Tics and Their Treatment. Feindel Eugène

Rather, then, than widen its application, we prefer to restrict it; we shall employ the term convulsion in its most general sense of "any anomaly due to excess of muscular contraction," of whatever variety or origin; and we shall limit the use of the word spasm to phenomena the result of irritation at any point on afferent or efferent reflex paths, or in reflex bulbo-spinal centres.

      In thus indicating our position, we find ourselves once more in accord with generally received opinion since the days of Charcot. These views have been excellently expressed by Guinon:

      Convulsive movements differ widely in kind. Some consist of localised spasms in the domain of a motor or mixed nerve, most frequently one of the cranial series – in especial the seventh – consecutive to some anatomical lesion, central or peripheral. The great majority of observers, French and foreign alike, are in the habit of designating such movements "tics." … But they are only partial convulsions limited to the area of some one nerve, not true convulsive tics, differing alike in essential features and concomitant symptoms. From the anatomo-pathological standpoint, moreover, lesions are as constantly present in the one as absent in the other.

      The opinion of Brissaud on the subject coincides with our own.

      If we suppose now that the cortex ceases to act as a surface of peripheral excitation, and becomes itself a reflex centre, we note at once a complete change. The modification effected by the cortex on afferent impressions is obvious in altered motor reactions, which appear with the stamp of cortical intervention, herein differing from bulbo-spinal phenomena. To this category belong the tics; we shall soon see why and how.

      Conformably, then, to convention sanctioned by usage, and especially by the teaching of Charcot and Brissaud, we have given a precise definition to the word spasm, and we can only solicit its general adoption.

      To resume briefly the argument we have advanced in the foregoing paragraphs, we maintain:

      If in a given motor phenomenon there is no evidence of actual or previous cortical intervention, it is not a tic.

      If the motor reaction is consecutive to pathological irritation at any point on a bulbo-spinal reflex arc, it is a spasm.

      If the cortex is or has been involved in its production, it is not a spasm.

      Should it present, in addition to the fact of cortical participation, certain distinctive pathological features, it is a tic.

      It is precisely these distinguishing characteristics that we shall now proceed to examine, preluding our study of them with one or two physiological considerations.

      TIC AND MOTOR REACTIONS; REFLEX, CO-ORDINATED, FUNCTIONAL, AUTOMATIC, AND VOLUNTARY ACTS

      The instantaneous muscular contraction that follows the application of a drop of sulphuric acid to the limb of a decerebrate frog is an example of a pure spinal reflex. With the persistence of the irritation contraction of the other limb and of the whole body ensues; the simple spinal reflex has become generalised. Observe the frog a little longer. Soon the sound foot approaches the affected limb and attempts by rubbing to remove the point of irritation. A movement of attack has succeeded the simple movement of defence, and indicates a complete change in the nature of the motor reaction. In the first case the limb is withdrawn briskly from the painful stimulus; in the second the animal performs a series of co-ordinated purposive movements. The first reflex is automatic, and so no doubt is the second, since the frog is decerebrate. But a co-ordinated movement is not of necessity automatic from the outset; its automatism may be the sequel to voluntary education. Co-ordination is often a manifestation of cortical activity.

      Take, next, the case of the infant. His earliest muscular movements are pure spinal reflexes. Pinch his leg, and he withdraws it; continue the stimulus, and he moves the other leg, his arms, his whole body; he starts to cry. The original reflex is becoming generalised, yet he makes no attempt to remove the source of irritation. Should a particle get into his eye, his lids will blink so long as the pain persists, but he never rubs them to expel the foreign body. In Virchow's phrase, the newborn infant is a spinal animal, endowed with spinal reflexes only; his responses to stimuli are beyond voluntary control.

      More complex motor phenomena, however, equally independent of cortical influence, characterise the early days of the infant's life. The contact of his lips with the breast at once elicits a reflex in the shape of sucking movements. These are obviously co-ordinated and adapted for a particular end; suction is a functional act. Yet the cortex plays no part therein; the act is automatic from the beginning. Peripheral excitation from tactile impression of nipple, teat, or finger is sufficient to provoke this reflex response.

      Similarly with the functions of respiration and nictitation – their establishment follows the stimulation by air of the respiratory or conjunctival mucosa. The appropriate movements constitute the spontaneous reaction to afferent impulses; they are simple bulbar reflexes. Co-ordinated and purposive though they be, they do not come within the sphere of the will. The newborn child cannot voluntarily accelerate or retard his respiratory rhythm.

      But a day comes when the formation of cortico-bulbar or cortico-spinal anastomoses renders possible the interaction of higher and lower centres; respiration may be made quicker or slower; the eyelid may be closed less rapidly, more often. In a word, cortical modification of function becomes a reality.

      A further step in advance is soon taken.

      Under the "law of least effort" the inhibitory power of the will reduces motor reaction for the attainment of a given object to a minimum. The infant begins to make more complicated movements, attempting the removal of a source of annoyance by direct attack, learning to scratch itself, to spit instead of swallow, etc.

      The essential difference between these acts – a thousand other examples might be chosen – and the reflexes of the first group, is that the precise and regular execution of the former demands more or less prolonged education, repetition, and voluntary co-ordination.

      It is true these co-ordinated acts are eventually performed with all the spontaneity of the simplest reflexes; voluntary co-operation is no longer indispensable; scratching, spitting, walking, can be effected without any actual intervention of the will. But we must not forget such muscular automatism entails a preliminary training in the shape of frequent repetition of purposive movements – a training which varies in duration with the individual and the nature of the particular movement. It is only after several years of volitional effort that such acts as locomotion or the expulsion from the throat of an irritant particle become really automatic.

      The fact that the newly hatched chick is capable of walking has been advanced as an argument for the existence of congenital automatism. It is true that the chick's movements are very imperfect – it stumbles and falls, as does the infant, on the slightest provocation, and even without any apparent cause; but the rapidity with which certain animals acquire the faculty is so surprising that the latter almost appears to have been innate.

      In all phenomena characterised as instinctive we cannot deny the existence of a certain congenital aptitude, the result possibly of ancestral education, owing to which some individuals learn infinitely more quickly than others, and in their case a period of preliminary education may seemingly be awanting. Probably the truth is, however, that this stage has been a very brief one. In man there is a gradual transformation of voluntary into automatic acts. Though no teacher be necessary, teaching is requisite. The infant learning to walk is really independent of his parents, and might, for that matter, be entirely self-taught; but the point remains, however automatic his walking subsequently become, that he begins by voluntarily co-ordinating the movements of his lower limbs and trunk towards a definite end.

      Another advance is still to be made.

      With increasing cortical development the individual is able, on stimulation no longer peripheral but central in origin, spontaneously to execute movements which frequent repetition has endowed with all the features of functional acts. Of these ideomotor phenomena physical exercises, games, manual trades, readily furnish instances. Swimming, for an instance, requires the rhythmical co-ordination of arm and leg, to attain which perseverance, retentiveness, and above all repetition are essential. At length the time arrives when the swimmer is surprised at the absence of any necessity for voluntary co-ordinating effort on his part. In fact, to