Zonal Marking. Michael Cox

player I am means I’m best suited to being behind the main strike force,’ Boban said. ‘I can’t be at my best in that role for all of the 34 games but I much prefer being in the centre of the field, where I’m more involved … Zaccheroni has made it possible for me to give my best. A lot has changed.’

It wasn’t plain sailing all the way to the title, and Milan had to rely on a last-minute own goal to defeat Sampdoria 3–2. Their most crucial victory came away at Juve. Milan were on the back foot throughout the first half, but after half-time a long, bouncing ball in behind gave Weah the chance to open the scoring by cleverly nodding over Angelo Peruzzi. Their second was another showcase of their front trio’s varied skill sets; Bierhoff battled for a high ball, Boban picked up possession and delicately half-volleyed the ball over the defence for Weah, who raced through, steadied himself and drove the ball home. The next week Milan defeated Empoli 4–0, with a Bierhoff hat-trick, and then recorded a final-day 2–1 victory at Perugia, a match interrupted when rioting home fans invaded the pitch, supposedly to delay the game and allow their relegation-threatened side an advantage by knowing the results of rivals’ matches. This delayed Milan’s confirmation as champions, too, but Zaccheroni’s side were eventually home and dry. It was one of the less convincing title victories of this era, but Milan captain Paolo Maldini declared it the most memorable of his seven Scudetti because it was so unexpected. Zaccheroni had overcome Milan’s obsession with 4–4–2, implemented a front three, and taken the Rossoneri – who finished in the bottom half the previous season – to the title.

      Questions persisted about precisely who had suggested the change in system, and one man inevitably insisted on taking all the credit. Milan owner Silvio Berlusconi claimed it was his idea to deploy Boban as the number 10, which deeply offended Zaccheroni.

      Whatever the truth, the number 10 had returned to prominence, and while 1999/2000 was an ugly season in Italian football, dominated by refereeing conspiracies and settled in controversial fashion on the final day, it was nevertheless a wonderful campaign for trequartisti.

      A good example came at Giovanni Trapattoni’s Fiorentina, who finished as last of the seven sisters but offered arguably the most cohesive attacking trident. Gabriel Batistuta was the most complete striker of this era, and his closest support came from Enrico Chiesa, a speedy, two-footed forward capable of operating wide and shooting from acute angles. Behind them was Rui Costa, a classic number 10 adept at dribbling past challenges and slipping delicate passes in behind.

Fiorentina’s equaliser in a 1–1 draw with fierce rivals Juventus shortly before Christmas was a perfect example of their attacking potential; Rui Costa brought the ball through midfield and prodded it into the path of Chiesa down the left, and he fired a near-post cross into Batistuta, who converted smartly. This was precisely how the attacking trident was supposed to operate: the number 10 initiating the break, the second striker running into the channel, the number 9 scoring. Fiorentina’s opener in a 2–1 victory over Inter was another typical goal, coming when Rui Costa passed out to Chiesa on the left; his devilish cross tempted Angelo Peruzzi to advance, but the goalkeeper grasped at thin air, and Batistuta nodded into an empty net. However, Fiorentina didn’t produce these moments consistently enough, and their underwhelming league finish meant Batistuta’s nine-year love affair with Fiorentina was over – he moved to Roma.

      Fabio Capello’s Roma had only finished one place above Fiorentina, but they were an exciting prospect. Capello was previously a strict 4–4–2 man, and therefore his decision to build the side around Totti, Italian football’s next great trequartista, was a significant moment in the revival of the number 10. Cafu and Vincent Candela were ready-made wing-backs, so Capello was another who turned to 3–4–1–2.

      Fielded permanently behind two strikers, Totti was sensational. He dropped deep to create from midfield, and could arrive late in the penalty area to score. But Totti’s natural home was between the lines, and his speciality was a specific pass – retreating slightly to receive a ball from midfield and then whipping the ball around the corner first-time for a runner down the right, usually either Vincenzo Montella breaking in behind or Cafu sprinting from deep.

