Историческая литература
Различные книги в жанре Историческая литератураTorch
"World War II had many superlatives, but none like Operation Torch—a series of simultaneous amphibious landings, audacious commando and paratroop assaults, and the Atlantic’s biggest naval battle, fought across a two thousand mile span of coastline in French North Africa. The risk was enormous, the scale breathtaking, the preparations rushed, the training inadequate, and the ramifications profound.Torch was the first combined Allied offensive and key to how the Second World War unfolded politically and militarily. Nonetheless, historians have treated the subject lightly, perhaps because of its many ambiguities. As a surprise invasion of a neutral nation, it recalled German attacks against countries like Belgium, Norway, and Yugoslavia. The operation’s rationale was to aid Russia but did not do this. It was supposed to get Americans troops into the fight against Germany but did so only because it failed to achieve its short-term military goals. There is still debate whether Torch advanced the fight against the Axis, or was a wasteful dispersion of Allied strength and actually prolonged the war.Torch: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory is a fresh look at this complex and controversial operation. The book covers the fierce Anglo-American dispute about the operation and charts how it fits into the evolution of amphibious warfare. It recounts the story of the fighting, focusing on the five landings—Port Lyautey, Fédala, and Safi in Morocco, and Oran and Algiers in Algeria—and includes air and ground actions from the initial assault to the repulse of Allied forces on the outskirts of Tunis. Torch also considers the operation’s context within the larger war and it incorporates the French perspective better than any English-language work on the subject. It shows how Torch brought France, as a power, back into the Allied camp; how it forced the English and the Americans to work together as true coalitions partners and forge a coherent amphibious doctrine. These skills were then applied to subsequent operations in the Mediterranean, in the English Channel, and in the Pacific. The story of how this was accomplished is the story of how the Allies brought their power to bear on the enemy’s continental base and won the Second World War."
"A" Force
June 1940. The Italians declared war on the British. Completely unprepared for war, the British had only 35,000 troops to defend Egypt. Opposing them, the Italian army in Libya numbered at least 215,000; in East Africa, the Italians could muster another 200,000 men against a meager 19,000 British and commonwealth troops positioned in the Sudan and East Africa. Out-numbered and unlikely to receive sizable reinforcements of men or desperately needed supplies, it is surprising that the British survived. But they did. How? They got creative. Under the leadership of General Archibald P. Wavell, the commander-in-chief of the Middle East, the British set out to greatly exaggerate the size of their forces, supply levels, and state of battle readiness. When their deceitful charades proved successful, Wavell turned trickery into a profession and created an entirely new agency dedicated to carrying out deception. “A” Force: The Origins of British Military Deception during the Second World War looks at how and why the British first employed deception in WWII. More specifically, it traces the development of the "A" Force organization – the first British organization to practice both tactical and strategic deception in the field. Formed in Cairo in 1941, "A" Force was headed by an unconventional colonel named Dudley Wrangel Clarke. Because there was no precedent for Clarke's "A" Force, it truly functioned on a trial-and-error basis. The learning curve was steep, but Clarke was up for the challenge. By the Battle of El Alamein, British deception had reach maturity. Moreover, it was there that the deceptionists established the deception blueprint later used by the London planners used to plan and execute Operation Bodyguard, the campaign to conceal Allied intentions regarding the well-known D-day landing at Normandy. In contrast to earlier deception histories that have tended to focus on Britain’s later deception coups (Bodyguard), thus giving the impression that London masterminded Britain’s deception efforts, this work clearly shows that British deception was forged much earlier in the deserts of Africa under the leadership of Dudley Clarke, not London. Moreover, it was born not out of opportunity, but out of sheer desperation. A” Force explores an area of deception history that has often been neglected. While older studies and documentaries focused on the D-day deception campaign and Britain’s infamous double-agents, this work explores the origins of Britain’s deception activities to reveal how the British became such masterful deceivers.
We Will Stand by You
An enlisted radioman recalls his years of action in the Pacific with candor and humor.
On the Warpath in the Pacific
When J.J. Clark graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at the end of World War I he was ready to be a pioneer in one of the great transformations of the U.S. Navy in the twentieth century – the change from a surface-only force to one in which aviation played a key if not determinant role. Under the leadership of the key aviation admirals, William Moffett and John Towers, «Jocko» Clark with other aviation-minded officers battled low budgets and unsympathetic policy makers to champion the development of naval aviation during the 1920s and 30s. Pearl Harbor proved them right. As captain of the new Yorktown (the original was sunk at Midway), Clark provided aggressive leadership in the capture of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. As a carrier task group commander, Clark was instrumental in the brilliant victory at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, which included the Marianas Turkey Shoot. He withstood numerous kamikaze attacks at Iwo Jima and Okinawa while seeing that Japan's airpower was destroyed. After the war he was instrumental in salvaging naval aviation from the attacks of other services and policy makers. During the Korean War he served as Commander Seventh Fleet in the all-important naval air support of that conflict. Naval historian Clark Reynolds is particularly well placed to write this book because he had access to family papers and was co-author of the Admiral Clark's autobiography.
The Lost Battalion of Tet
Published to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Tet Offensive, this new paperback edition brings back into print a book that became an essential source for a 2006 study of the battle by the U.S. Army s Center of Military History. It takes a critical look at what went wrong in early 1968 during one of the first engagements of Tet, when a U.S. infantry battalion was ordered to attack a large North Vietnamese force near Hue City without air or artillery support. The tragic military foul-up resulted in over 60 percent casualties for the 2d Battalion, 12th Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, when the soldiers were surrounded by the enemy and began running out of ammunition. The bold decision by battalion commander Lt. Col. Richard Sweet to break out with his remaining soldiers under cover of darkness saved this encirclement from being a total disaster. Author Charles Krohn, the unit s intelligence officer at the time, provides a much-needed analysis of what took place and fills his account with details that have been confirmed as factual by other survivors. Krohn examines the battalion s involvement in two other major attacks for lessons learned when vital systems break down lessons, he says, that are timeless and applicable anywhere. This book is published in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army.
