The History of Antiquity, Vol. 6 (of 6). Duncker Max

they had served Crœsus. Cyrus rejected the offer which the ambassadors of the Ionian and Aeolian cities brought to Sardis. Mere recognition of his supremacy and payment of tribute he did not consider sufficient to secure the obedience of cities so remote, and he was strong enough to insist on a more dependent relation without great efforts. But ever cautious and provident, he took means to separate the cities. To Miletus, the strongest, he offered a continuance of the relations in which she had stood to Lydia. When Miletus, "from fear," as Herodotus remarks, accepted these conditions, Cyrus had already won the victory. The cities were divided, robbed of their strongest power and natural head.

      Conscious that their submission on the conditions proposed had been refused, the cities of the Ionian tribe took counsel at their old common place of sacrifice on the shore of the sea, opposite Samos, under Mount Mycale. Miletus, it is true, was absent; but among the Ionians there was far too much pride, far too great a sense of freedom, to offer unconditional submission to Cyrus. The defection of Miletus seemed to be compensated when ambassadors of the cities of the Aeolian tribe appeared on the same day as the Ionians, which had never occurred before, and declared their common resolution "to follow the Ionians wherever they led."32 It was resolved to fortify the cities, to make a resistance to the Persians, and for this object to call as quickly as possible on the mother country for help. A common embassy of the Ionian and Aeolian cities went to Sparta, in order to ask aid of the Dorians there, the leading state in the peninsula. But in vain did Pythermus of Phocaea, the mouthpiece of the embassy, put on his purple robe in order to manifest the importance and wealth of the cities, when the ephors introduced the legation before the common assembly. Though the Spartans at that time were at the height of their power, and had promised help to Crœsus, though the ships had been equipped and the contingent was ready to embark when the news came of the capture of Sardis, Sparta now refused to send aid, regardless of the fate of her countrymen. She merely resolved to despatch ambassadors to Cyrus with the request that he would leave the Greek cities in peace. A ship of fifty oars carried the embassy to Asia, with the real object, as Herodotus supposes, of ascertaining the position of affairs in Ionia and with Cyrus. It landed at Phocaea. Lacrines, the spokesman of the ambassadors, found Cyrus in Sardis, and there warned him in Sparta's name, "to do no harm to any Hellenic city, for Sparta would not allow such conduct to go unpunished." Without the support of an army this warning was an empty and foolish threat, which Cyrus treated as it deserved.33

      There must have been some urgent necessity which summoned Cyrus to the East before he subjected the Lydians, Carians, and Greeks of the coast. Herodotus tells us that he intended to conquer Babylon, the Bactrian nation, the Sacæ and Egyptians. In the early spring he set out with the bulk of his army to Ecbatana.34 Crœsus was in his train. He had given the government of Lydia to Tabalus, a Persian, but the management of the revenues to Pactyas, a Lydian.35 He may have thought that Lydia was more peaceable than it really was, or more reconciled to its fate by his gentle treatment of Crœsus, and the nomination of a Lydian as manager of the taxes. The dominion of the Persians had come upon the Lydians suddenly; they refused to recognise the superior power of their rulers, and could not finally accept the rapid change which had so suddenly overthrown their ancient kingdom and their fame in arms. So far from being subdued, they hardly considered themselves seriously beaten. The rapid and decisive action, in which they had been defeated, might appear to them rather a fortunate surprise, than a victory won by the Persians. It was Pactyas, whom Cyrus had made manager of the revenues, who raised the standard of revolt. He collected the Lydians, and induced the inhabitants of the coast, i. e. the cities of the Greeks, to join him. Tabalus could not resist in the open field the sudden outburst of rebellion. When Pactyas marched against Sardis, he was compelled to shut himself up in the citadel, and was there besieged. While yet on his march Cyrus received the news of the revolt. Yet his presence in upper Asia was so necessary that he did not return in person; he sent Mazares, a Mede, with a part of the army, to bring the Lydians once more to obedience. The rebellion appears to have been undertaken in haste without sufficient preparations, and Pactyas was not the man to lead it with energy. He did not venture to await the arrival of Mazares; the citadel of Sardis was delivered; Tabalus was free; the rebellion was crushed; Pactyas fled to the Greeks on the coast, to Cyme, the leading city of the Aeolians. When Mazares demanded that he should be given up, the oracle of Apollo at Miletus twice ordered the Cymæans, in answer to their repeated inquiry, to surrender him. The priests of that temple, the Branchidæ, well knew that the arrangement which their city had made with Cyrus, pledged her to carry out the wishes of the Persians. The Cymæans did not obey even the second response, but first took Pactyas in safety to Mytilene in Lesbos, and when they found that the Mytileneans were ready to give him up, they took him to Chios. But the Chians, though, like the Lesbians, they had nothing to fear from the Persians in their island, nevertheless surrendered him.36

