The Practicing Stoic. Ward Farnsworth

Discourses 3.8.5

      “I have a headache.” Do not add “Alas!” “I have an earache.” Do not add “Alas!” I’m not saying that you cannot groan, but don’t groan inside.

      Epictetus, Discourses 1.19.19

      Say nothing more to yourself than what first appearances report. Suppose it is reported that a certain person is saying terrible things about you. This much is reported; but it is not reported that you have been hurt. I see that my child is sick. I see that much; but that he is in danger, I do not see. So always stay with first appearances, and add nothing from within yourself – nothing happens to you. Or rather add something, but do it like someone who knows of all that happens in the world.

      Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 8.49

      Guillaume du Vair noted a particular snare when interpreting events: creating false metaphors to describe them, and making other kinds of alarming and misleading comparisons.

      Our opinions torment us more than things themselves, and are formed by the words we use when something surprising occurs; for we call one thing by the name of another, and imagine it to be like that other thing, and the image and idea stay there in our minds.

      du Vair, The Moral Philosophy of the Stoics (1585)

      Another Stoic technique involves subtraction. It is used for externals that are already known to us, and that we have trouble seeing clearly because they are covered already with conventional meanings. One has to chip away at the romance or horror or other story that has been overlaid onto the thing, and to distinguish between what it is and what it is called. This is really a variation of the process shown a moment ago: seeing things as they are, not as we have been told they are, or as everyone pretends they are, or as we tell ourselves they are. But rather than adding nothing, one takes off what is already there.

      A favorite Stoic method for the purpose involves viewing a subject in the most literal way possible, or breaking it down into parts that dissolve the formidable appearance it might have, whether of desirability or the reverse.

      With everything that is beguiling, or useful, or that you love, remember to say also what sort it is – starting with the smallest things. If you love a piece of pottery, say “it is a pot that I love” – and when it is shattered you will not be upset.

      Epictetus, Enchiridion 3

      The thought might occur to us, when eating fancy foods, that “this one is the corpse of a fish, this one the corpse of a bird or a pig”; or again, that “this fancy wine is the dribble of a bunch of grapes, and this purple robe is sheep hair dyed with shellfish blood”; or, about copulation, that “this is the rubbing of a little piece of entrail and, along with some convulsion, an excretion of mucus.” Impressions like these are the ones that penetrate to the heart of things themselves and let us see what they really are. We should do the same in all areas of life, and, whenever things appear too highly valued, we should lay them bare in our minds, perceive their cheapness, and strip off the prestige they have traditionally been assigned.

      Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 6.13

      You will disdain lovely singing and dancing, and martial arts, if you will cut up the musical phrase into separate notes, then ask yourself, about each one, if you are unable to resist it. You won’t know how to answer. Do the same with dancing, for each movement or position; the same even with martial arts. To sum up: apart from virtue and the things that stem from it, remember to go over things piece by piece, and by separating them come to look down on them; and carry this over to your whole life.

      Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 11.2

      By “martial arts” he was referring to pankration, which was roughly what we would now call ultimate fighting or mixed martial arts. It was an Olympic event.

      5. Judging others. The events and worldly goods just considered are the simplest and commonest examples of externals. But other people also amount to externals for Stoic purposes; we have as much trouble seeing them clearly as we do anything else. Again, Stoics try to strip away their disguises.

      Just as the eyesight can be sharpened and cleared up by certain drugs, if we are willing to free our spiritual vision from impediments, we will be able to perceive virtue even when it is hidden within the body, even with poverty as an obstacle, even where insignificance and disgrace stand in the way. We shall see that beauty, I say, however much it may be covered in filth. Conversely, we will be able to perceive evil, and the sluggishness of a wretched mind, however much the view may be blocked by gleaming riches, or however strongly a false light – here of rank and position, there of great power – beats down on the beholder.

      Seneca, Epistles 115.6

      None of those who have been raised to a lofty height by riches and honors is really great. Why then does he seem great? Because you are measuring the pedestal along with the man. A dwarf is not tall, though he stands on a mountain; a Colossus will maintain its size even when standing in a well. This is the error under which we labor, and how we are deceived; we value no man by what he is, but add the trappings in which he is adorned.

      Seneca, Epistles 76.31–32

      The pedestal is no part of the statue. Measure him without his stilts; let him lay aside his wealth and his titles; let him present himself in his undershirt. Is his body healthy, active, and able to perform its functions? What sort of soul does he have? Is it beautiful and capable, and fortunate enough to have all of its parts intact? Is the soul rich in what is its own or rich in what it has borrowed? Has luck had nothing to do with it? Can it face the drawing of swords without flinching? Is it indifferent between a death by the expiration of breath or the slitting of the throat? Is it calm, unflustered, and content? This is what we must see; that is how the great differences between us should be judged.

      Montaigne, Of the Inequality Amongst Us (1580)

      And the same analysis might be turned on oneself.

      Do you see that king of Scythia or Sarmatia, his head elegant with the badge of his office? If you wish to see what he amounts to, and to know his full worth, take off his headband; much evil lurks beneath it. But why do I speak of others? If you want to take your own measure, put aside your money, your estates, your honors, and look inside yourself. At present you are taking the word of others for what you are.

      Seneca, Epistles 80.10

      Scythia and Sarmatia were territories lying in the steppes north and east of the Black Sea. They were often at war with the Roman Empire, and their peoples were regarded by the Romans and Greeks as barbarians.

      We saw in the previous section that Stoics sometimes look at worldly objects in a literal way; it is a technique for seeing things as they are and without romance or fear. The same general idea can be applied to people.

      What are they like when they’re eating, sleeping, copulating, defecating, and so on? What are they like when they’re being imperious and arrogant, or angrily scolding others from some position of superiority? A little while ago they were slaves, and doing all those things just named; and soon they will be again.

      Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 10.19

      6. Knowing the difference. The first question that Stoics typically ask about any apparent problem or prospect is whether it is up to them. If not, they don’t agonize about it, because it wouldn’t help if they did. Stoics therefore are very attentive to the difference between things within and beyond their control.

      Right from the start, then, practice saying to every harsh appearance, “You are just an appearance, and not at all what you appear.” Then examine it, and test it by those rules you have – and by this first one especially, whether it has to do with things that are up to us or things that are not up to us. And if it has to do with something not up to us, let the thought be close at hand that “It is nothing to me.”

      Epictetus, Enchiridion 1.5

      Of course there are mixed cases: situations where we have control over some aspects of a problem but not others, or the power to