Многоликая коррупция. Выявление уязвимых мест на уровне секторов экономики и государственного управления. Эдгардо Кампос

Как говорится в главе 12, отмывание денег часто зависит от финансовых систем и деловой практики других стран. Это сложный международный механизм, созданный с целью заметания следов, который способствует возникновению крупномасштабной коррупции. Отсюда следует, что крупномасштабную коррупцию невозможно эффективно сдерживать, не говоря уже о предотвращении, без усилий многих сторон в различных странах мира, направленных на борьбу с отмыванием денег.

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