major work by one of Japan's leading naval historians, this book traces Alfred Thayer Mahan's influence on Japan's rise as a sea power after the publication of his classic study, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Hailed by the British Admiralty, Theodore Roosevelt, and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the international bestseller also was endorsed by the Japanese Naval Ministry, who took it as a clarion call to enhance their own sea power. That power, of course, was eventually used against the United States. Sadao Asada opens his book with a discussion of Mahan's sea power doctrine and demonstrates how Mahan's ideas led the Imperial Japanese Navy to view itself as a hypothetical enemy of the Americans.Drawing on previously unused Japanese records from the three naval conferences of the 1920s–the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the Geneva Conference of 1927, and the London Conference of 1930–the author examines the strategic dilemma facing the Japanese navy during the 1920s and 1930s against the background of advancing weapon technology and increasing doubt about the relevance of battleships. He also analyzes the decisions that led to war with the United States–namely, the 1936 withdrawal from naval treaties, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, and the armed advance into south Indochina in July 1941–in the context of bureaucratic struggles between the army and navy to gain supremacy. He concludes that the «ghost» of Mahan hung over the Japanese naval leaders as they prepared for war against the United State and made decisions based on miscalculations about American and Japanese strengths and American intentions.
Operation KE explores the air combat that attended the Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal in early 1943—a topic which has hitherto received very little attention. Operation KE was successful largely because Japanese strategic planning and tactical execution was basically sound. The traditional view holds that the Japanese got away with the initiative largely because the Americans let them; the U.S. Pacific high command felt it was not worth the effort to try and stop them. The authors contend that this was not entirely the case. They argue that the Cactus Air Force and Guadalcanal-based naval units did their best to disrupt the evacuation, still believing that the Tokyo Express was bringing reinforcements and supplies to the 17th Army. Other US forces in the South Pacific did make a half-hearted and questionably-executed attempt to stop the Japanese, but were bluffed into adopting a «wait-and-see» posture.Operation KE focuses on the air war fought between the Cactus and US 13th Air Forces on the one hand and the Japanese Navy and Army Air Forces on the other, from mid-December, 1942 to mid-February, 1943. The book scrutinizes the US air strikes against the six KE-related Tokyo Express destroyer runs, plus related air strikes against the Japanese merchant marine, as well as air and naval base-suppression missions undertaken by both sides, to determine what actually happened in order to analyze why the Japanese evacuation succeeded and why Cactus failed to stop it. Background chapters attempt to assess the respective states of readiness of the Japanese and US air arms in the South Pacific to support on the one hand and counter on the other the execution of Operation KE.The central portion of the book narrates in some detail what actually occurred in the air and at sea – including air strikes, fighter sweeps, base suppression missions, and naval sorties – during the crucial prelude to and the actual playing out of the interrelated events that comprised the evacuation operation. Concluding chapters analyze, on both strategic and tactical levels, the Japanese planning and execution of Operation KE, and Cactus' initiatives to interdict KE's successful prosecution. The authors conclude that both the Japanese and the American states of readiness on the eve of Operation KE suffered in such matters as optimizing both resources and operating procedures, and combating a hostile environment. Consequently, both combatants were somewhat handicapped in their abilities respectively to carry out and contest Operation KE.The author contends that the Japanese developed a reasonably sound strategy that exploited those methods and tools of war then in use in the South Pacific; to achieve success, they maximized their own strengths while taking advantage of their adversary's limitations. Contrary to the traditional view, the authors are of the opinion that Japanese utilization of their newly-built airstrip at Munda in the Central Solomons played an important role in the success of Operation KE, which was in keeping with the long-range intention of developing Munda and Vila airstrips as major forward airbases to defend against any Allied push toward Rabaul through the Solomons.The U.S., on the other hand, by consistently misreading Japanese intent regarding Operation KE and pursuing a cautious offensive strategy, blunted the tactical impact of their initiatives to counter the evacuation. Several imprudent tactical decisions and a misallocation of resources further diluted the strength of US efforts.
Hailed as one of the finest examples of aviation research, this comprehensive 1984 study presents a detailed and scrupulously accurate operational history of carrier-based air warfare. From the earliest operations in the Pacific through the decisive Battle of Midway, it offers a narrative account of how ace fighter pilots like Jimmy Thach and Butch O'Hare and their skilled VF squadron mates – called the «first team» – amassed a remarkable combat record in the face of desperate odds. Tapping both American and Japanese sources, historian John B. Lundstrom reconstructs every significant action and places these extraordinary fighters within the context of overall carrier operations. He writes from the viewpoint of the pilots themselves, after interviewing some fifty airmen from each side, to give readers intimate details of some of the most exciting aerial engagements of the war. At the same time he assesses the role the fighter squadrons played in key actions and shows how innovations in fighter tactics and gunnery techniques were a primary reason for the reversal of American fortunes. After more than twenty years in print, the book remains the definitive account and is being published in paperback for the first time to reach an even larger audience.
