The Law of Fundraising. Bruce R. Hopkins

11. A discussion of these points appears in Packel v. Frantz Advertising, Inc., 353 A.2d 492 (Pa. 1976).

      12 12. See § 3.2(a).

      13 13. See § 3.2(b).

      14 14. State v. Blakney, 361 N.E. 2d 567, 568 (Ohio 1975).

      15 15. Id. Likewise Brown v. Marine Club, Inc., 365 N.E. 2d 1277 (Ohio 1976).

      16 16. As to the latter, see § 3.2(e).

      17 17. See § 5.5.

      18 18. See Charitable Giving, § 7.18.

      19 19. See §§ 3.2(i), 4.7.

      20 20. See § 3.2(d).

      21 21. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960), quoting from Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).

      22 22. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116–117 (1986).

      23 23. Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).

      24 24. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986).

      25 25. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 692 (1989).

      26 26. Id.

      27 27. See Charitable Giving, § 2.1.

      28 28. Attorney General v. International Marathons, Inc., 467 N.E. 2d 51 (Mass. 1984).

      29 29. See § 3.5(i).

      30 30. See §§ 3.5, 4.8.

      31 31. See § 3.3.

      32 32. See § 3.5.

      33 33. See § 3.2(h).

      34 34. See § 7.11(a).

      35 35. See §§ 3.2(a), 3.5.

      36 36. A registration regime does not require the same level of constitutional law protection as does a licensing regime. E.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003); Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d 1474 (6th Cir. 1995). Cases pertaining to a license requirement include Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).

      37 37. In most instances, this classification will be as an organization that is tax exempt under IRC § 501(a) because it is described in IRC § 501(c)(3). In general, see § 3.2(b).

      38 38. See §§ 3.2(g), 3.2(h).

      39 39. See § 4.6.

      40 40. See § 4.19.

      41 41. See § 4.2 for a discussion of the constitutionality of this type of fee arrangement.

      42 42. See § 4.4.

      43 43. See § 3.7.

      44 44. The development of this unified registration statement is a welcome one. This advance toward simplicity and uniformity is somewhat marred by the additional supplemental statements and varying annual reports.

      45 45. See § 3.5.

      46 46. See § 3.7.

      47 47. A court upheld a state statute requiring religious institutions to apply for an exemption from the state's charitable solicitation act, rejecting the contention that the application scheme constituted an impermissible prior restraint on speech (Free the Fathers, Inc. v. State of Tennessee, 2008 WL 360612 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)).

      48 48. Because of constitutional law constraints and as a practical matter, the law does not normally attempt a definition of the term church. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 10.1. If an organization is regarded as a church or closely related organization for federal income tax purposes (IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)), it presumably is treated the same for state fundraising regulation purposes.

      49 49. IRC § 508(c)(1)(A), which also applies with respect to integrated auxiliaries of churches, and conventions or associations of churches.

      50 50. Foundations functioning on behalf of educational institutions that are operated by state governments are expressly recognized by the federal tax law, as concerns public charity and charitable donee classifications (IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(iv)). See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 12.3(b)(v). Foundations functioning on behalf of other educational institutions are also public charities, often publicly supported ones (IRC §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (IRC § 509(a)(1)) and 509(a)(2)). See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 12.3(b)(i), (iv). Some of these foundations in the second category are supporting organizations (IRC § 509(a)(3)), although they may meet a test as to public support. See Tax-Exempt Organizations, § 12.3(c).

      51 51. As to this point, an analogy may be made to the federal securities laws, which differentiate between regulated sales of securities to the public and somewhat unregulated private offerings of securities.

      52 52. One court held that a state's charitable solicitation act was inapplicable to private foundations, for the reason that the “obvious intent” of the statute is “to regulate those charitable organizations, who solicit or accept contributions from persons or corporations outside the charitable entity” (Estate