The True Military Power of North Korea. Donald Trump

strategic/ theater and global command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), missile, radar, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare assets.

       Interdiction, seizure, or control of strategic targets (air bases, naval bases, port facilities, POL facilities, lines of communications, and nuclear power plants within [ROK] rear areas).

       Raids against U.S. Air Force and Navy bases in Japan and Okinawa and conceivably against military installations in Guam, Hawaii and the continental United States.

       Seizure of critically important topographic features (mountain passes, tunnels, bridges, etc.) and civilian facilities (railroads, highways, airports, power plants, etc.).

       Interdiction, seizure, and control of ROK/U.S. lines of communications, for the interdiction of reinforcements and supplies for forces deployed along the DMZ, and in advance of, or in support of, regular ground force operations.

       Targeting for long-range artillery.

       Establishing intelligence networks in the ROK.

       Creating insurgency in the ROK, recruiting and controlling insurgent forces (a Primary Second Front Mission).

       Targeting reconnaissance for DPRK WMD (e.g., ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, and possibly nuclear devices).

       Covert delivery of biological weapons.

       Assassination or abduction of ROK political leaders and senior ROK/U.S. military commanders.

       Strategic reconnaissance and the provision of timely and accurate intelligence to the General Staff Department and corps commanders.

       Kidnapping and diversionary operations.

       Establishing military and political intelligence nets within the ROK and fostering the growth of guerrilla forces.

       Military training to foreign revolutionary organizations, organizations.

       Military assistance, training, and internal security for Kim’s inner circle (to include body guards and palace guards),

       Assisting friendly governments and organizations (e.g., Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, PLO, and Burundi).

      SOF forces can conduct operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. During offensive operations, SOF reconnaissance units would conduct penetration (into enemy territory) missions to collect military intelligence and launch raids on military and civilian targets. Prior to the main attack, some units would infiltrate behind enemy lines by air and sea, while others would cross into the ROK through tunnels under the DMZ or along the mountain ridges.

      The Special Purpose Forces Command is organized into eight sniper brigades, with two amphibious brigades and two airborne brigades; and 12 light infantry brigades, with three airborne brigades, 17 reconnaissance battalions, one airborne battalion, and eight Bureau of Reconnaissance SOF battalions. The only organization controlling SOF units is the Reconnaissance Bureau and the Light Infantry Training and Guidance Bureau (formerly the VIII Special Purpose Corps). The Reconnaissance Bureau is composed of five departments, a number of operational units and reconnaissance brigades, and shares some of the responsibility for training and dispatching espionage and subversive agents to the south, with the Liaison and Operations Departments. It maintains a training center, the 907th Army Unit, to train South Korean Army personnel who have been abducted, or have defected to North Korea.

      The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is the primary organization within the KPA tasked with the training and conducting of unconventional (asymmetric) and special warfare operations. During peacetime, it is believed to exercise administrative control over all special operations units, including those of the North Korean Air Force and Navy (the Air Force and Navy will be discussed below) and Reconnaissance Bureau. During wartime, it will function as the primary headquarters coordinating all special operations.

      The following example of a failed KPA Special Purpose Forces operation reflects, in part, their mission and capabilities:

       In 1996, a KPA Reconnaissance Bureau operation failed when a KPN SANGO-class submarine ran aground off the east coast of the ROK during the retrieval of a 26-man sniper brigade team. Two members of this team successfully eluded a massive (more than 16,000 ROK Army troops) search and capture operation for 49 days before being located and killed. A third sniper team member eventually escaped back to the DPRK across the DMZ. Twenty-three members of the team and crew of the submarine accepted death as more honorable than capture, indicative of the KPA dedication and political indoctrination.

      This supreme dedication to their leadership and their country is a very important element that must be considered. The unconventional warfare (small unit) aspect of North Korea’s offensive strategy is essential to winning the decisive fight and to achieving victory.

      KPA Conventional Capabilities. Measured by the number of personnel in uniform, North Korea possesses the world’s fourth largest military. But this ranking fails to capture the high level of militarization in the DPRK. Most men and some women (approximately 10 percent of the KPA are women) between the ages of 17 and 25 serve legally for 42-48 months, but most stay at least 10 years (for women, it is normally 6-8 years). However, their commitment is then transferred from active duty to a reserve, defense industry factory, or security aspect of the government.

      Ground. With approximately 1 million active-duty troops, the KPA ground forces are the largest and most formidable of the KPA’s components. The size, organization, and combat capabilities of the ground forces provide the DPRK with substantial defensive and offensive capabilities.

      The active-duty KPA ground forces are comprised of 19 corps-level units including nine corps, four mechanized corps, one tank corps, one artillery corps, the Pyongyang Defense Command, Border Guard Command, Missile Guidance Bureau and the Light Infantry Instruction Guidance Bureau (previously discussed).

      During the past 20 years the KPA has initiated a comprehensive program involving the reorganization, reequipping, and forward redeployment of ground forces units, as well as the complete restructuring and upgrading of reserve forces and the rear area command structure. Notable improvements include the reorganization of a number of motorized infantry divisions and mechanized brigades into mechanized corps, and the production and deployment of new tanks and long-range self-propelled artillery systems.

      Today, the KPA is assessed to have an aggregate of 3500 main battle tanks, 6560 armored fighting vehicles, and 10,400 field artillery (including multiplerocket launchers), as well as large array of air-defense artillery systems (almost 16,000 pieces).

      The KPA’s concept of “mechanization” is different from that currently used by the ROK or U.S. military forces. With regard to infantry forces, “mechanization” is designed to provide rapid protected movement to combat. The vast majority of the KPA’s mechanized infantry forces will travel via trucks or armored personnel carriers (APC), not infantry fighting vehicles. Once these KPA units arrive at their destination, they will debark and fight as conventional infantry. However, the KPA has enhanced the mobility of its infantry forces and the protection of its tanks, self-propelled artillery and self-propelled anti-aircraft systems, not the acquisition of large quantities of armored personnel carriers (APCs) or infantry fighting vehicles. Thus, anywhere from 40-60 percent of any KPA mechanized infantry unit actually is truck mobile.

      During the past 20 years, the KPA has attempted to improve the organization and equipment of its ground forces. This has been accomplished during a period of deepening economic crisis which has limited access to foreign equipment and precipitated fuel shortages, and restricting training and operations.

      Further complicating this effort has been a series of natural disasters such as typhoons, floods, and famines that have affected every aspect of life within the DPRK. Despite preferential treatment when compared to the general population, the effects of these domestic crises on the KPA ground component have been significant, especially upon units deployed within the rear areas.

      There have been frequent reports of serious shortages of food, fuel, winter clothes, and other military supplies for KPA troops. Soldiers