Hitler’s Terror Weapons: The Price of Vengeance. Richard Overy

both numbers and training, which had proved itself an essential element in battlefield victory. German Europe would be secured from invasion from the west while the German air force remained superior. When, in 1943, plans were laid to invade northern France from Britain, Lt. General Morgan (acting Chief of Staff to the supreme commander, allied expeditionary force) wrote ‘A definite and highly effective local superiority over the German fighter force will be an essential prerequisite of any attempt to return to the continent, since it is only through freedom of action of our own air forces that we can offset the many and great disabilities inherent in the situation confronting the attacking surface forces.’

      Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery wrote after the war that:

      ‘It is not possible to conduct successful offensive operations on land against an enemy with a superior air force, other things being equal. The enemy’s air force must be subdued before the land offensive is launched. The moral effect of air action is very great and is out of proportion to the material damage inflicted. In the reverse direction, sight and sound of our own air forces against the enemy have an equally satisfactory effect on our own troops. A combination of the two has a profound influence on the most important single factor in war – morale.’⁵

      Thus vengeance on France seemed to Hitler to be a luxury that he could afford, for the west could not be invaded unless his air force was defeated, and even then, the incomparable German army would have to be overcome in battle. When, to Hitler’s irritation, the British, now under the redoubtable Winston Churchill (who was supported by one of the noblest of her kings, George VI), refused to heed the peace feelers that he put out, he decided, after a fatal⁶ delay, that the Luftwaffe could clear the skies over Britain for an invasion fleet to cross the narrow sea.

      The story of the Battle of Britain is well known. A few fighter pilots, from many nations as well as Britain, denied air superiority to the Luftwaffe, inflicting disproportionate losses on the attackers. When German aircrew bombed London in error, Churchill ordered the bombing of Berlin in retaliation. This infuriated Hitler, and struck a deep chord in his furious soul: ‘When the British air force drops two or three thousand kilograms of bombs, then we will in one night drop 150, 230 or 400,000 kilograms! When they declare that they will increase the attacks on our cities, then we will raze theirs to the ground!’⁷

      The Germans now transferred their attacks from airfields and radar stations to London, at the extreme range of their main fighter aeroplane, the Messershmitt Bfl09. As bomber losses mounted, the attacks on British cities were switched to the hours of darkness. All in all, during the Battle of Britain (July 10^th to October 30^th 1940), the Germans lost 1733 aircraft; the British lost 915.⁸ But production figures were also significant – even more so, if the German estimates of British losses and production are taken into account. The Germans estimated that British losses in fighters were twice their own.⁹ They also grossly underestimated British production. Between July 1940 and April 1941 they thought that their battered enemy had produced 6825 aircraft,¹⁰ while in reality they had made 14,761.¹¹ This was not all; during this period, 3555 aircraft were delivered from North America (of which 1279 were delivered direct to overseas commands and Dominion governments).¹² Britain acquired 18,316 aircraft, not 6825! This was a very serious miscalculation, for it led to a fatal complacency; aircraft production requires planning well in advance, as does pilot training. This was simply not done in time. Germany produced only 10,826 aircraft in 1940 and 11,776 in 1941.

      But the consequences of the Battle of Britain were not only complacency born of an underestimate of British production, and overestimate of British losses. The defeat of the German air force led their High Command to discount the value of strategic bombing, and to continue with an air force mainly limited to army co-operation. Britain, however, drew the opposite conclusion, seeing the battle as confirmation of the necessity of vigorously pursuing a general air policy, that is, an air force designed for strategic bombing, air defence, and naval and army support.¹³

      There were other flaws that ran deeply hidden under the surface of the German position. Firstly, the British had identified and ‘turned’ all the German secret agents in Britain, and thereafter, throughout the rest of the war, all subsequent agents entering the country were either noted or greeted by British intelligence.

      Secondly, as a corollary to this coup, the British had in their hands the secret of the German ‘enigma’ coding machines, which were used by the German armed forces as well as the railways. These devices were capable of encoding information in an incredibly complex manner, and there were millions of possible combinations. The machine itself had been on the open market from 1923 until its adoption by the German army and navy (who used different versions) in 1929.¹⁴ Although the Germans had modified the enigma machine considerably from its original design, the Poles had obtained one and had communicated a method of cracking the code to the French. This information was brought to Britain from France, and was studied assiduously by mathematicians and codebreakers of genius. These were established at Bletchley Park in Buckinghamshire where, because of the time needed to calculate the correct settings before the daily, and sometimes thrice daily German changes, the world’s first programmable electronic computer was devised and built. By 1944 these brilliant men and women were routinely passing on German naval, air and military information from the highest level, including instructions from Hitler himself, often reading it before the intended recipients! The intelligence gained was used to advantage, although always with a cover story that would conceal the source of the information and allay German suspicions, or perhaps arouse them in an inappropriate area.

      The advantage of surprise in warfare is incalculable; the German commanders, generally of the highest skill and professionalism, were to be deprived of this advantage for themselves, yet had it used against them in all the most considerable actions in the West. In any area of human antagonism, be it in law, in business, in sport or in war, the knowledge of your opponents innermost plans is a pearl of great price. This secret was known to the British as ‘ultra’.

      Another weakness was soon revealed to all. Hitler’s ally, Italy, consisted of some 40 million vigorous, brave and industrious individuals, with an army of over 70 divisions and a modern battlefleet, apparently united under Mussolini and the Fascist party. But from the first shots Mussolini’s Italy was revealed as corrupt, her army antiquated, her industry inadequate, her treasury drained and her leaders bombastic and incompetent. The union of the disparate Italian regions was imperfect, and her citizens were more dedicated to province than to nation, and more to family than province. Her natural friendship with Britain and the United States (which harboured so many millions from her shores, who maintained a regular correspondence with their families in the homeland) was a further source of weakness. Her armies, soon deprived of the air cover of a few ancient biplanes, were swept aside, and her soldiers abandoned the one sided and unpopular struggle in droves, although many units fought with great courage and skill, especially the crews of torpedo boats and midget submarines. The fact that morale crumbles in the bravest of armies when they lack modern equipment, particularly tanks and aircraft, was demonstrated by the Poles in 1939, the French in 1940, the British and Americans in the Far East in 1942, and by the Germans themselves in 1945, (when what equipment they possessed was immobilised by lack of fuel). Italian units soon needed to be stiffened by Germans; and Italy sank rapidly into satellite status.

      A further weakness in the German position was the utter determination of the British government to see the whole thing through until Nazism was finally extinguished in Germany. She could not be brought to terms by bombardment, however ferocious. Hitler presumed that British hostility was sustained by a powerful clique of Jews, for he could not appreciate, nor could any of his great officers of state, the absolute odium in which he was held,