Ethnic Boundaries in Turkish Politics. Zeki Sarigil

dimensions of ethnicity as a collective identity across those definitions: hereditary/innate (e.g., common descent or ancestry, language, phenotype, homeland or region of origin); cultural (e.g., norms, values, traditions, symbols, beliefs, memories); and subjective/cognitive (e.g., self-consciousness, self-identification, imagination, recognition, classification, categorization, interpretation). Thus, borrowing from those definitions, this study considers ethnicity as a subjectively felt belonging to a collectivity or group, distinguished by a claim to a common origin or descent (real or putative),9 language, and territory (actual or mythical homelands), as well as a somewhat shared distinct culture (e.g., myths, memories, symbols, values, customs, rituals, norms) (see also Wimmer 2013, 7).

      Ethnonationalism (or ethnic nationalism) refers to a political movement or a form of identity politics (see Rothschild 1981; Breuilly 1993; Lecours 2000; Romano 2006; Wolff 2006; Eriksen 2010). As Rothschild (1981, 6) states, ethnonationalism is “the transformation of ethnicity from a purely personal quest for meaning and belonging into a group demand for respect and power.” Another definition suggests that “ethnonationalism is the action of a group that claims some degree of self-government on the grounds that it is united by a special sense of solidarity emanating from one or more shared features and therefore forms a ‘nation’” (Lecours 2000, 105). For Romano (2006, 23), ethnonationalist movements “seek to heighten ethnic identification within a target population and then in turn politicize ethnic identity in order to challenge the state.” Finally, Eriksen (2010, 10) remarks that “most ethnic groups, even if they ask for recognition and cultural rights, do not demand command over a state. When the political leaders of an ethnic movement make demands to this effect, the ethnic movement therefore by definition becomes a nationalist movement.” These definitions and treatments suggest that in the case of ethnonationalist movements and processes, ethnicity is no longer an issue of cultural or social markers but an issue of politics. As a particular type of political movement, ethnonationalist movements might have quite diverse demands, ranging from the legal recognition of their distinct ethnic identities to certain cultural and political rights, such as language rights and power-sharing arrangements such as regional autonomy or total separation.

      Many definitions of nation, on the other hand, associate the term with notions of self-rule or self-government, political autonomy, independence, territorial self-determination, or sovereignty and statehood (e.g., Kedourie 1960; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991; Brass 1991; Calhoun 1993; Kellas 1998; van den Berghe 2001; Cederman 2002; Wolff 2006; Cornell and Hartmann 2007; R. Jenkins 2008; Barker 2009; Eriksen 2010; Wimmer 2013; Brubaker 2014). For example, Calhoun (1993, 229) states the following: “Certainly a crucial difference between ethnicities and nations is that the latter are envisioned as intrinsically political communities, as sources of sovereignty, while this is not central to the definition of ethnicities.” Barker (2009, 9) concurs: “What separates a nation from an ethnic group or other group identity is political ambition—specifically the goal of self-rule or self-determination.… A movement becomes nationalist in nature when its goal becomes self-determination.” Similarly, Eriksen (2010, 144) puts forward that “nationalism and ethnicity are kindred concepts, and the majority of nationalisms are ethnic in character. The distinction between nationalism and ethnicity as analytical concepts is a simple one.… A nationalist ideology is an ethnic ideology which demands a state on behalf of the ethnic group.” Finally, Wimmer (2013, 8) notes that “if members of an ethnic community have developed national aspirations and demand (or already control) a state of their own, we describe such categories and groups as nations” (see also Wolff 2006, 54).

      Regarding nationalism, the literature treats it as a political ideology/principle/doctrine or as a political/ideological movement. For Kedourie (1960, 9), nationalism is constituted by three propositions: “that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.” According to Gellner (1983, 1), nationalism is a political principle, which “holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.” Breuilly (1993, 2) treats nationalism as a political movement with three basic assertions: “a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character, b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values, [and] c) The nation must be as independent as possible, which usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.” Considering nationalism as an ideological movement, Smith (2006, 175) suggests that nationalism advocates “the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population, some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation.’”

