The Myth of Self-Reliance. Naohiko Omata

This incursion marked the opening of the brutal fourteen-year civil war in Liberia (Cleaver and Massey 2006: 179–80).

Among Africa’s numerous wars and conflicts, the Liberian war has been seen by some as one of the most destructive. In addition to more than 200,000 fatalities, it displaced one-third of the population internally or externally (Jackson 2006: 16–18). After 1990, owing to the protracted conflict, many uprooted Liberians intermittently sought refuge in Ghana, which at the time was deemed the most stable state in the sub-region. Because Ghana and Liberia do not share a border, Liberian refugees reached Ghana by sea, by road and on foot, through intervening countries, primarily Ivory Coast.7

      Prolonged Exile, Aid Fatigue and Repatriation Pressure

      Facing the incessant arrival of displaced Liberians, in 1990 the Ghanaian government organized an ad hoc committee and set up a refugee reception centre adjacent to Buduburam village, and this was the origin of the Buduburam refugee camp. In the very early phase of refugee inflows, the Ghanaian villagers generously provided food, water and blankets for displaced Liberians, which considerably contributed to refugees’ survival during the emergency phase (Dick 2002b: 12). In 1991, UNHCR started supplying cooked meals, water, mattresses, blankets, charcoal and other necessities to the refugees. Tents were set up to accommodate the displaced Liberians. Around early 1993, UNHCR, in partnership with WFP, commenced the distribution of dry food rations. Cooking utensils were also provided to refugee households to enable them to cook at home. At this time, dry food rations were distributed to all refugee households in the camp. The basic needs of the Liberian refugees were, in general, met in the initial emergency phase of their exile in Ghana (Essuman-Johnson 1995, 2011).

      As the exile of refugees extended due to the prolongation of the Liberian civil war, the environment surrounding the refugees became gradually inhospitable, and the refugees were encouraged by UNHCR to return to their home country. This trend strengthened especially after the ceasefire agreement of 2003. The internationally backed peace accord in 2003 helped the donor community to forge a consensus about Liberia’s restored peace and stability. Thereafter, UNHCR started actively promoting the repatriation of refugees, whose number had risen to a peak of 42,000 in Ghana (UNHCR 2004b: 6). Between 2004 and 2007, UNHCR organized a large-scale repatriation promotion programme for Liberians in the sub-region and encouraged their return to Liberia. But because many were cautious about returning to the precarious political and economic situation in their country of origin (see also Agblorti 2011: 5; Essuman-Johnson 2011: 118), the number of repatriates from Ghana reached only 7,000 during the three-year repatriation programme. At the end of 2007, about 27,000 Liberian refugees remained in Ghana, which made the country host to the largest number of Liberian refugees in the world at that point (UNHCR 2008: 78). Given the limited success of UNHCR’s promotion of repatriation, the Ghanaian administration expressed grave concern about the large number of Liberian refugees remaining in the country (Salducci 2008: 12).

As widely observed in protracted refugee situations worldwide, the volume of relief aid for Liberian refugees dwindled over the period of people’s extended exile. According to Loescher (2001: 321–22), in the late 1990s the amount of funding from donor states for protracted refugees in Africa had already started declining, and refugees in West Africa, including Liberian refugees, were the principal losers as a result of the shortage. After the 2003 ceasefire agreement, the volume of aid for Liberian refugees was further cut. As the Liberian civil war had become a ‘finished’ issue in international politics, the global community’s interest in assisting residual Liberian refugees was already very small. During an interview with UNHCR’s senior programme officer in Ghana, he frankly confirmed that there was no more funding for Liberian exiles in Ghana as it was very difficult for UNHCR to ‘sell this refugee population’ to any donors.8

      The dwindling financial support of the donor community also affected the provision of basic services and facilities in the camp. As described above, at the time of my study, camp residents were paying fees for basic services and items such as water, electricity and even using a public latrine. UNHCR provided subsidized services for medical treatment and primary education, but refugees still had to cover a large proportion of these expenses on their own.

      Alongside the increasing emphasis on repatriation and the declining financial commitment of the donor community, UNHCR rapidly downscaled support for the livelihoods and welfare of residual refugees in Ghana. For instance, according to the director of one of the UNHCR implementing partners (IPs) operating in Buduburam, his NGO had previously provided a micro-loan programme for refugee entrepreneurs, designed to help refugees start new businesses in Ghana. But as the repatriation of refugees had to be prioritized in its assistance programmes after 2004, the organization had to close down its micro-finance project. Instead, the NGO focused on the provision of vocational skills such as carpentry and masonry to assist repatriates in contributing to Liberia’s reconstruction process upon their return.

      Ambiguous Legal Status: ‘Are We Really Refugees?’

      Despite more than a decade of exile, the legal status of Liberian refugees in Ghana remained unclear, and this had a profound impact on many aspects of their lives. At the inception of my fieldwork in 2008, in addition to around 18,000 refugees who were formally ‘registered’ with UNHCR, there was an unknown but considerable number of non-registered Liberians living both in and outside the camp. Whilst there were no official statistics, UNHCR had previously estimated that there were over 4,000 of them (UNHCR 2004c: 161).

      The large number of ‘invisible’ Liberian refugees emanated from UNHCR’s sloppy registration exercises (see Omata 2011a). In August 2003, UNHCR and the GRB conducted a one-off comprehensive registration exercise for all refugees in Buduburam camp (UNHCR and WFP 2006: 11). Liberian refugees who had arrived in Ghana before the registration exercise and who managed to show up for it were granted prima facie refugee status and given a UNHCR ID card. After the registration exercise there was no update of new arrivals, meaning that those who arrived after it or who missed it never had an opportunity to receive an ID card.

      Unregistered refugees without an ID card were excluded from any forms of protection and assistance provided by UNHCR. For instance, they were denied access to the UNHCR/WFP free food ration for vulnerable refugees, even if they met the vulnerability criteria. Unregistered refugees did not benefit from the subsidized medical services for refugees in the camp. They were unable to access vocational training programmes organized by UNHCR’s IPs to learn new livelihood skills. Even if they decided to resume a new life in Liberia out of desperation, only the formally registered ID cardholders were able to access the UNHCR repatriation package to assist them in returning to Liberia.

      Although UNHCR ID cardholders were formally granted refugee status in Ghana, even then they were perplexed about their legal status because of statements on their ID cards. The front of the card contained the refugee’s picture and a serial number, and their name, date of birth, date of issue, sex and nationality. But the reverse contained the following contradictory statement with the signatures of both GRB and UNHCR officials: ‘This card is for registration of asylum seekers. The card neither confers nor implies recognition of refugee status under international or domestic law. This card does not entitle the holder to any individual benefit from either UNHCR or the Government of the Republic of Ghana’.

In Ghana, even formally registered refugees were unable to prove or claim their refugee status by presenting any kind of document, since the UNHCR ID card was the only official item given to individual refugees. In fact, the unclear refugee status was a long-standing concern for Liberian refugees in Ghana, and was one of the major reasons why they adamantly resisted the local integration plan. Andrew, a Liberian refugee who had been living in Ghana since the early 1990s, expressed his view on his ambiguous refugee status: ‘I think the reason why UNHCR and the Ghanaian government refuse to give us full refugee status is that if it is given to us, it will entail rights to better welfare for us. Then they will have more responsibilities for us. I believe this is what these stakeholders are afraid of’.9