Uncertain Democracy. Lincoln A. Mitchell

seemed in a strong position. He had avoided any serious opposition in his reelection campaign and kept his party, which still dominated the legislature and Georgian politics generally, unified throughout the campaign. He remained broadly respected internationally for his role in ending the Cold War and bringing Georgia back from the precipice of disaster. This term was to be his last, before he planned to retire as a respected elder statesman of both international and Georgian politics.

      Shevardnadze played an enormous role in late twentieth-century Georgia. By the time he left office in November 2003, he had been leader of Georgia, as Soviet republic or independent country, for 22 of the previous 30 years. For an additional 6 of those years, when Shevardnadze was Soviet foreign minister, Georgia was governed by Jumbar Patiashvili, a Shevardnadze loyalist. Shevardnadze was more than just the long-time leader of Georgia: he was a man of extraordinary political talent who began life as a poor youth in the mountains of the rural region of Guria and rose to be one of the most powerful men in the world. Moreover, he did so in the competitive, often nasty world of Soviet politics.

      After he returned to Georgia in 1992 he again became the sun around which Georgian politics revolved. Politicians positioned themselves not according to any ideology but by their degree of support or opposition to Shevardnadze. His behind the scenes machinations could set opposition parties squabbling with each other for weeks. By the end of his tenure as president, both opposition and government blocs in parliament were filled with people he had appointed, recruited, or supported. When he needed to remind Georgians about his status, he would drop the name of a U.S. president or secretary of state or other world leader with whom he enjoyed a personal relationship. Those who stayed close to him could access these resources; those who had never been close to him would have a hard time getting a phone call returned in Washington, London, Berlin, Strasbourg, or Brussels.

      Shevardnadze’s personal prestige and relationships in the West prevented many observers and policy makers from becoming aware of the depth of Georgia’s problems. These people had a difficult time recognizing that the man who had worked so closely with the United States as Soviet foreign minister could be part of a regime that was profoundly corrupt and dishonest and that, for example, stole elections. They wanted to believe Shevardnadze was fighting for reform and were reluctant to blame him personally for the corruption, election fraud, economic stagnancy, and other problems Georgia was experiencing. Shevardnadze, who seemed genuinely torn between the reform and corrupt wings of his party, encouraged this perception by showcasing Zhvania, Saakashvili, and the other reformers in the party, charming foreigners with recollections of the Cold War, and allowing a substantial amount of freedom in Georgia.

      Many Western leaders, in addition to not fully understanding the undemocratic aspects of Shevardnadze’s regime, also critically misunderstood the view of Shevardnadze held by many Georgian people. Ordinary Georgians believed Shevardnadze was deeply and personally responsible for the economic and political problems in Georgia. Even those Westerners, particularly during the last years of his presidency, who were critical of Shevardnadze were baffled as to how the man who did such a good job as Soviet foreign minister could be so unsuccessful as president. Georgians asked themselves the precise opposite question: How could the man who was a bad first secretary of the Communist Party in Georgia and an even worse president have done such a good job as foreign minister of the Soviet Union?

      The years 2000–2003 did not go well for the newly reelected president. He continued to be unable to deliver any kind of meaningful economic development for Georgia as unemployment remained high, foreign investment did not grow, and tourism and trade with neighboring countries did not return either. Nor was Shevardnadze able to make progress toward bringing South Ossetia and Abkhazia back under Georgian control or returning internally displaced people, who by the late 1990s numbered roughly 250,000, to their homes in these regions. Shevardnadze also failed to make any serious effort to reduce corruption, so that problem continued to grow, damaging the economy, destroying the education system, frightening off foreign investment, and generally making life in Georgia very difficult for its shrinking population. Throughout these years thousands of Georgians left for Russia, the United States, Germany, Israel—virtually anywhere where they would have an opportunity to make a living and send money home.

      The 2000 election would prove to be a turning point. Shevardnadze’s major opponent was Jumbar Patiashvili, who had once served as first secretary during Shevardnadze’s tenure as Soviet foreign minister. Patiashvili was not well liked in Georgia, largely due to his support for the Soviet Union during the independence movement in the late 1980s and his role in the violent suppression of the April 9, 1989, demonstration in Tbilisi.

      Shevardnadze was almost certain to beat Patiashvili, but his supporters and parties committed numerous cases of electoral fraud anyway. The report from the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) described “problems … in the following areas: interference by State authorities in the election process; deficient election legislation; not fully representative election administration; and unreliable voter registers.” The report also noted that “The authorities did not behave impartially and gave strong support for the election campaign of the incumbent. Also, there was no clear dividing line between State affairs and the incumbent’s campaign.”⁶ Human Rights Watch addressed the Georgian elections in its country report for Georgia for that year, stating that the elections were “marred by irregularities” but also adding that “nontraditional religious minorities were harassed, attacked, and subjected to baseless charges during the run up to the election.”⁷ In short, it was a typical post-Soviet, undemocratic election, even if the outcome was more or less what the voters wanted.

      The 2000 presidential election was not the only fraudulent election in the late Shevardnadze years. The 1999 parliamentary election was also marred, but unlike the presidential election, the fraud, intimidation, bribery, and violence had a substantial impact on the outcome of the election and the makeup of the new parliament. In many respects, the flawed 1999 election laid the groundwork for the parliamentary election of 2003, so it is important to take a closer look at that election, its outcome and the politics surrounding it.

      Interestingly, the ODIHR report on the 1999 election painted a much more positive picture than was perceived by most Georgians. The basic conclusion of ODIHR was that

      the conduct of this election represented a step towards Georgia’s compliance with OSCE commitments, although the election process failed to fully meet all commitments. In the areas where elections were held, voters were mostly able to express their will and, despite some irregularities, were generally able to vote without interference in an atmosphere largely free from intimidation. However, some instances of intimidation and violence observed during the pre-election period and on Election Day, raise concern.⁸

      The 1999 parliamentary election, like that of 2003, sought to elect 235 people to the Georgian national legislature through a mixed electoral system that consisted of party list and majoritarian components.⁹ The party list component was a single, nationwide list where 150 seats would be divided, based on proportion of the vote received, among parties that won 7 percent or more of the votes. The remaining 85 MPs were elected in districts that were coterminous with rayons.¹⁰ Only 75 of these were actually elected since ten seats were reserved for Abkhazia, which was not at the time under Georgian control. Because these majoritarian seats were based on rayons, the population of these districts varied dramatically, from fewer than 15,000 to more than 100,000. Surprisingly, this discrepancy never seemed to be an issue for Georgian reformers. The political reality was that the party list part of the election was of most concern, as most conceded that the majority of the district-based seats would be won by local corrupt business people loyal to the government. Unlike the 2000 presidential elections, where no politician was able to compete with Shevardnadze on a national level, the 1999 parliamentary elections were very competitive since Shevardnadze’s policies of allowing freedom of speech and assembly led to the creation of a number of strong opposition parties seeking to win seats from the governing CUG.

      The CUG ran an aggressive campaign, combining modern campaign techniques such as polling, mail, and television advertisements with fraud and intimidation. The architect of this campaign was the CUG’s most prominent reformer, Zurab Zhvania, who by then was also