      Given these definitions or conceptualizations, how should we conceptually treat the case of the Kurdish movement? Following the foregoing definitions and the general orientation in the existing literature on the Kurdish issue (e.g., see Entessar 1992, 2010; van Bruinessen 2000a, 2000b; White 2000; Natali 2005; Romano 2006; Marcus 2007; Watts 2010; Gürbüz 2016), this study treats Kurdishness and the Kurdish movement as typical forms of ethnicity and ethnonationalism, respectively. Although the origin of the Kurds is still disputed, there is a general consensus that they are the descendants of the Medes, an Indo-European tribe (see Entessar 1992, 3; White 2000, 14). The Kurdish language is regarded as a member of the Iranian languages, which stem from the Indo-European family (Entessar 1992, 4; van Bruinessen 2000a; White 2000, 16; Jwaideh 2006, 11). The most widely spoken dialects are Kurmanji, Zaza, Sorani, and Gorani (van Bruinessen 2000a; Romano 2006, 3). Kurds, who inhabit a land divided among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, are regarded as one of the largest ethnic communities in the world without an independent state of their own (e.g., Gottlieb 1994; van Bruinessen 2000a; Gunter 2004). In the Turkish setting, Kurds constitute the second-largest ethnic group after Turks. Since the Turkish state has not collected data on ethnicity since 1965, there has since been no clear consensus on the size of the current Kurdish population in Turkey; estimations, however, correspond to 15% to 18% of the total Turkish population (see also Romano 2006, 24; Marcus 2007, 3; Watts 2010, xi; Yeğen, Tol, and Çalışkan 2016, 16).10 The results of our public opinion surveys (conducted in 2011, 2013, and 2015) are in line with this estimate: on average, 16% of survey respondents identified themselves as Kurdish.11 Despite massive migration to major western and central cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, at least half of Kurds still live in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Turkey (see Koc, Hancioglu, and Cavlin 2008, 450).12 Regarding religious characteristics, our survey results suggest that the vast majority (around 90%) of the Kurds in Turkey, similar to their Turkish compatriots, subscribe to the Sunni mezhep or madhab (a Muslim school of law or fiqh [jurisprudence]).13 The majority of Sunni Kurds (around 70%) adhere to the Shafi school, while 30% practice within the Hanefi school.14

      The term Kurdish movement in this study refers to secular, left-oriented pro-Kurdish groups, which constitute by far the largest, most powerful Kurdish ethnonationalist or ethnopolitical movement in the Turkish setting (Marcus 2007, 267; Watts 2010, 22). Since the mid-1980s, this movement has posed a major challenge to the Turkish state (see Gunter 1997; Özbudun 2000; Kramer 2000; Moustakis and Chaudhuri 2005; Somer 2005; Marcus 2007; Watts 2010; Aydin and Emrence 2015).15 As a culturally and politically self-aware ethnic group, Kurds have been demanding certain cultural rights such as speaking, publishing, and broadcasting in Kurdish, public education in Kurdish, and political rights such as constitutional recognition of Kurdish ethnic identity, political representation, and power-sharing arrangements such as decentralization, self-rule (özerklik, öz yönetim), or regional autonomy.

      Regarding the state attitude, a politics of denial, suppression, and assimilation dominated Turkey’s Kurdish policy from the mid-1920s until the 1990s (Imset 1996; van Bruinessen 2000a). In this period, the state simply denied the ethnopolitical nature of the problem, defining it instead as an issue of socioeconomic underdevelopment or backwardness (i.e., the prevalence of feudalism, ignorance, and poverty in the southeast) and a security concern (banditry and terrorism incited and sponsored by foreign powers) (see also Yeğen 1996, 2007, 2011; Romano 2006; Marcus 2007; Romano and Gurses 2014; Aydin and Emrence 2015). As a solution, the state primarily relied on military measures to enhance national and regional security and exterminate the PKK (e.g., declaring a state of emergency in the region; updating military technology; increasing the number of troops deployed in the region; recruiting local people as armed village guards; empowering border protection and security;