Captured Peace. Christine J. Wade

of the war but extends to cover sociopolitical issues aimed at restructuring Salvadoran society. Although the terms of the agreement mandated that the negotiation process was confidential, there was also an acknowledgment that civil-society organizations “have an important role to play in achieving peace.”⁹ As such, the parties were permitted to consult these organizations “when it is deemed appropriate and on the basis of mutual agreement.”¹⁰ However, the agreement did not establish any official channel for consultation. This established a pattern of popular exclusion that would characterize not only the peace process but extend well beyond the implementation phase. The following month in Caracas, the parties agreed to an agenda and timetable, albeit vague, for future talks. Issues on the agenda included the armed forces, human rights, judicial and electoral reform, economic and social issues, and the reintegration of the FMLN. It also affirmed that a ceasefire would be postponed until the political agreements had been reached.¹¹ The postponement of the ceasefire was vital to the participation of the FMLN, as the FMLN (with the backing of the secretary general) claimed that they would lose any leverage if the ceasefire was imposed before the agreements.

      Military reform had become a quagmire in the negotiations early on, a testament to both its controversy and its immense importance to the proceedings. In an effort to advance negotiations, the parties agreed to focus on human rights in the San José Agreement (July 1990). This agreement assured the parties’ commitment to human rights as they existed under both Salvadoran law and in accordance with international standards and treaties. The most significant agreement, however, was the verification of the accords by the UN through the creation of ONUSAL.¹² The mission’s main purpose was to verify the observance of human rights by both sides and to promote respect for human rights. It would be the first and most extensive of its kind, conducting in situ verification of human rights following the ceasefire. Furthermore, the parties agreed to the “full guarantee of the freedom and integrity of the person,” prohibiting the arrest of persons for political reasons and “torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.”¹³ The San José Agreement also provided for support of habeas corpus and freedom of expression and association, including trade union freedom and enjoyment of labor rights.

      The Mexico Agreement (April 1991) reflected agreements on constitutional reforms to the armed forces, judiciary, and electoral system. The agreement laid the groundwork for the restructuring of the military. The reforms included the subordination of the armed forces to civilian authorities and a redefinition of mission to defend the sovereignty of the state, creation of a new civilian police force, placing the military and police under different ministries, and dismantling paramilitary forces. Building on the agreements reached in the San José Agreement, the parties also agreed to the creation of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH), whose purpose was to “promote and ensure respect for human rights” (and which was to be elected by a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly), as well as to the creation of a Truth Commission to investigate “serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently requires that the public should know the truth.”¹⁴ The main element of electoral reform was the creation of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) as the ruling administrative authority. Wary of the politicization that had characterized its predecessor, the Central Election Council (CCE), the agreement stipulated that “the composition of the Tribunal shall be determined by secondary legislation, making sure that no party or coalition of parties predominates it. It has also been agreed that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal shall include members without any party affiliation, elected by a majority of the Legislative Assembly.”¹⁵ A special commission would later suggest changes to the electoral code.

      The agreement provided for the separation of the judiciary and executive through the reorganization of the Supreme Court and established a new procedure for the elections of Supreme Court judges, requiring a two-thirds majority of deputies in the Legislative Assembly. This same formula was applied to the election of the attorney general and the PDDH. The parties also agreed to a set allocation of the national budget for the judiciary at 6 percent. The restructuring of the National Judiciary Council made it responsible for nominating judges and running the judicial training school.¹⁶ The government did not agree to FMLN proposals for replacing the Supreme Court, evaluating and purging the judiciary, or a number of other reforms of criminal procedure.¹⁷ The proposed reforms were insufficient to modernize El Salvador’s judiciary, but the FMLN was not equipped to advance the agenda. As Margaret Popkin has observed, “a guerrilla insurgency with minimal experience in the legal system is not the ideal protagonist for profound judicial reform.”¹⁸

      The stalemate on the reduction of the armed forces was finally broken when the FMLN agreed to drop the demand that FMLN forces be incorporated into the armed forces in exchange for its members participation in the new civilian police force and an oversight commission for the implementation of the accords. The New York Agreement (September 1991) stipulated the purification of the armed forces based on a review of personnel conducted by the Ad Hoc Commission and the reduction of the armed forces, the specifics of which were to be determined. Additionally, the agreement provided for the creation of the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) as the party responsible for ensuring the implementation of all political agreements.¹⁹ COPAZ was to be composed of two government representatives, including a member of the armed forces, two FMLN representatives, and one representative of each party or coalition in the Legislative Assembly, while the archbishop of San Salvador was given observer status. Although COPAZ was given no executive powers, the agreement did require that the commission be consulted on all matters relating to the implementation and oversight of the peace agreements. COPAZ was also given the power to draft preliminary legislation related to the agreements.

      The Chapúltepec Accords were signed on January 16, 1992, in Mexico City. The accords resolved the remaining and most contentious issues of the negotiations, those concerning the armed forces, and reaffirmed agreements reached during the past two years. Chapter I upheld the agreements stipulated in the Mexico Agreement, which effectively restructured the armed forces. Among the principles addressed in the Chapúltepec Accords were adherence to democratic values, respect for human rights, subordination of the armed forces to constitutional authorities, and national defense. The language in the accords required the armed forces to be “obedient, professional, apolitical, and non-deliberative” in their service and “respect to the political order determined by the sovereign will of the people and all political or social changes generated by that will, in accordance with democratic procedures consistent with the Constitution.”²⁰ The accords also defined the role of the armed forces as one of national defense, as opposed to internal security: “National defense, the responsibility of the armed forces, is intended to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity against outside military threat”; they further specified that “the maintenance of internal peace, tranquility, order and public security lies outside the normal functions of the armed forces.”²¹ To that end, the parties agreed to changes to the education and training of the armed forces to focus on human rights, respect for democracy, and the subordination to civilian authorities, including the president’s authority to appoint civilians to the post of defense minister. Although the accords themselves did not specify the extent of the reduction of the armed forces agreed to in the New York Agreement, the Chapúltepec Accords did acknowledge that a plan had been submitted to the secretary general. With regard to purification, the duties and responsibilities of the Ad Hoc Commission were detailed. Finally, the National Guard, Treasury Police, National Police, Rapid-Deployment Infantry Battalions (BIRIs), and “civil defence units”—all those organizations most responsible for gross human rights violations—were to be abolished, and the National Intelligence Department was to be replaced with a State Intelligence Organization, subordinate to civilian control.

      Chapter II provided for the creation of a new civilian police force, the National Civilian Police (PNC), as a separate entity from the armed forces, placing the armed forces and police under the authority of different ministries. Under the accords, the PNC became the only armed police body with national jurisdiction. The accords further distinguished the role of the national police from that of the armed forces by defining public security as “a service provided by the State to its citizens, free from all political considerations of politics, ideology