A History of Germany 1918 - 2020. Mary Fulbrook

century, and actively participated in civic life, shaping and challenging aspects of society and culture. In the early twentieth century increasing numbers of so-called Ostjuden (Eastern Jews) arrived in Germany, seeking better economic and social conditions and escaping pogroms in Eastern Europe. Religious differences among Christians were also of crucial importance: post-Reformation Germany was divided between Catholicism and a variety of forms of Protestantism (both Lutheran and Reformed). While some states – notably Prussia – were of a mixed religious complexion, divisions between Catholic and Protestant communities in many areas were highly salient. These divisions went right through the community: it was quite possible to live one’s life entirely within the framework, for example, of the Catholic church and its political, economic and social institutions: the Catholic Centre party in politics, the Catholic trade unions at the workplace, the reading, cycling and singing clubs when at leisure. Similarly, Protestants and others had their own penumbra of institutions. Political persuasion might be as important as religious confession: the Social Democrats, for example, had a comparable range of organizations and leisure activities, encompassing many aspects of life and helping to define a particular social and cultural milieu. It is difficult to evaluate the implications of these sociocultural environments; some historians have seen them as giving members of those subordinate groups that the architect of Imperial Germany, Bismarck, dubbed ‘enemies of the Empire’ (Reichsfeinde) an accepted place in society, while others have seen more subversive aspects to their varied activities. Then, too, there were those members of society who constituted different ‘under-worlds’: those who fell through the cracks, or resisted all attempts at organization of whatever kind.¹

      Politically, the old Prussian aristocracy retained preeminence nationally, through its domination of the largest constituent state of the federal empire – Prussia. The inegalitarian three-class voting system obtaining in Prussia entailed the division of the population of each electoral district into three classes according to the payment of wealth taxes. The minority that were the richest were entitled to one-third of the votes; the moderately wealthy the next one-third; and the large majority that fell into the poorest category were also allotted only one-third of the votes. The double effect of this system not only greatly disadvantaged the propertyless masses but also promoted the political position of the landowning Junker class (who were relatively the wealthiest within the sparsely populated rural constituencies) compared with the very much wealthier urban bourgeoisie. Dominating Prussian politics, the Junkers were then able to play a major role in the Prussian-dominated Reich. It was a role they were to exercise in the context of the autocratic political structure of the German Empire: real power lay not so much with the Parliament or Reichstag as with the emperor, his close circle of advisers, his chancellor, and leaders of the army and the civil service. Influence was exerted on these groups and individuals by the increasingly important pressure groups – many stridently nationalist – that circumvented parliamentary politics in pursuit of their aims. As the German sociologist Max Weber put it, no person with any aspirations to real power would seriously consider becoming a member of Parliament in imperial Germany.

Yet at the same time Junker domination was not unchallenged. For one thing, with Germany’s extraordinarily rapid industrialization, the propertied bourgeoisie (Besitzbürgertum) was becoming increasingly important, and compromises had repeatedly to be hammered out between policies reflecting bourgeois economic interests and the often conflicting interests of the landowning classes. At the same time, the working classes were emerging on to the political scene, particularly through the ever-growing Social Democratic Party (SPD). This latter, while professing a certain revolutionary rhetoric deriving from its Marxist heritage, was in practice rather moderate, with a marked focus on parliamentary representation and activity (partly as an ironic result of Bismarck’s antisocialist laws that effectively restricted Social Democratic activity to this sphere). Nevertheless, the growth of an explicitly radical party representing the expanding working classes struck fear in the hearts of the elites, who – on some accounts – resolved certain differences among themselves in order to present a more united front against a perceived threat from below. Whatever the wider merits of this interpretation, certainly one manifestation was the fostering of German nationalism, in the hope that loyalty to the German ‘fatherland’ would transcend bitter divisions between the classes. Fear of potential civil war at home contributed to willingness to engage in war abroad.

      Bismarck’s complex juggling act among the European powers had been replaced by less stable foreign alliances within Europe, accompanied by imperialist ambitions in the reign of Wilhelm II. The long period of peace within Europe after the Franco–Prussian War of 1870 had, around the turn of the century, increasingly been marked by flashpoints abroad. The growth of the German navy appeared usefully to combine the militaristic values traditionally associated with the landed aristocracy with the economic interests of the bourgeoisie, contributing to the growth of a more strident and expansionist nationalism in some quarters. Germany’s newly acquired colonies abroad were in practice economically and politically relatively insignificant, but the militarist culture and the brutal practices deployed in the suppression of anticolonial revolts in German southwest Africa and east Africa in the first decade of the twentieth century served only to enhance the esteem in which military medals were held among a populace safely distant from any military action. On some views, the acts of brutality and the willingness to contemplate the ‘extermination’ of ‘inferior’ civilian populations played a long-term role in the background to German atrocities in the First and Second World Wars.² Meanwhile, growing strains between the European powers, accompanied by an arms race amidst an atmosphere of rising tension and expectation of war, contributed to increasing political instability within Europe itself. Although the causes of the First World War, and Germany’s own role in unleashing it, remain controversial, there is little doubt that it was a war that the Emperor and his advisors were at the time only too willing to entertain.³

In the event, the First World War did little to resolve the domestic strains of Imperial Germany. Despite a brief moment of apparent and much celebrated (if not exaggerated) national unity in August 1914, social tensions were exacerbated rather than eased by the experience of total war. Even among the males of military age who were called up to serve on the front, war experiences were by no means always those of the idealized ‘comradeship of the trenches’ so celebrated in later nationalist mythology. Officers and members of privileged groups observing from behind the lines of battle had very different experiences from those in the front lines, surrounded by enemy fire and daily witnessing the loss of lives and the physical and psychological maiming of previously healthy young men, with little end in sight.⁴ Experiences on the Eastern front, and in other arenas of war, were quite different from the stalemate trench warfare on the most written-about Western front. The notion of a uniform ‘front generation’ glorifying war and determined to make good its losses and the humiliating defeat of 1918 was a convenient construction in right-wing quarters in later years, rather than a genuine outcome of the military experience itself. This would become significant under changing political conditions: a minority on the nationalist fringes continued to foment unrest and glorify physical violence, particularly in the postwar Free Corps units; and some members of a younger generation, who had been too young to fight and experience violence firsthand, would be easily mobilized for militaristic nationalist causes as young adults in the following years.⁵

      Nor were social divisions on the home front in any way ‘healed’ by the brutal demands of economic preparedness for ‘total war’. Industry became more concentrated, with cartels fixing prices and production quantities, but organized labour also became more powerful, since the government and employers had to find ways of avoiding strikes and maximizing production in a war economy and therefore had to treat with the recognized representatives of labour. With the continued expansion of industrial capitalism, the ‘old’ middle classes – the small producers, shopkeepers and traders – found their already declining position ever more threatened. New sections of the population were increasingly politicized: with many men away at the front, and with the large numbers of war casualties, women and young people were drawn into sectors of the economy in which they had not previously worked and gained firsthand experience of union organization, confrontation with employers and notions of ‘class war’. Even those women who were not part of the paid labour market may have become somewhat