The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11. Samuel Johnson

corruption, and repelled the shocks of outward violence; it has often been endangered by corrupt counsels, and wicked machinations, and surmounted them by the force of its established laws, without the assistance of temporary expedients; at least without expedients like this, which neither law nor justice can support, and which would in itself be a more atrocious grievance than those, if they were real, which it is intended to punish, and might produce far greater evils than those which are imputed to him, against whom it is projected.

      It has, indeed, my lords, been mentioned by a noble lord, in much softer language, as a method only of making an inquiry possible. The possibility of an inquiry, my lords, is a very remote and inoffensive idea; but names will not change the nature of the things to which they are applied. The bill is, in my opinion, calculated to make a defence impossible, to deprive innocence of its guard, and to let loose oppression and perjury upon the world. It is a bill to dazzle the wicked with a prospect of security, and to incite them to purchase an indemnity for one crime, by the perpetration of another. It is a bill to confound the notions of right and wrong, to violate the essence of our constitution, and to leave us without any certain security for our properties, or rule for our actions.

      Nor are the particular parts less defective than the general foundation; for it is full of ambiguous promises, vague ideas, and indeterminate expressions, of which some have been already particularized by the noble lords that have spoken on this occasion, whose observations I shall not repeat, nor endeavour to improve; but cannot forbear proposing to the advocates for the bill one sentence, that it may be explained by them, and that at least we may not pass what we do not understand.

      In the inquiry into the conduct of the earl of ORFORD, every man, as we have already seen, is invited to bring his evidence, and to procure an indemnity, by answering such questions as shall be asked, touching or concerning the said inquiry, or relative thereto. What is to be understood by this last sentence, I would willingly be informed; I would hear how far the relation to the inquiry is designed to be extended, with what other inquiries it is to be complicated, and where the chain of interrogatories is to have an end.

      When an evidence appears before the committee, how can he be certain that the questions asked are relative to the inquiry? How can he be certain that they are such as he may procure an indemnity by resolving? Or whether they are not unconnected with the principal question, and therefore insidious and dangerous? And to what power must he appeal, if he should be prosecuted afterwards upon his own confession, on pretence that it was not relative to the inquiry?

      Expressions like these, my lords, if they are not the effects of malicious hurry, and negligent animosity, must be intended to vest the committee with absolute authority, with the award of life and death, by leaving to them the liberty to explain the statute at their own pleasure, to contract or enlarge the relation to the controversy, to inquire without bounds, and judge without control.

      Thus, my lords, I have laid before you my opinion of this bill without any partial regard, without exaggerating the ill consequences that may be feared from it, or endeavouring to elude any reasoning by which it has been defended. I have endeavoured to pursue the arguments of the noble lord who spoke first, and to show that it is founded upon false notions of criminal justice, that it proposes irrational and illegal methods of trial, that it will produce consequences fatal to our constitution, and establish a precedent of oppression.

      I have endeavoured, in examining the arguments by which the bill has been defended, to show that the rights of the publick are ascertained, and that the power of the majority is to be limited by moral considerations; and to prove, in discussing its particular parts, that it is inaccurate, indeterminate, and unintelligible.

      What effects my inquiry may have had upon your lordships, yourselves only can tell; for my part, the necessity of dwelling so long upon the question, has added new strength to my conviction; and so clearly do I now see the danger and injustice of a law like this, that though I do not imagine myself indued with any peculiar degree of heroism, I believe, that if I were condemned to a choice so disagreeable, I should more willingly suffer by such a bill passed in my own case, than consent to pass it in that of another.

      The duke of ARGYLE replied to the following effect:—My lords, I am not yet able to discover that the bill now before us is either illegal or absurd, that its interpretation is doubtful, or its probable consequences dangerous.

      The indisputable maxim, that the publick has a right to every man's evidence, has been explained away with much labour, and with more art than a good cause can often require. We have been told of publick contracts, of the rights of society with regard to individuals, and the privileges of individuals with respect to society; we have had one term opposed to another, only to amuse our attention; and law, reason, and sophistry have been mingled, till common sense was lost in the confusion.

      But, my lords, it is easy to disentangle all this perplexity of ideas, and to set truth free from the shackles of sophistry, by observing that it is, in all civilized nations of the world, one of the first principles of the constitution, that the publick has a right, always reserved, of having recourse to extraordinary methods of proceeding, when the happiness of the community appears not sufficiently secured by the known laws.

      Laws may, by those who have made the study and explanation of them the employment of their lives, be esteemed as the great standard of right; they may be habitually reverenced, and considered as sacred in their own nature, without regard to the end which they are designed to produce.

      But others, my lords, whose minds operate without any impediment from education, will easily discover, that laws are to be regarded only for their use; that the power which made them only for the publick advantage ought to alter or annul them, when they are no longer serviceable, or when they obstruct those effects which they were intended to promote.

      I will, therefore, my lords, still assert, that the publick has a right to every man's evidence; and that to reject any bill which can have no other consequence than that of enabling the nation to assert its claim, to reconcile one principle of law with another, and to deprive villany of an evasion which may always be used, is to deny justice to an oppressed people, and to concur in the ruin of our country.

      And farther, my lords, I confidently affirm it has not been proved, that this bill can endanger any but the guilty; nor has it been shown that it is drawn up for any other purpose than that which the noble lord mentioned, of hindering an inquiry from being impossible; it may, therefore, justly be required from those who affect, on this occasion, so much tenderness for liberty, so many suspicions of remote designs, and so much zeal for our constitution, to demonstrate, that either an inquiry may be carried on by other means, or that an inquiry is itself superfluous or improper.

      Though none of those who have spoken against the bill have been willing to expose themselves to universal indignation, by declaring that they would gladly obstruct the progress of the inquiry; that they designed to throw a mist over the publick affairs, and to conceal from the people the causes of their misery; and though I have no right to charge those who differ from me in opinion, with intentions, which, as they do not avow them, cannot be proved; this, however, I will not fear to affirm, that those who are for rejecting this method of inquiry, would consult their honour by proposing some other equally efficacious; lest it should be thought; by such as have not any opportunities of knowing their superiority to temptations, that they are influenced by some motives which they are not willing to own, and that they are, in secret, enemies to the inquiry, though, in publick, they only condemn the method of pursuing it.

      The duke of NEWCASTLE next rose, and spoke to this effect:—My lords, the arguments which have been produced in defence of the bill before us, however those who offer them may be influenced by them, have made, hitherto, very little impression upon me; my opinion of the impropriety and illegality of this new method of prosecution, still continues the same; nor can it be expected that I should alter it, till those reasons have been answered which have been offered by the noble lord who spoke first in the debate.

      The advocates for the bill seem, indeed, conscious of the insufficiency of their arguments, and have, therefore, added motives of another kind; they have informed us, that our power subsists upon our reputation, and that our reputation can only be preserved by concurring in the measures recommended by the commons; they have insinuated