This is the story of a little-known Soviet-Japanese conflict that influenced the outbreak and shaped the course of the Second World War. In the summers of 1937, 1938, and 1939, Japan and the Soviet Union fought a series of border conflicts. The first was on the Amur River days before the outbreak of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. In 1938, division-strength units fought a bloody 2-week battle at Changkufeng near the Korea-Manchuria-Soviet border. The Nomonhan conflict (May-September 1939) on the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier, was a small undeclared war, with over 100,000 troops, 500 tanks and aircraft, and 30,000-50,000 killed and wounded. In the climactic battle, August 20-31, the Japanese were annihilated. This coincided precisely with the conclusion of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (August 23, 1939) – the green light to Hitler's invasion of Poland and the outbreak of WW II one week later. These events are connected. This book relates these developments and weaves them together.From May through July 1939, the conflict was provoked and escalated by the Japanese, whose assaults were repulsed by the Red Army. In August, Stalin unleashed a simultaneous military and diplomatic counter strike. Zhukov, the Soviet commander, launched an offensive that crushed the Japanese. At the same time, Stalin concluded an alliance with Hitler, Japan's nominal ally, leaving Tokyo diplomatically isolated and militarily humiliated.The fact that these events coincided was no “coincidence.” Europe was sliding toward war as Hitler prepared to attack Poland. Stalin sought to avoid a two-front war against Germany and Japan. His ideal outcome would be for the fascist/militarist capitalists (Germany, Italy, and Japan) to fight the bourgeois/democratic capitalists (Britain, France, and perhaps the United States), leaving the Soviet Union on the sidelines while the capitalists exhausted themselves. The Nazi-Soviet Pact pitted Germany against Britain and France and allowed Stalin to deal decisively with an isolated Japan, which he did at Nomonhan.Zhukov won his spurs at Nomonhan and won Stalin’s confidence to entrust him with the high command in 1941, when he halted the Germans at the gates of Moscow with reinforcements from the Soviet Far East. The Far Eastern reserves were deployed westward in the autumn of 1941 when Moscow learned that Japan would not attack the Soviet Far East, because it decided to expand southward to seize the oil-rich Dutch East Indies, which led them to attack Pearl Harbor.The notorious Japanese officer, TSUJI Masanobu, who played a central role at Nomonhan, was an important figure in the decision to attack Pearl Harbor. In 1941, Col. Tsuji was a staff officer at Imperial General HQ. Because of the U.S. oil embargo on Japan, the Imperial Navy wanted to seize the Dutch East Indies. Only the U.S. Pacific Fleet stood in the way. Some army leaders, however, wanted to attack the U.S.S.R., avenging the defeat at Nomonhan while the Red Army was being smashed by the German blitzkreig. Tsuji, an influencial leader, backed the Navy position that led to Pearl Harbor. According to senior Japanese officials, Tsuji was the most influential Army advocate of war with the United States. Tsuji later wrote that his experience of Soviet fire-power at Nomonhan convinced him not to take on the Russians in 1941
In the Gray Area builds on Seth Folsom’s earlier award-winning memoir, The Highway War, which described his 2003 command of one of the first Marine light armored reconnaissance battalion companies to march on Baghdad. In February 2008, he was deployed to Iraq again as the leader of a U.S. Marine advisor team embedded with an Iraqi army infantry battalion. In this new work, Folsom frankly addresses the realities of the Marines’ mission as he reflects on challenges they and their Iraqi counterparts faced in their struggle to gain control of al-Anbar province. He explores the bonds he formed with his men, the “Outlanders,” and the tenuous relationships forged between the American and Iraqi soldiers whose cultures were so vastly different. The author creates a compelling picture of the obstacles faced by both as they lived, ate, and fought side-by-side.The Highway War was lauded for its insights about how a young combat leader copes with his own vulnerabilities while publicly presenting a tough persona. In the Gray Area, Folsom shows a now more mature commander thoughtfully evaluating the situation at a time when the Iraqi army is on the cusp of independence from its American partners. He further reflects on the difficulties posed by a possibly premature American departure from Iraq and questions if the advisor mission is really the key to an American exit of Iraq.
