The History of the Russo-Japanese War. Sydney Tyler

Rossia 12,200 18,000 20.0 2 1,348 Rurik 10,940 3,500 18.0 3 1,345

      Though nominally the fleets of the two Powers were fairly equal, Japan possessed several very considerable advantages which, in the opinion of experts, changed that paper equality to marked superiority on her side. In the first place, the Chino-Japanese war only ten years ago had given her naval officers and men an invaluable experience of fighting on the grand scale under modern conditions; in the next place, their fleet was much more of a pattern; and in the third place it was operating from a base fully capable of providing all the needs and reinforcements entailed by losses in war, including a ready coal supply.

      Russia, on the other hand, had for its only bases Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the one inadequate to the multifarious needs of her fleet, and the other ice-bound in winter, and so situated geographically as to be completely isolated from what promised to be the main scene of operations. Although Port Arthur had been rendered almost impregnable as a fortress, the Russians had not had time to complete it as a naval dockyard, and at the outbreak of war it possessed only one dry dock, and that not capable of accommodating vessels of the largest size. At Vladivostock the channel out of the harbor could only be kept free by ice-breakers. In the event of naval disasters, Russia, therefore, had no possibility of repairing her lame ducks, while the radius of her fleet's activity was limited by the fact that her only supplies of coal were to be obtained at Port Arthur. In the situation, therefore, which presented itself at the outbreak of war, this powerful naval force was practically deprived of mobility. It could not leave Port Arthur for more than a short cruise; and while it remained there it must be specially vulnerable to attack, lying in an open roadstead and huddled together in order to enjoy the protection of the guns of the fortress.

      With regard to the land forces of the two belligerent Powers, it was only possible to reckon with certainty those of Japan; for it remained doubtful, until the progress of active operations revealed the facts, how much of Russia's enormous military strength had been concentrated in the Far East. Broadly speaking, Japan could put into the field in the last resort an army of between 400,000 and 450,000 men. The standing army amounts to almost 200,000 men, and it was immediately available for mobilization. To this number another 35,000 men was added by the reserve, while the militia of all arms could be reckoned at 200,000 men. The Japanese infantry soldier is armed with the Midji magazine rifle, and the artillery with the Arisaka quick-firing gun; but the adoption of this latter weapon has been so recent that the whole of the artillery is not yet supplied with it, and in this one respect at least the Russian gunners are believed to possess a very great advantage. The Japanese army has been organized largely on German models. It proved its efficiency as a fighting machine in the Chino-Japanese War; while the Japanese troops that took part in the relief of the Peking Legations earned the unstinted praise of all the military experts who watched their behavior. Until the present war, however, the Japanese army had never undergone the supreme ordeal of facing a European adversary.

      Of the Russian military organization, the strength and weakness have long been known to the world, and the great question for strategists in contemplating the present hostilities was the number of troops which the Northern Power could bring into the field to confront her foe. Various estimates had been given, from the overwhelming army of 400,000 men confidently claimed by Russia's partisans, to a force of little more than a quarter of that strength. But though the actual figures were in doubt, it was possible by collating the information from various sources to arrive at an approximate estimate of the truth. At the time of the Boxer outbreak in 1900 Russia had 35,000 men in the Far East, and that force was, within little more than a year, trebled. Since the possibility of trouble with Japan had loomed on the horizon, reinforcements had been steadily dribbling over the Trans-Siberian Railway and over seas in the volunteer transports, until the army under the command of the Viceroy of the Far East could not number much less than 150,000 men of all arms, with 286 guns. Of this force, at least a half must have been absorbed in the defence of the long line of railway communications and in garrisoning fortresses; but the troops available for active operations consisted largely of Russia's most formidable fighting material—namely, the Cossacks, who possess an endurance and mobility which must be of the utmost value in such a country as that in which the present war was to be fought out.

ADMIRAL TOGO.		ADMIRAL KAMIMURA.
	ADMIRAL MAKAROFF.
ADMIRAL SKRYDLOFF.		ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKY.

      JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN ADMIRALS.

      In the latter part of January the well-informed correspondent of the London Times at Peking telegraphed an estimate of the Russian forces east of Lake Baikal, which, in its circumstantiality and exhaustiveness, bore the evidence of truth. According to this authority, Russia had available at that time a total of 3,115 officers, 147,479 men, and 266 guns; and these numbers included the railway guards over the whole of the Manchurian railways and the garrisons of the principal fortresses. The infantry of this force numbered 108,000 officers and men, and the cavalry 22,000 officers and men, of whom nearly the whole were Cossacks. The garrisons of Port Arthur and Vladivostock alone absorbed 45,000 men, and remembering that the railway line to be guarded, east of Lake Baikal, was over 1,500 miles in length, and traverses a country of which the inhabitants were more or less hostile, it is evident that the troops available to take the field at the end of January could not have exceeded, on this estimate, more than 50,000 men. Lake Baikal is 400 miles in length, and though a railway round its southern extremity was in course of construction, it was far from completion at the outbreak of hostilities. The lake is frozen over during the winter months, when transit has to be effected by sledges. But in the emergency the Russians laid railway lines across the lake, and thus by the end of February had established a through service of sorts. But even then the number of reinforcements and the quantity of supplies that could be moved up to the theatre of war were strictly limited by the delays inseparable from the working of a single track railway, and it is doubtful whether more than 25,000 men at the outside had been added to the field force by the beginning of March.

      The strategical problem which presented itself at the outbreak of hostilities was a comparatively simple one—for Japan at any rate. The power of Russia in the Far East depended on the maintenance of two great arteries of communication with the heart of the Russian Empire. One of these was the over-sea passage from the Black Sea or the Baltic through the Suez Canal and the East Indian Archipelago—a voyage occupying six weeks at least, and however feasible in time of peace, rendered particularly difficult and even precarious under war conditions owing to the possibility of interception and the absence of any intermediate coaling stations. The other connecting link between Port Arthur and St. Petersburg was the Trans-Siberian Railway, that gigantic enterprise which, completed in 1899, brought the capital of Russia within 15 days' journey of its furthermost outpost in the Yellow Sea. From Moscow to Port Arthur is a distance of some 4,000 miles, but at two-thirds of its length the railway is interrupted by the great inland sea known as Lake Baikal. At this point transshipment across the lake had to take place, a circumstance that offered an insurmountable hindrance to rapid transit. In the building of the railway, too, soundness had been sacrificed to rapidity of construction; the line was only a single track one, with stations and sidings at intervals of about 25 miles; and even when the whole service was monopolized for military purposes the number of trains that could be passed over the railway in one day was a fixed and very limited quantity. Even with this line open, therefore, the rate at which Russia could reinforce her troops in the Far East had to be determined by other circumstances than military urgency, and the number of her reinforcements also had to be governed by the capacity