The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 10. Samuel Johnson

army here to defend us against insults and invasions, the question about the manner of raising or employing new regiments is superfluous, because none ought to be raised, as our old troops are sufficiently numerous for foreign service. But if the security of the nation requires an army, would it not be madness to send those troops to a distant part of the world, in which we can confide most! Would not those, who speak with such contempt of an expedition undertaken by boys, have a better reason for their censure, if only boys were stationed on our coasts to repel the veterans of France? Would not such measures animate our enemies, and invite an invasion?

      It may, perhaps, be urged farther, that the troops which are sent into America, are more likely to succeed in their design, than any regiment of ancient establishment. The chief danger to be feared in that part of the world, is not from the enemy but the climate, with which young men are most able to contend, though they may not be equally qualified for attempts in which skill is equally necessary with vigour.

      I am convinced, sir, that this war has hitherto been prosecuted with ardour and fidelity, and that no measures have been taken but such as experience and reason have supported, and therefore affirm, without scruple, that if we are not successful, our miscarriages must be imputed to the chance of war, from which no prudence can exempt us.

      Lord QUARENDON spoke next, in the following manner, being his first speech:—Sir, having-but very lately had the honour of a seat in this assembly, I am conscious how little I am acquainted with either the subjects or forms of debate, and should, therefore, continue to listen to the sentiments of persons more experienced, with silent veneration, did I not observe with how much indulgence they are heard who mean well, however deficient in knowledge, or in eloquence.

      As the honourable gentleman who spoke last, sir, professes to have formed his opinion rather from facts than arguments, I hope I shall be indulged by the house, in an attempt to examine those facts which he has produced, because I think them not sufficient to support his positions, which must, therefore, be established by some other proofs, before a decision of this question can be fixed by them.

      With regard to his experience, to which undoubtedly no small degree of veneration is due, he confesses that we have tried only one of the two forms of establishment now in competition, and that, therefore, though he has had reason to approve that with which he is most acquainted, he has no certain proofs of the inefficacy or imperfection of the other.

      But experience, sir, may be extended much farther than our own personal transactions, and may very justly comprehend those observations which we have had opportunities of making upon the conduct and success of others. This gentleman, though he has only commanded in the armies of Britain, has seen the forces of other nations, has remarked their regulations, and heard of their actions with our confederates in the last war; he has probably acted in conjunction, and though it is known that they differ from us in the proportion of soldiers and officers, he has mentioned no disadvantage which might be supposed to arise from their establishment, and therefore, I suppose, he cannot deny that their behaviour and success was the same with that of our own troops.

      The battles of Almanza, Parma, and Guastalla, which he has particularly mentioned, were lost, as he informs us, by armies not officered according to the establishment which he recommends to us: but it is observable that his argument is defective in an essential part; for though he affirms that the armies which were defeated had fewer officers than the enemy, he has neither shown, nor attempted to show, that the want of officers occasioned the defeat, or that the loss would have been prevented by a greater number.

      These instances, therefore, can be of no effect on the determination of the present question; for though it is certain that at Germany, and at other places, armies with few officers have lost the battle, it is not less common for those troops that are more liberally supplied, to be overthrown by others which are differently modelled.

      With regard, sir, to the troops of Germany, I have heard them praised, in many parts of Europe, as not inferiour either to those of France, or of any other nation, and have been informed, that their ill success, both at Parma and Guastalla, may be justly imputed to other causes than the want of officers.

      There has, perhaps, sir, seldom been an example of firmness, discipline, and resolution, beyond that which was shown by the Germans at the action of Parma, where they attacked the trenches of the French, sustained the fire of the ramparts of the city, and though they lost their commander-in-chief and two others, towards the beginning of the action, they continued the fight for eleven hours, and at last retired only at the approach of night.

      At Guastalla, sir, they attacked the French in their trenches, even with forces inferiour in number, so far were they from any diffidence in the form of their establishment; and after a fight of seven hours, in which their loss was, under all their disadvantages, not greater than that of their enemies, they retreated to their former camp unmolested and unpursued. The French, sir, were preserved in both these battles, not by the number of their officers, but by their situation, by woods, cassines, ditches, and intrenchments.

      Nor do I discover, sir, what can be inferred from his observation of the influence of example in time of action, but that officers should be selected with great care, and not be promoted by favour, or interest, or caprice; for an example of cowardice in a leader must be pernicious, in proportion as that of bravery is beneficial; and as, where more officers are supposed necessary, there is less room for choice, it must be allowed that the troops, which have more officers than other forces, are in more danger of being infected with cowardice.

      It appears, therefore, to me that the expense of the present establishment is a certain evil, and that the advantages are very doubtful: it appears that the present state of the nation requires frugality, and, therefore, I shall vote for the incorporation of our new levies with the old regiments.

      By this incorporation, sir, our new-levied troops will be no longer distinguished from our veterans; they will be equally acquainted with discipline, and will learn, from the conversation of their associates, a spirit of enterprise, and a contempt of danger; we may then employ forces equally formidable in all parts of the publick service, and invade the dominions of our enemies, without leaving our own country desolate.

      The arguments which the honourable gentleman has offered in defence of sending our younger troops to America, which may likewise be used against an incorporation, is, in my opinion, sir, far from being conclusive; for it supposes, what will not be granted, that a cold climate may be changed for a hotter with more safety by a young than an old man. I have been told, on the contrary, that superabundant heat is the great disease of youth, and that the want of it produces most of the infirmities of age; and every one has known the lives of persons languishing with age, prolonged by a removal into warm countries. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the honourable gentleman's argument is defective in all its parts, and hope that I shall not be charged with obstinacy or perverseness for dissenting from him.

      Mr. HOWE spoke next, in substance as follows:—Sir, before I engage in a discussion of the question, I cannot but think it necessary to observe, that the honourable gentleman who spoke the second in this debate, has been very far from consulting either policy or justice in his declamation, and that he deviated from the subject only to ridicule his country, to exalt our enemies, and depress our efforts.

      He has described, sir, the British youth, the sons of noble families, and the hopes of the nation, in terms too contemptuous to be heard without indignation; he has amused himself with displaying their ignorance and their effeminacy, and has indulged his imagination in a malignant kind of gaiety, which, however it may divert himself, is very far from contributing either to the reformation or prevention of those practices which he censures.

      I believe, sir, it will be granted, that nothing ought to please but in proportion to its propriety and truth; and, if we try the satire that we have lately heard, by this test, it will be found to have very little claim to applause; for our armies must be composed of the youth of the nation; and, for my part, I cannot discover what advantage we shall gain over the Spaniards, by informing them how little our troops are accustomed to danger, how short a time they have been acquainted with fatigue, how tenderly they have been nursed, how easily they may be frighted, and how certainly they will be conquered, if they but meet with opposition.

      Nor, sir, is such an account of the youth of Britain more true,