U.S. Constitution: Foundation & Evolution (Including the Biographies of the Founding Fathers). Madison James

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Название U.S. Constitution: Foundation & Evolution (Including the Biographies of the Founding Fathers)
Автор произведения Madison James
Жанр Юриспруденция, право
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Издательство Юриспруденция, право
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isbn 9788027241057



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in all cases be necessary. A firmness & independence may be the more necessary also in this branch, as it ought to guard the Constitution against encroachments of the Executive who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch.

      Mr. Madison, considered 7 years as a term by no means too long. What we wished was to give to the Government that stability which was every where called for, and which the Enemies of the Republican form alledged to be inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much stability by the term of Seven years. His fear was that the popular branch would still be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that we had so little direct experience to guide us. The Constitution of Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy to this part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Maryland created just suspicions of danger from it. In some instances perhaps it may have erred by yielding to the H. of Delegates. In every instance of their opposition to the measures of the H. of D. they had had with them the suffrages of the most enlightened and impartial people of the other States as well as of their own. In the States where the Senates, were chosen in the same manner as the other branches, of the Legislature, and held their seats for 4 years, the institution was found to be no check whatever against the instabilities of the other branches. He conceived it to be of great importance that a stable & firm Government, organized in the republican form should be held out to the people. If this be not done, and the people be left to judge of this species of Government by the operations of the defective systems under which they now live, it is much to be feared the time is not distant when, in universal disgust, they will renounce the blessing which they have purchased at so dear a rate, and be ready for any change that may be proposed to them.

      On the question for "seven years" as the term for the 2d branch

      Massachusetts divided. (Mr. King, Mr. Ghorum ay, Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong, no) Connecticut no. N. Y. divd N. J. ay. Pennsylvania ay. Del. ay. Maryland ay. Virginia ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

      Massachusetts divd. Connecticut ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P. no. Del. ay. Maryland no. Virginia no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.

      It was then moved & agreed that the clauses respecting the stipends & ineligibility of the 2d branch be the same as, of the 1st branch: — Con: disagreeing to the ineligibility.

      It was moved & seconded to alter the Resol: 9. so as to read "that the jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall be to hear & determine in the dernier resort, all piracies, felonies, &c."

      It was moved & seconded to strike out "all piracies & felonies on the high seas," which was agreed to.

      It was moved & agreed to strike out "all captures from an enemy."

      It was moved & agreed to strike out "other States" and insert "two distinct States of the Union."

      It was moved & agreed to postpone the consideration of the Resolution 9, relating to the Judiciary:

      The Committee then rose & the House Adjourned.

       Table of Contents

      Resol: 9 being resumed

      The latter parts of the clause relating to the jurisdiction of the National tribunals, was struck out nem. con in order to leave full room for their organization.

      Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison, then moved the following resolution respecting a National Judiciary,viz "that the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall extend to cases, which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony" which was agreed to.

      Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Sherman moved to insert after the words "one supreme tribunal" the words "the Judges of which to be appointed by the National Legislature."

      Mr. Madison, objected to an appointment by the whole Legislature. Many of them were incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications. They were too much influenced by their partialities. The candidate who was present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means, would without any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a competitor not having these recommendations, but possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the appointment should be made by the Senate, which as a less numerous & more select body, would be more competent judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify such a confidence in them.

      Mr. Sherman & Mr. Pinkney withdrew their motion, and the appointment by the Senate was ag^d to nem. con.

      Mr. Gerry moved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating money bills. The other branch was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the Purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed to originate such bills, they would repeat the experiment, till chance should furnish a sett of representatives in the other branch who will fall into their snares.

      Mr. Butler saw no reason for such a discrimination. We were always following the British Constitution when the reason of it did not apply. There was no analogy between the H. of Lords and the body proposed to be established. If the Senate should be degraded by any such discriminations, the best men would be apt to decline serving in it in favor of the other branch. And it will lead the latter into the practice of tacking other clauses to money bills.

      Mr. Madison observed that the Comentators on the Brit: Const: had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the H. of L. in money bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the people as well as the 1st branch. If they said have any dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail on some member of the latter to originate the bill they wished to be passed. As the Senate would be generally a more capable sett of men, it would be wrong to disable them from any preparation of the business, especially of that which was most important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other. The Gentleman in pursuance of his principle ought to carry the restraint to the amendment, as well as the originating of money bills, since, an addition of a given sum would be equivalent to a distinct proposition of it.

      Mr. King differed from Mr. Gerry, and concurred in the objections to the proposition.

      Mr. Read favored the proposition, but would not extend the restraint to the case of amendments.

      Mr. Pinkney thinks the question premature. If the Senate should be formed on the same proportional representation