A longtime military history professor at Virginia Military Institute and prolific author, Spencer Tucker examines the important roles played by the Union and Confederate navies during the Civil War. His book makes use of recent scholarship as well as official records and the memoirs of participants to provide a complete perspective for the general reader and enough detail to hold the interest of the specialist. Tucker opens with an overview of the U.S. Navy's history to 1861 and then closely examines the two navies at the beginning of the war, looking at the senior leadership, officers and personnel, organization, recruitment practices, training, facilities, and manufacturing resources. He discusses the acquisition of ships and the design and construction of new types, as well as ship armament and the development of naval ordnance, and North and South naval strategies. The book then takes a close look at the war itself, including the Union blockade of the Confederate Atlantic and Gulf coasts, riverine warfare in the Western theater, Confederate blockade running and commerce raiders, and the Union campaigns against New Orleans, Charleston, Vicksburg, and on the Red River. Tucker covers the major battles and technological innovations, and he evaluates the significance of the Union blockade and the demands it placed on Union resources. Fourteen maps and a glossary of terms help readers follow the text. Extensive endnotes provide additional material.
Oliver P. Smith fought at Peleliu and Okinawa and then commanded the 1st Marine Division in Korea during the assault at Inchon, the recapture of Seoul, and the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir. Called one of the twentieth century's great Marine leaders, Smith was known as an outstanding combat commander and a man of great intellect and moral courage. This biography, written by the granddaughter he helped raise, illuminates the general's remarkable life. It draws on interviews, oral histories and a thorough examination of letters held by the family and not previously available to researchers. Gail Shisler's investigation of Smith's relationship with his Army superiors in Korea and with his Marine Corps peers and superiors takes exception to previously published descriptions and adds new insights into the Corps' postwar battle for survival.
Still segregated in World War I, the U.S. Army was reluctant to use its 93d division of black soldiers in combat and instead assigned the division's three National Guard and one draftee regiments to the French Army. The battlefield successes of these African Americans under the French at the height of the German offensives in 1918 turned white expectations of failure upside down. Their bravery and heroism gained the respect of French and German alike and called into question the U.S. Army's policy of racially segregating its divisions. The full story of their accomplishments is told here for the first time through the eyes of the enlisted men and their white and black officers.The book highlights the actions of individuals as well as the various units of the 93d in compelling combat scenes. We join Company C of the 370th Infantry under heavy fire as they capture artillery pieces, machine guns, and even a portion of a railroad track to win a unit citation and the Croix de Guerre. We learn about the extraordinary actions of Corporal Freddie Stowers, the only African American in the war to be nominated for-and seventy years later awarded-the Medal of Honor, and others who earned the Distinguished Service Cross and French awards for gallantry in combat. Their story of overcoming the odds at a time when most believed blacks performed poorly in combat is told by Frank Roberts, who has been researching the subject for years. While his book acknowledges the many problems encountered by the 93d, the focus is on the many triumphs of these tenacious soldiers as they fought the enemy and the prejudices of their fellow Americans. This book is published in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army.
As plans got under way for the Allied invasion of Sicily in June 1943, British counter-intelligence agent Ewen Montagu masterminded a scheme to mislead the Germans into thinking the next landing would occur in Greece. The innovative plot was so successful that the Germans moved some of their forces away from Sicily, and two weeks into the real invasion still expected an attack in Greece. This extraordinary operation called for a dead body, dressed as a Royal Marine officer and carrying false information about a pending Allied invasion of Greece, to wash up on a Spanish shore near the town of a known Nazi agent.Agent Montagu tells the story as only an insider could, offering fascinating details of the difficulties involved-especially in creating a persona for a man who never was–and of his profession as a spy and the risks involved in mounting such a complex operation. Failure could have had devastating results. Success, however, brought a decided change in the course of the war.
As the only French woman among some 11,000 defenders at Dien Bien Phu, Geneviève de Galard had a unique perspective of the siege and fall of the French fortress. This memoir about her years as a flight nurse for the French air force offers previously unknown details about their defeat. De Galard was on the flights that evacuated casualties from the battle, often landing in the midst of Vietminh artillery barrages. After a French air force C-47 with de Galard on board was seriously damaged, she tended to the wounded and dying in a field hospital. Her efforts won her the Knight's Cross and the Croix de Guerre, and from the American press the name Angel of Dien Bien Phu. Following a tickertape parade in New York, President Eisenhower awarded her the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1954. Now, Americans can learn the full story.