The Trial of Reuben Crandall, M.D.. Unknown

Britain. If so, that case is stronger than that of having a printed copy in possession of a libel published only in a foreign country; and so far, if such be the fact, it is sustained by the dictum in Hawkins, but this dictum is not itself sustained, as far as I could judge from the authorities cited at the bar, from Hawkins himself, nor by any adjudged case. I think I may boldly assert, then, that the merely having in possession a libel printed and published in a foreign country only, is not an indictable offence here, and publication of the same libel here.

      Let us then examine how far these alleged libels, which, although not subjects of criminal prosecution here, can be made use of to sustain the publication, or prove, or aid in proving, the criminal intent or malice in the publication of another libel charged in the first count, and of the publication of which some evidence has been offered to the jury. Now the libels in the first count, of which evidence of publication has been given to the jury, is of itself libellous, or it is not; if it be libellous and published, the law deduces the criminal intent from the libellous matter itself, and therefore requires no aid from other libellous writings to sustain it: if it be not libellous, it cannot be made so by showing other libellous writings of the traverser, of which he is not accused or charged in the indictment. I mean the libellous matter itself in the libel is, in the eye of the law, proof of criminal intent, if it be published, unless the traverser can rebut this inference of law by proving his innocence of any criminal intent, by some sufficient excuse, as that some person stole the copy from him and published it without his knowledge or consent. But the Attorney for the United States urged that these pamphlets, indicating the one charged in the first count, contained or expressed opinions which coincided with his sentiments on the subject matter of them; and this was urged as a reason for admitting them in evidence. This, in my view, amounts to nothing more than that he appropriated to himself and adopted the thoughts of others. What proof could this appropriation or adoption afford of a malicious intent in their publication? Every man has an unquestionable right to his own moral or religious sentiments: there is no crime in this: it would be criminal to restrain any man in this country in his own, or in adopting the moral or religious opinions of others, if he please; it is criminal only when he attempts to propagate them, and only when they have a tendency to disturb the peace of society—to invade the general rights of property—and are most essentially criminal, if they have a tendency to produce the dreadful results charged in the indictment. But bad as the tendency of those writings may be, and unquestionably are, if truly portrayed in the indictment, I know not how much less danger would result, if, led away by our feelings, we bend the rules and principles of law from expediency, or the supposed political necessity of convicting the accused. The present crisis may pass without leaving any dangerous consequences behind it. The good sense and virtue of the people, and the fear of punishment in transgressors, will check the progress of these alarming doctrines; but if we invade the panoply which the law has provided for the protection of the accused against arbitrary or vindictive judgments, we establish precedents, the evil consequences of which cannot be calculated. The criminal intent, then, does not consist in the writing or possession of a written or printed libel, but in the publishing it. It is not easy to conceive how the criminal intent of publishing one libel, can be proved by the having in possession other libels not published, any more than you would be permitted to prove a man guilty of stealing one horse, because you might prove that he had a propensity to horse-stealing. But you would not be allowed to introduce such proof. The quo animo with which a horse is taken, is as necessary in an indictment for horse stealing, as for publishing a libel. Now, as I observed before, if the matter of the pamphlet charged in the first count in the indictment is libellous, does not the acknowledgment of the traverser that the sentiment in the several pamphlets coincided with his own, embrace in it the sentiments in the pamphlets charged in the first count, and of which evidence has been offered of publication? If so, does not this libel of itself afford sufficient evidence of malice, without resorting to the matter of other pamphlets not charged? Then why resort to them? The traverser was not apprised from this first count, that he was responsible for any libel or libellous matter, except what was contained in the libel set out in said count. If you are permitted in order to prove malice in publishing the libel in the first count, to read to the jury the libellous matter of other alleged libels, what will be the consequence? The matter in those other libels may be of a more aggravated or inflammatory character than in that set out in the first count. Is it not evident, if such be the case, that the jury may be influenced to convict the traverser, not by the matter of the libel with which he is charged, but from that of other libels with which he is not charged? Surely, if malice in the publication of a libel be an inference of law, that inference must be drawn only from the libel charged and published, not from other writings which are not libellous because not published. As I observed before, if the paper charged in the first count be of itself libellous, the criminal intent of publication is to be inferred from the confession of the traverser that he approved of the sentiments contained in it. If such inference can be drawn from such confession it can as well be sustained from the matter of this libel, as from that of any number of others, and there is no need to resort to them for such inference; if the matter of such papers be not libellous, no number of other libels found in the traverser's possession, however coinciding with his own opinions, can sustain the libel charged.

      Again: if the matter of those pamphlets, which the Attorney for the United States has moved the court to be permitted to lay before the jury, be libellous, may not the traverser be hereafter arraigned upon them if proof shall be had of their publication? This is possible; almost probable, if his zeal in the cause be so great as has been attempted to be proved. Then might he not be convicted by their instrumentality in the present prosecution, and again in a subsequent prosecution for publishing those very libels? I thought the court had decided this point in a former opinion in this case, where they said they could not be evidence if they were of themselves indictable writings.

      Again: if the proof of malice in the publication of the charged libel be not complete, can it be made so by the production of other pamphlets or libels not published? Is it an inference of law, that having such libels in the traverser's possession furnishes any proof of malice in the publication of the charged libel? I question the legal logic of such an argument. It was almost as easy to publish by distributing fifty pamphlets as one. Now if but one of fifty was given out, is it not as probable that he did not desire to publish them, as that he did? Now an inference from facts, or acts, is matter of law, and I should hesitate to tell the jury that the traverser having in his possession fifty other libels, or any lesser or greater number, which he might have published with the same ease as he published one, is proof of malice in publishing that one. An inference to be drawn from proved facts or circumstances is something like a corollary drawn from a previously demonstrated theorem in mathematics.

      I wish it was as certain and clear. An inference deduced from a proved theorem in geometry is unquestionable. Every body will agree to it. An inference drawn by law from previously proved facts or circumstances, is doubtful at best. Two discreet judges may and often do disagree in regard to it. Do we not hear every day, in this court, of the most wise and able judges—of the venerated Hale himself—admonishing courts and juries not to lend a willing ear to them; at least against circumstantial evidence, which is the same thing. How many almost irresistable cases of inferences drawn from pregnant facts have been shown, in which time proved the fallacy of such inferences, and that many an innocent man has been consigned to an ignominious death by circumstantial or (which is the same thing) inferential evidence, and still so strong were the facts and circumstances in the very cases cited by them, (where time proved the innocence of the accused who had suffered the penalty of the law), that under the same circumstances I should permit the same evidence to go to the jury—but in the case before the court those admonitions are well worth considering. We are asked to admit certain pamphlets said to be of similar libellous tendency, and proved by the confession of the traverser to coincide with his opinions, as the one charged in the indictment, and of the publication of which evidence has been offered to the jury, although such pamphlets were never out of the possession of the traverser nor shown to any one, to prove malice in the traverser in the publication of another pamphlet charged to have been published by him in the first count in the indictment. I do not distinctly see the legal inference of malice in having in his possession those unpublished pamphlets. He could have published them, if this malice was in his heart. Why did he not? Is it not in evidence that when he permitted one of those pamphlets to