      Roma’s best performance was their 4–1 derby victory over Lazio in November. All four goals came within the first half-hour and were scored in similar circumstances, with Delvecchio and Montella racing in behind, scoring two apiece, while Totti prowled between the lines. Roma briefly went top in autumn, although they collapsed dramatically in spring, winning just one of their last ten, failing to score in five of them. But that was a blessing in disguise, as it prompted Roma’s signing of Batistuta, and his goals fired Roma to Totti’s only Serie A title in 2000/01.

Fifth-placed Parma had a disjointed campaign. They were hindered by the inconsistency of their number 10 Ariel Ortega, who, having replaced Juan Verón successfully at Sampdoria, now replaced him less convincingly at Parma. A 3–0 victory over Verona in October showed their 3–4–1–2 had potential, with Ortega grabbing a goal, an assist and a pre-assist, and the two forwards, Hernán Crespo and Márcio Amoroso, all getting on the scoresheet.

      Ortega linked particularly well with the wing-backs Fuser and Paolo Vanoli, but sadly struggled with alcoholism throughout his career, rarely justified his tag as the first of the many ‘new Maradonas’ and started fewer than half of the matches in 1999/2000. Without him, the manager Alberto Malesani varied between a more cautious 3–5–2, or a 3–4–3 with Amoroso and Di Vaio flanking Crespo, but in both systems Parma missed a trequartista.

      Significantly, however, Parma finished level on points with Inter, who started 1999/2000 with unrivalled attacking options: Ronaldo, Christian Vieri, Iván Zamorano, Álvaro Recoba and – last and very much least in the eyes of coach Marcello Lippi – Roberto Baggio. His excellent season at Bologna had convinced Inter to sign him in the summer of 1998, although he endured a difficult first campaign, in a typically chaotic Inter season that featured three changes of coach.

      Just as Baggio had been devastated at being reunited with Sacchi at Milan, now at Inter he suffered from the appointment of Lippi, with whom he’d rowed at Juventus. Lippi had little interest in Baggio, and even less interest in fielding a number 10; Vieri and Ronaldo were expected to cope by themselves, although injury problems meant they only once started together all season, in a 2–1 derby defeat to Milan, when Ronaldo was dismissed after half an hour for elbowing Roberto Ayala.

Like Parma, Inter struggled to create chances when playing 3–5–2, collecting only ten points from the nine matches before the opening of the January transfer window. They then completed a significant signing: Real Madrid’s Clarence Seedorf. Although the Dutchman had spent the majority of his career in a deeper position, he was instantly deployed as a number 10, and transformed Inter. On his debut, Inter defeated Perugia 5–0. Seedorf assisted the first, then dribbled inside from the left flank, produced a stepover so mesmeric that it left Perugia defender Roberto Ripa on the ground, and lifted the ball into the corner. Three more Inter goals followed, and Seedorf was substituted to a standing ovation. His arrival, and the shift from 3–5–2 to 3–4–1–2, meant Inter collected 23 points from their next ten games.

      Baggio, meanwhile, didn’t start a single Serie A game until mid-January – Lippi was using anyone else he could find. For a January trip to Verona, Ronaldo, Vieri and Zamorano were all out, so Seedorf played behind Álvaro Recoba and unknown 21-year-old Adrian Mutu, making his first-ever Serie A start. Inter went 1–0 down, and Lippi spent the final stages of the first half speaking to a nonplussed Baggio on the edge of the technical area, giving him instructions with a succession of hand gestures in such a deliberate, overt way that he was surely asserting his authority as much as detailing specific plans. At half-time, Lippi introduced him as his number 10.

      Baggio, never one for instructions, did his own thing. Two minutes into the second half, his through-ball to Vladimir Jugović bounced fortuitously to Recoba, who swept the ball home. Fifteen minutes from time, Recoba attacked down the left and stabbed a cross into the box that was met by Baggio, who slid in and diverted the ball into the far corner. Baggio celebrated passionately and, in typical fashion, used his post-match interview to slam Lippi for having questioned his level of fitness.

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