Middle Eastern Terrorism. Mark Ensalaco

a conspiracy to kill other Arab heads of state.⁸ In the end, the Arab League reaffirmed the PLO's unique status and proclaimed the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland. Even King Hussein, who had risen to the floor to deliver an impassioned but ultimately futile defense of Jordan's territorial rights over the West Bank, voted in favor of the resolution. Henry Kissinger was crestfallen: “the collapse of the Jordanian option,” he lamented, “was a major lost opportunity.” Because the PLO rejected Israel's right to existence, and because the PLO remained committed to terror, the Rabat decision “guaranteed nineteen years of impasse on West Bank negotiations.”⁹

      Arafat at the United Nations

      Arafat was riding a rising tide of diplomatic success. He had convinced the PNC to endorse his desideratum of a Palestinian authority in the West Bank in June, and he had won the Arab League's reaffirmation of the PLO's right to speak for all Palestinians in October. In November, he triumphed again, this time in New York. On 13 November, Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly. In a lengthy speech that aired Palestinian grievances, Arafat promised the Jews living in Palestine the opportunity to live in Palestine in “peace and without discrimination,” but without a state of their own. Speaking as chairman of the PLO and “leader of the Palestinian revolution” Arafat offered Jews “the most generous solution, that we might live together in a framework of just peace in our democratic Palestine.” Although the maneuvering in Cairo demonstrated his still secret inclination to achieve a Palestinian state through negotiations, Arafat could not explicitly recognize Israel's right to exist within secure borders per Resolution 242. The most generous solution he could offer was not the most reasonable solution that could be envisioned: separate Jewish and Palestinian states. The most Arafat could offer Jews was the opportunity to live in a democratic Palestine under PLO rule. Because Arafat's speech had to resonate with the PLO rank and file, the leader of the Palestinian Revolution could not abandon the rhetoric of violence, so he concluded with a threat: “Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.” It was not an empty threat. Arafat would not explicitly renounce violence for another thirteen years when the political terrain shifted still again, and even then violence forever remained an option for him. Still, Arafat understood the path to the creation of a Palestinian state wound through the labyrinth of American-brokered negotiations. The address before the General Assembly was a triumph. After the speech the General Assembly bestowed observer status on the PLO, placing it on the same plane as the Vatican.

      Arafat's triumph was an affront to Israel. The General Assembly had rewarded terror by recognizing an organization whose members practiced it. After the General Assembly granted the PLO observer status, a PLO spokesman conceded “now that we are observers at the United Nations, we will think more deeply and thoroughly regarding armed operations.”¹⁰ Arafat had tried to distance himself from the terror of Black September, and in recent months had missed no opportunity to disavow the terror operations of PLO organizations hostile to him. But his personal connections with Black September's commanders were undeniable. Abu Iyad, a founding member of Fatah, was the force behind Black September and the person most responsible for the murder of the Israeli Olympians in Munich. Iyad feuded with Arafat, but he still served him. Ali Hassan Salameh, who once commanded Black September's European operations, was even closer to Arafat. Arafat's trust in him was an endorsement of Black September.