El sistema financiero a finales de la Edad Media: instrumentos y métodos. AAVV

money, from savers looking for investment opportunities, to towns looking for foreign funding. They did this on a local, regional, and interregional level. This finding begs the question to what degree late-medieval financial markets contributed to a more or less efficient reallocation of savings. Although difficult to answer, the question of efficiency is crucial for understanding markets, since these are supposed to bring together supply in demand in such a way that prices converge, and «pockets» where prices are either relatively high or low disappear. To get an impression of «efficiency» we will use a dataset based on a large government survey taken in Holland in 1514, inquiring amongst other things into the public debt towns and villages had created.

In 1514³⁶ Maximilian I (regent 1482-1494, 1506-1515) ordered government agents to investigate into the wealth of towns and villages, in order to come up with a new distribution code for taxation. In Holland the provincial government was not entitled to tax its subjects individually. Instead, the central government ordered each community to pay its share, based on a distribution code, and next local governments taxed its citizens or villagers.³⁷ The government agents talked to representatives of towns and villages and questioned them about the number of inhabitants, the economic situation and the way they usually levied taxes. They also asked about the financial situation, about revenues and expenses, and loans local governments had contracted: which type of loans, under what conditions these had been contracted, when and why.

The investigation has been preserved in a document called Informacie. Since Robert Fruin edited this source in 1866 many historians have used it in research into late-medieval Holland. Some questioned its credibility, pointing out that town and village representatives probably tried to make things look worse than they were in order to get a lower taxation, while others deemed the source to be reliable enough.³⁸ It is certainly so that some representatives of towns and villages overacted, complaining about the horrors of war and natural disaster. And even though they were questioned under oath, some representatives even made false statements. However, fraud seems to have been restricted to statements about the landed property of the villagers.³⁹ This is hardly surprising because landed property was one of the main elements, if not the main element, the distribution code would be based on. The data regarding public debt probably had a much smaller effect on the new distribution code.

The reliability of the data on public debt the Informacie gives can be confirmed by referring to town accounts, such as those of Dordrecht. The interest rates mentioned in both Informacie and town accounts are identical, which means that the survey provides insight in sale conditions, and does not reflect any changes made to contracts afterward.⁴⁰ Furthermore, it has become clear that government agents, during their investigation in 1514, also required representatives of towns to back up their statements with evidence in writing. Even though some town magistrates sometimes showed little enthusiasm to hand over documents such as town accounts, they usually cooperated. It was more difficult to get village governments to present evidence in writing because few villages seem to have kept financial records. Only in one case we have been able to compare the data the Informacie gives with village accounts. The representatives of the large village of Noordwijk claimed they paid an interest of 31½ guilders, and the village accounts support their statement.⁴¹

What does the Informacie reveal about public debt? By 1514 all towns of Holland had created public debt, having sold life and redeemable annuities. Moreover, 60 % of the villages of Holland had done so as well. This public debt was mainly created during the period 1477-1514, during a period of increasing financial pressure due to ongoing state formation and war efforts by the Dukes of Burgundy –in particular Charles the Bold (r. 1467-1477) and Maximilian I. Faced with ambitious rulers, towns and villages used most of the principals to be able to pay taxes and war expenses. In contrast, only a small part of the funds went to such causes as public works.⁴²

      Table 1 gives an overview of the annuities towns and villages had to pay out every year. The main towns of Holland were most heavily indebted: the burden of annuities per capita was 2,26 guilders. In other words: here every inhabitant contributed 2,26 guilders –presumably via taxation– to interest payments. In Holland’s many smaller towns the per capita contribution was much lower, at 0,79 guilders. This difference is most likely the result of the main towns increasingly being used by the rulers to gain access to financial markets: the towns thus sold annuities on behalf of the rulers because the latter lacked creditworthiness. The rulers did not use smaller towns to such ends, let alone villages: the latter’s public debt was on average 0,21 guilders per capita.

      The Informacie provides detailed information of the interest rates towns and villages paid on annuities –i. e. of the prices they paid in financial markets–. We have decided to focus on redeemable annuities, and to disregard life annuities: pricing of life annuities is likely to have been based in part on the age of the beneficiary and hence the number of years he could be expected to live. Since data on ages is not given in the Informacie, interest rates on life annuities cannot be used as an indicator for pricing. However, our source does give 282 interest rates public bodies paid on redeemable annuities. Most redeemable annuities (219 out of 279) carried an interest rate between 5,6 % and 7,1 %. A rate of 6,25 % was most common (80 of 279 observations).

Based on the data presented in table 1 and figure 2 it seems that towns had better access to financial markets than villages. First of all, the main towns paid on average 6,3 %, the small towns 6,4 %, and the villages 6,5 %. Second, towns rarely paid more than 7,1 %: as we have seen in section III, this may be due to the towns’capacity to participate in various financial markets, in Holland and abroad, and thus being able to pick out markets where prices were low. The highest interest rate paid by a town was 8,3 % by Dordrecht, on annuities sold between 1472 and 1490.⁴³ It is difficult to explain why this town would have paid higher interest rates than the other large towns, but it may have had something to do with the deterioration of Dordrecht’s financial situation after the 1460’s.⁴⁴ Under such circumstances Dordrecht would have had increasing problems selling annuities at favorable interest rates.

      FIGURE 2

       Premiums on redeemable annuities (1514; N=279)

      Main towns: Dordecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, Gouda, Amsterdam. Small towns: Beverwijk, Alkmaar, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Medemblik, Edam, Monnikendam, Naarden, Weesp and Weesperkerspel, Muiden, Purmerend, Woerden, Oudewater, The Hague, Vlaardingen Gravenzande, Schoonhoven, Gorinchem, Heusden, Rotterdam, Schiedam, Geertruidenberg, Asperen, Heukelum.

      Towns rarely paid interest rates below 5,6 %. The outliers in our dataset –annuities carrying premiums either below 5,6 % or above 7,1 %–, had generally been sold by villages (46 of 60). This difference may well be due to towns selling annuities in large financial centers, where they competed with others in attracting investors, and where investors likewise competed amongst each other, the result being price convergence. Apparently villages generally operated on a smaller scale: they did not explore several financial markets, but would usually have tried to sell an annuity to a fellow villager, or to an inhabitant of the nearest village or town. They operated in a limited number of localities, which could also be fairly isolated: this sometimes yielded them favourable premiums, but could also force them to accept high interest rates.

      To be sure: not all villages found buyers for their annuities: several complained they lacked credit during the interrogation in 1514. Thus, when Hilversum, to the Southeast of