Magic and Religion. Andrew Lang

120. 'Ctesias flourished rather earlier than Berosus, who is about 200 B.C.;' for 200 read 260. Ctesias was a contemporary of Herodotus.

      CONTENTS

       I. SCIENCE AND SUPERSTITION II. THE THEORY OF LOAN-GODS; OR BORROWED RELIGION III. MAGIC AND RELIGION IV. THE ORIGIN OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH V. THE APPROACHES TO MR. FRAZER'S THEORY I. THE EVOLUTION OF GODS II. THE ALLEGED MORTALITY OF GODS III. RELIGIOUS REGICIDE IV. ANNUAL RELIGIOUS REGICIDE V. THE SATURNALIA VI. THE GREEK CRONIA VII. THE SACÆA VI. ATTEMPTS TO PROVE THE SACÆAN CRIMINAL DIVINE I. SACRIFICE BY HANGING. DOES IT EXIST? II. STAGES IN MR. FRAZER'S THEORY III. A POSSIBLE RECONCILIATION IV. THE SACÆA SUDDENLY CHANGES ITS DATE V. VARIOUS THEORIES OF THE VICTIM VII. ZAKMUK, SACÆA, AND PURIM I. HISTORICAL DIFFICULTY II. PERSIANS ARE NOT BABYLONIANS III. ORIGIN OF PURIM IV. IS PURIM PRE-EXILIAN OR POST-EXILIAN V. THEORY OF A HUMAN VICTIM AT PURIM VI. CONTRADICTORY CONJECTURE VII. A NEW THEORY OF THE VICTIM VIII. NEW GERMAN THEORY OF PURIM IX. ANOTHER NEW THEORY. HUMAN AND THE VICTIM VIII. MORDECAI, ESTHER, VASHTI, AND HAMAN I. ESTHER LOVED BY MORDECAI II. THE PERSIAN BUFFOON III. A HELPFUL THEORY OF MY OWN IX. WHY WAS THE MOCK-KING OF THE SACÆA WHIPPED AND HANGED? I. PERIODS OF LICENCE II. THE DIVINE SCAPEGOAT III. MORE PERIODS OF LICENCE IV. THE SACÆA AS A PERIOD OF LICENCE X. CALVARY XI. THE GHASTLY PRIEST XII. SOUTH AFRICAN RELIGION XIII. CUP AND RING: AN OLD PROBLEM SOLVED XIV. FIRST-FRUITS AND TABOOS XV. WALKING THROUGH FIRE APPENDICES A. MR. TYLOR'S THEORY OF BORROWING B. THE MARTYRDOM OF DASIUS C. THE RIDE OF THE BEARDLESS ONE INDEX

I

SCIENCE AND SUPERSTITION

       Table of Contents

      We all know what we mean by science; science is 'organised common sense.' Her aim is the acquisition of reasoned and orderly knowledge. Presented with a collection of verified facts, it is the part of science to reduce them to order, and to account for their existence in accordance with her recognised theory of things. If the facts cannot be fitted into the theory, it must be expanded or altered; for we must admit that, if the facts are verified, there is need for change and expansion in the theory. The 'colligation' of facts demands hypotheses, and these may not, at the moment of their construction, be verifiable. The deflections of a planet from its apparently normal course may be accounted for by the hypothesis of the attraction of another heavenly body not yet discovered. The hypothesis is legitimate, for such bodies are known to exist, and to produce such effects. When the body is discovered, the hypothesis becomes a certainty. On the other hand, the hypothesis that some capricious and conscious agency pushed the planet into deflections would be illegitimate, for the existence of such a freakish agency is not demonstrated. Our hypotheses then must be consistent with our actual knowledge of nature and of human nature, and our conjectured causes must be adequate to the production of the effects. Thus, science gradually acquires and organises new regions of knowledge.

      Superstition is a word of much less definite meaning. When we call a man 'superstitious,' we usually mean that evidence which satisfies him does not satisfy us. We see examples daily of the dependence of belief on bias. One man believes a story about cruelties committed by our adversaries; another, disbelieving the tale, credits a narrative about the misconduct of our own party. Probably the evidence in neither case would satisfy the historian, or be accepted by a jury. A man in a tavern tells another how the Boers, retreating from a position, buried their own wounded. 'I don't believe that,' says the other. 'Then you are a pro-Boer.'

      The sceptic reasoned from his general knowledge of human nature. The believer reasoned from his own prejudiced and mythopoeic conception of people whom he disliked. If the question had been one of religion the believer might be called superstitious; the sceptic might be called scientific, if he was ready to yield his doubts to the evidence of capable observers of the alleged fact.

      Superstition, like science, has her hypotheses, and, like science, she reasons from experience. But her experience is usually fantastic, unreal, or if real capable of explanation by causes other than those alleged by superstition. A man comes in at night, and says he has seen a ghost in white. That is merely his hypothesis; the existence of ghosts in white is not demonstrated. You accompany him to the scene of the experience, and prove to him that he has seen a post, not a ghost. His experience was real, but was misinterpreted by dint of an hypothesis resting on no demonstrated fact of knowledge.

      

      The hypotheses of superstition are familiar. Thus, an event has happened: say you have lost your button-hook. You presently hear of a death in your family. Ever afterwards you go anxiously about when you have lost a button-hook. You are confusing a casual sequence of facts with a causal connection of facts. Sequence in time is mistaken for sequence of what we commonly style cause and effect. In the same way, superstition cherishes the hypothesis that like affects like. Thus, the sun is round, and a ball of clay is round. Therefore, if an Australian native wishes to delay