Arguing Science. Michael Shermer

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Название Arguing Science
Автор произведения Michael Shermer
Жанр Философия
Серия
Издательство Философия
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isbn 9781939681584



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towards which the system develops. When a system has reached its final form—for example, in an insulin molecule or a Paramecium cell—its morphic field helps to stabilize its form and restore it after disturbances.

      It’s hard to say exactly what a morphic field is. There are mathematical theories, such as those of René Thom, but these are models in multi-dimensional phase space, which is a specialized mathematical concept utterly obscure to everyone except professional mathematicians.

      So, does this tell us what the fields are? Not really. But what is the exact nature of an electromagnetic field? Electrical and magnetic fields were first proposed by Michael Faraday in the 1830s, and he was unsure as to their nature. He put forward two possibilities. First, that they consist of strains and patterns in subtle matter, called the “ether.” Or, second, they were modifications of “mere space.”

      James Clerk Maxwell took up the ether hypothesis in the 1860s in his famous equations of electromagnetism, but Einstein dropped the idea of the ether and reverted to something closer to Faraday’s idea of fields as modifications of mere space. Gravitational fields are also patterns in space. The gravitational field is not in space-time, according to Einstein, it is space-time.

      Modern superstring theory tries to account for the physical fields of nature in terms of a 10-or 11-dimensional proto-field, in which the extra dimensions “curl up” to give the fields of nature as we know them.

      So, what, exactly, is any field?

      James Barham: You accept that psi phenomena (telepathy, ESP, paranormal activity, etc.) are real. What convinces you of their reality? And why do skeptics like James Randi, who make it their livelihood debunking psi phenomena, remain so unconvinced?

      According to Dean Radin, psi phenomena have extremely strong statistical backing (with significance levels better than one in a billion), and yet they are weak in the sense that they don’t permit anyone to beat the lottery or win consistently in Las Vegas. Do you agree?

      Rupert Sheldrake: I think that phenomena like telepathy are real because they happen spontaneously in the course of normal life, and also they are supported by a great deal of experimental evidence. I have had many dealings with self-proclaimed skeptics and it has become obvious to me that their opposition to these phenomena is not based on a careful study of the evidence, but rather on materialist ideology, which says that minds are nothing but brains, and so if all mental activity is located inside the head, it cannot possibly have effects at a distance. Therefore, psychic phenomena like telepathy are impossible. And therefore all the evidence for them must be flawed or fraudulent, and people who believe in these things are subject to delusions.

      In my various encounters with skeptics like Richard Dawkins, James Randi, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Shermer, I have found that they have no interest in looking at the evidence because they know in advance it must be false. In other words, their position is one of prejudice rather than open-minded scientific enquiry. In that sense, I think they are deeply anti-scientific.

      Some of the phenomena studied under rather artificial conditions by parapsychologists show only fairly weak effects, but in the real world telepathy may operate much more reliably. For example, I have done studies on telepathy between mothers and their babies, and the mothers often know quite accurately when their baby needs them even when they are miles away. Similarly, many dogs and cats seem to know when their owners are coming home and wait for them at a door or window in a reliable and repeatable way.

      I agree that psychic abilities may be much weaker when it comes to winning lotteries or beating the casino in Las Vegas, but these are not the kinds of situations in which psi is expressed in the real world. In my own research, I have concentrated on common, everyday psi phenomena that most people have personally experienced, like the sense of being stared at, pets knowing when their owners are coming home, telepathic bonds between mothers and children, and telephone telepathy (thinking of someone for no apparent reason who then calls).

      James Barham: In Chapter 11 of Science Set Free, regarding the objectivity of science, you mention the very many ways in which scientists—who are, after all, only fallible human beings—may fall short of the ideal of objectivity. No one can quarrel with this. But then you make a pretty strong claim: “The supposed objectivity of the ‘hard sciences’ is an untested hypothesis.”

      We would like to say in reply that science is a normative enterprise, meaning that it can be done well or badly. The norms or ideals that govern—or ought to govern—scientific practice were summarized by Robert K. Merton long ago: disinterestedness; organized skepticism; transparency; and universality; among others. To which, of course, must be added the ordinary, everyday virtues of diligence, honesty, fairness, and so forth.

      The question, then, is this: Are the authoritarianism and closed-mindedness that are increasingly plaguing science today the result of the inherent subjectivity of all human knowledge? Or are they not rather the result of the progressive breakdown of the traditional Mertonian norms due to new temptations (power, greed, ideology, fashion, etc.) that have arisen due to Big Science, and which are posing an unprecedented challenge to the ordinary fallen human nature of scientists?

      In other words, is science really irremediably subjective? Or is it being corrupted, which implies it has fallen away from the ideal of objectivity?

      Rupert Sheldrake: I am all in favor of the scientific ideals enunciated by Robert Merton and by others. But in science, as in any other human endeavor, there is an enormous gap between the ideals and reality. For example, Christians would presumably all subscribe to a belief in the importance of loving kindness and forgiveness, and yet many Christians have taken part in wars that involve mass slaughter and great cruelty. Everyone can see that there is a gulf between ideals and reality in ordinary life, without rejecting the ideals. But in the sciences, there has been a remarkable degree of self-deception through scientists believing their own rhetoric about objectivity. I’m not suggesting that most scientists are behaving fraudulently or deceitfully. But it has become increasingly apparent in the past few years that much of established science is a house of cards. For instance, recently a high proportion—more than 80 percent—of the key papers in biomedical science have turned out not to be replicable.

      The same has become apparent in the realms of psychology and other sciences, too. The main reason for this unreliability seems to be that scientists publish only a small proportion of their data, usually the proportion that shows the most impressive results, namely, results that agree with their hypothesis. As much as 80 percent of the data may not be published because it does not fit in with the experimenters’ expectations, or it does not make sense. This inevitably imparts a major bias to papers published in scientific journals.

      For years, defenders of scientific orthodoxy have argued that the objectivity of science is guaranteed by replication and the peer-review process. But it has become glaringly obvious within the scientific world that this is not the case. First of all, scientists get very little credit for replicating other people’s results. Such research is regarded as unoriginal and is generally discouraged. And even if scientists do carry out replications of other people’s research, scientific journals will often refuse to publish them on the grounds they are not original. Journals also have a strong bias against publishing negative results.

      Meanwhile, peer review is not necessarily a guarantee of quality. Moreover, it can militate against originality because peer reviewers, who operate anonymously, tend to defend the status quo. And many of them simply don’t have time to read very thoroughly the papers they are asked to review. Recently, in an experiment on peer reviewing, dozens of nonsense papers, generated by computers, were submitted to peer-reviewed journals and more than half of them were accepted!

      A new mood of humility is apparent within the sciences, and the complacency that for decades has enabled scientists to imagine that just because they were scientists they were objective is melting away. Discussion of questionable research practices is going on throughout the scientific world at present, and hopefully will lead to better research procedures.

      James Barham: You end your new book with the wonderful line: “Much remains to be discovered and rediscovered, including wisdom.” In your view, what is wisdom?

      Rupert