      The hopes which the Greek cities might have built upon the rebellion of the Lydians were quickly broken. The mother country had refused any help. Sparta would not come to their assistance, and Athens, torn as she was by internal dissensions, could not. No one in the cantons of the Greek peninsula roused themselves to give aid to an important section of the Greek nation, to the colonies which had outstripped the mother country in their development, or strove to save the most vigorous centres of Greek nationality from subjection to a foreign people, which had come out of the remote part of Asia. If the voice of a common blood and the sense of nationality failed to warn the Greeks beyond the sea against giving over to strangers for plunder such rich and flourishing cities, was there no one in Hellas who foresaw that if the establishment of the Persian dominion on the coasts of Asia Minor were not prevented, and the cities of the coast with their navy were allowed to fall into the hands of the Persians, Greece itself would not be safe from their attack, and they would be able to visit the coasts of Hellas in Greek ships? Yet even without assistance the power of the Hellenic cities would have sufficed for a considerable resistance to the Persians – for the position of affairs in Asia did not allow Cyrus to bring any great force against these distant coasts – if they had been able to understand and take to heart the lessons of their own past. If they had neglected to unite their forces against the Lydians, such union was now doubly necessary. They had learned from experience the evil of delay, and the danger was now greater than ever. The Greek cities were in uncontested possession of the sea,37 and thus in a position to give help in common to any city which the Persians might attack. An organisation which permitted the whole force of the city to be used for the benefit of each one, would have given a prospect of successful resistance. But no step whatever was taken in this direction. Each city turned its attention to strengthening its own walls, and awaiting the attack of the Persians.

      After the subjugation of the Lydians, Mazares, as Herodotus tells us, turned his arms against "those who had besieged Tabalus along with Pactyas." He invested Priene, took the city, and reduced the inhabitants to slavery; then the plain of the Maeander was laid waste, the city of Magnesia taken, and its inhabitants enslaved. After the capture of Magnesia Mazares fell sick and died. Cyrus sent Harpagus the Mede as his successor. He marched northwards from the valley of the Maeander; in the first instance against Phocaea, which appeared to have taken the leading part in resistance, or at any rate had done most to gain the help of Sparta; after Miletus it was the most powerful city of the Ionians. The trade in the Adriatic and the Tyrrhene sea, on the coasts of Gallia and Iberia, was in the hands of the Phocaeans. A strong and magnificent wall, well built of large stones, surrounded the city, the circuit of which, as Herodotus says, reached "not a few stadia." Harpagus invested Phocaea, and threw up works round the walls; he then sent intelligence to the Phocaeans that he should be content if they would pull down but one tower, and solemnly give up to him the possession of one dwelling. The Phocaeans must have thought that they could no longer hold the city or repulse an attack. According to Herodotus, they answered the offer of Harpagus with a request that he would allow them a day for consideration, and for that day would lead his army from the wall. Harpagus replied that he knew very well what their intentions were, but he would give them time for consideration. When Harpagus led his forces from the wall, the Phocaeans drew their ships to the sea, put upon them their wives and children, and everything that they

32

Herod. 1, 141, 142, 151, 169.

33

Herod. 1, 152; Diod. Exc. Vatic. p. 27 = 9, 36, 1.

34

Herod. 1, 153. In 1, 157, on the other hand, we find "to the Persians;" cf. 1, 177.

35

H. Stein on Herod. 1, 153.

36

Herod. 1, 161. What is brought forward in the treatise "on the unfairness of Herodotus" from Charon of Lampsacus against the historian's statement about the surrender of Pactyas is limited to the naked fact that he came from Chios into the power of Cyrus.

37

Thucyd. 1, 12, 14.