Flying Black Ponies
The tragic, the comic, the terrifying, the poignant are all part of the story of the Black Pony pilots who distinguished themselves in the Mekong Delta during the Vietnam War. Flying their turboprop Broncos down and dirty, low and slow, they killed more of the enemy and saved more allied lives with close-air support than all the other naval squadrons combined during the three years they saw action. Author Kit Lavell was part of this squadron of black sheep given a chance to make something of themselves flying these dangerous missions. The U.S. Navy's only land-based attack squadron, Light Attack Squadron Four (VAL-4) flew support missions for the counter insurgency forces, SEALs, and allied units in borrowed, propeller-driven OV-10s. For fixed-wing aircraft they were dangerous, unorthodox missions, a fact readers quickly come to appreciate.
Secret Missions
An instant bestseller when it was first published in 1946, this memoir recounts the author's nearly forty years of service in naval intelligence, beginning in 1908. One of the first to venture into the realm of psychological warfare, Ellis Zacharias was awarded the Legion of Merit with two gold stars for his contributions. Among the highlights of his impressive career was the role he played in convincing the Japanese to accept surrender in 1945, a subject he deals with in fascinating detail in this book.Zacharias gives readers access to rare psychological profiles that he prepared for the Office of Naval Intelligence on leading political and military figures in Japan. His book also recounts his exploits as a young naval attaché with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo in the early 1920s. In the early months of the war readers join him in the thick of combat in the Pacific, first aboard a cruiser under his command and later in a battleship. Of particular interest are descriptions of his one-man radio broadcasts beamed at Japan between V-E and V-J days that received kudos from Adm. Ernest J. King for helping bring about the surrender.
Trapped at Pearl Harbor
Stephen Bower Young was a seaman first class assigned to gunnery duty in turret no. 4 on the Oklahoma when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Struck by torpedoes, the battleship started to sink, and Young and others became trapped when it overturned. Here, he recounts their terrifying experience with stunning clarity, recalling their frantic search for an escape route and horror at finding the exits blocked. He describes the water's inexorable rise, inch by awful inch; the sickening taste of fuel oil; the foul smell of the air; the nervous wisecracks echoing through the cold darkness; and finally the silence, as the possibility of rescue becomes ever more remote. Undeniably one of the most spellbinding events to unfold during the air raid, this true-life story of Young's escape rivals that of any fiction thriller.
Black Ops, Vietnam
During the Vietnam War, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (MACVSOG) was a highly-classified, U.S. joint-service organization that consisted of personnel from Army Special Forces, the Air Force, Navy SEALs, Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance units, and the CIA. This secret organization was committed to action in Southeast Asia even before the major build-up of U.S. forces in 1965 and also fielded a division-sized element of South Vietnamese military personnel, indigenous Montagnards, ethnic Chinese Nungs, and Taiwanese pilots in its varied reconnaissance, naval, air, and agent operations. MACVSOG was without doubt the most unique U.S. unit to participate in the Vietnam War, since its operational mandate authorized its missions to take place “over the fence” in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, where most other American units were forbidden to go. During its nine-year existence it managed to participate in most of the significant operations and incidents of the conflict. MACVSOG was there during the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, during air operations over North Vietnam, the Tet Offensive, the secret bombing of and ground incursion into Cambodia, Operation Lam Son 719, the Green Beret murder case, the Easter Invasion, the Phoenix Program, and the Son Tay POW Raid. The story of this extraordinary unit has never before been told in full and comes as a timely blueprint for combined-arms, multi-national unconventional warfare in the post-9/11 age.Unlike previous works on the subject, Black Ops, Vietnam is a complete chronological history of the unit drawn from declassified documents, memoirs, and previous works on the subject, which tended to focus only on particular aspects of the unit’s operations.
From Storm to Freedom
Covering both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom as two campaigns within a single, if discontinuous, conflict, this book analyzes the strategic interaction between Iraq and the United States from 1990 to 2010 and the key operational decisions that determined the course of the war. The author’s assessment of the long war against Iraq includes misunderstandings between government leaders in Iraq and the United States that led initially to war, ineffective UN sanctions, inefficient efforts by the Clinton administration, and uncoordinated actions by the Bush administration that then led to a preemptive strategy, continuation of conventional combat, and the evolution of an Iraqi insurgency.Ballard’s thorough examination of these multiple operations within the context of a single conflict provides readers with rare and insightful perspectives on the complexity of modern war and the challenges of operational command. He first identifies the influence of the Vietnam era on the use of U.S. military power and the decision for war in 1990 and then outlines the important factors of Iraqi history and culture that dominated relations between the two nations during the 1980s and 1990s. Subsequent chapters examine the conduct of Desert Storm from the American and Iraqi perspectives and the military, economic, and diplomatic actions of the period between the two conventional campaigns. Final chapters analyze the 2003 offensive on Baghdad, the postwar stabilization operations that began with the failure to transition under the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the eventual implementation of a warfighting strategy that combined new doctrine and a surge of forces to protect the population in a renewed counterinsurgency campaign. A concluding chapter reviews key lessons for the future, including the importance of effective strategic decision making and the operational mindset required to prosecute modern war successfully.