected by some of our own compañeros.

       When we learned of Compañero Nne’s death, we sent Compañero Mbili with 20 reinforcements to see how things really stood there, and they discovered that Compañero Maffu’s ambush included Compañeros Kasambala, Sultán, Ajili and others belonging to Nne’s group. When Compañero Mbili saw the situation, he informed me of it and asked for some more men so that, if I thought it appropriate, he could head off with them to the road. By this time it was 18:00 on the 29th.

       When I discussed the problem with Commander Mundandi, he told me that the Rwandan compañeros were refusing to fight. We therefore had no more men to send for the ambush because the surviving Rwandan compañeros from Nne’s group had set out for the base, while the 20 Rwandans with Compañero Mbili also refused to fight, and the men under Maffu’s command were in the same situation. We therefore thought of sending word to Mbili that he should leave four or five of our compañeros to look for dead bodies, while the others should return on the night of 6/30/65. But at 04:00 on the 30th, only he and the other Cuban compañeros were left at Compañero Azi’s position, and their situation was raised with the compañero Commander Mundandi. The decision was then taken that they should withdraw to a nearby hill.

       The other problems that Compañero Mbili encountered during this operation he will explain to you in detail.

       The command post, where Commander Mundandi was also located, was some 800 meters from the front (beside the river). We had there: Moja, Mbili, Paulu, Saba and Anga.

       We did not leave more at the command post as we thought that the ambushes should be strengthened because of the distances involved.

       Bahasa and Ananane were too ill for combat and remained at the base camp.

       Moja

      Everything was against Compañero Nne. He had discussed his plan beforehand with Maffu, thinking that he would carry out the ambush and then turn to attack the enemy’s position; he had proposed this idea to the command but did not get approval; nevertheless, he went ahead with the idea. Once the battle was underway elsewhere, there was little possibility of reaching the designated place because the guide was so terrified that he would not take another step, and no one else knew the way. Nne decided to attack the position he had in front of him at the start of the fighting—that is, the military academy—but he was met with intense, well-coordinated fire from heavy weapons. According to eyewitnesses, Nne himself was soon wounded and handed over his machine gun position to Kawawa, but then Kawawa was killed by a mortar, and another two compañeros were slightly wounded and withdrew. A scout sent out shortly afterwards found Thelathini’s body; Ansurune was missing and presumed dead. They had started the engagement at a point within the enemy’s sights, at a distance of some 200 meters. In addition to the four Cuban compañeros, at least 14 Rwandans were killed—including the brother of Commander Mundandi. The exact number cannot be established as the Rwandan accounting was very poor.

      In this ill-fated action, I assign much of the blame to the Cuban command. Compañero Nne, underestimating the enemy, launched an undeniably daring operation to carry out what he considered his moral duty, although not his specific task; he launched a frontal attack and perished along with other compañeros, leaving open the way from Albertville along which enemy reinforcements were expected to come.

      As part of the contingency planning before the engagement, all the compañeros had been instructed to leave behind any documents or papers that might allow them to be identified. They did do this, although Nne’s group kept some documents in their packs and were meant to leave their belongings at a certain distance before joining the ambush. When the fighting started, however, they still had their packs with them, and the enemy found a diary which suggested that Cubans had participated in the attack. What they did not know was that four had been killed at that place,² as the newspapers always spoke only of two.

      A very large quantity of weapons and ammunition was hastily abandoned, but we could not know exactly how much because there had been no previous records. The wounded were left to their fate, as were the dead, of course.

      Meanwhile, what was happening in Katenga?

      One hundred and sixty men took part in the attack, with weapons greatly inferior to those of the Rwandans. The best they had were automatic rifles and short-range rocket launchers. The surprise factor was lost because, for reasons that Mundandi never explained, the attack had been ordered for a day later (the 30th), when enemy aircraft were flying over the whole region and those in defensive positions were naturally on the alert.

      Of the 160 men, 60 had deserted by the time of the engagement and many others never managed to fire a shot. At the agreed hour, the Congolese opened fire on the barracks, generally shooting in the air because most of them kept their eyes shut while pressing the triggers of their automatic weapons until the ammunition ran out. The enemy answered with accurate 60 mm. mortar fire that inflicted a number of casualties and provoked an immediate rout.

      The losses were four dead and 14 wounded, the latter during the disorderly retreat, in which men ran away in terror. At first they explained the defeat by saying that the medicine man was no good and had given them bad dawa. He tried to defend himself by blaming women and fear, but there were no women around and not a single man was honest enough to admit his weaknesses. The medicine man was in a tight spot and was replaced. It became the main task for Calixte, the group’s commander, to search the entire zone for a new muganga with the right qualities.

      The result of this dual attack was great demoralization among the Congolese and Rwandans, but also a loss of heart among the Cubans; our combatants had morosely witnessed assault troops melt away at the moment of combat and abandon precious weapons in order to flee more quickly; each had also observed the lack of comradeship as they left their wounded to fend for themselves, the terror that gripped the soldiers and the ease with which they dispersed without following orders of any kind. Often it was the officers—including the political commissars (a blot on the Liberation Army that I will discuss later), who were often the first to run away. The heavy weapons, which had mostly been handled by Cubans, were nearly all saved; the FM and DP machine guns, handled by Rwandans, were lost in significant numbers, as were rifles and all kinds of ammunition.

      In the days after the attack, a large number of soldiers either deserted or requested a discharge. Mundandi wrote me a long letter, as always full of tales of heroism. He lamented the loss of his brother, but stated that he had died after wiping out a truck full of soldiers (a complete fabrication because there were no trucks there). He regretted the loss of several of the more resolute cadres in his group, and protested at the fact that the General Staff was in Kigoma while the men were fighting and laying down their lives in the Congo. He mentioned in passing that two-thirds of the enemy troops had been killed, but he could not have had any reliable source for this and it was, of course, false. True to his inclination to fantasy, he could not refrain from making such assertions, while at the