U.S. Constitution: Foundation & Evolution (Including the Biographies of the Founding Fathers). Madison James

as the Judiciary from the Legislature & from each other. There would in truth however be no improper mixture of these distinct powers in the present case. In England, whence the maxim itself had been drawn, the Executive had an absolute negative on the laws; and the Supreme tribunal of Justice (the House of Lords) formed one of the other branches of the Legislature. In short whether the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the Legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate Departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from passing laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form, the utility of annexing the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to the Executive seemed incontestable.

      Mr. Gerry thought the Executive, whilst standing alone would be more impartial than when he could be covered by the sanction & seduced by the sophistry of the Judges.

      Mr. King. If the Unity of the Executive was preferred for the sake of responsibility, the policy of it is as applicable to the revisionary as to the executive power.

      Mr. Pinkney had been at first in favor of joining the heads of the principal departments the Secretary at War, of foreign affairs &c. — in the council of revision. He had however relinquished the idea from a consideration that these could be called on by the Executive Magistrate whenever he pleased to consult them. He was opposed to the introduction of the Judges into the business.

      Col. Mason was for giving all possible weight to the revisionary institution. The Executive power ought to be well secured against Legislative usurpations on it. The purse & the sword ought never to get into the same hands whether Legislative or Executive.

      Mr. Dickinson. Secrecy, vigor & despatch are not the principal properties required in the Executive. Important as these are, that of responsibility is more so, which can only be preserved; by leaving it singly to discharge its functions. He thought too a junction of the Judiciary to it, involved an improper mixture of powers.

      Mr. Wilson remarked, that the responsibility required belonged to his Executive duties. The revisionary duty was an extraneous one, calculated for collateral purposes.

      Mr. Williamson, was for substituting a clause requiring 2/3 for every effective act of the Legislature, in place of the revisionary provision.

      On the question for joining the Judges to the Executive in the revisionary business,

      Mass. no. Connecticut ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pennsylvania no. Del. no. Maryland no. Virginia ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.

      Mr. Pinkney gave notice that tomorrow he should move for the reconsideration of that clause in the sixth Resolution adopted by the Committee which vests a negative in the National Legislature on the laws of the several States.

      The Committee rose & the House adjourned to 11 OC.

1 "Mr. Gerry. — If the national legislature are appointed by the state legislatures, demagogues and corrupt members will creep in." — Yates's Secret Debates in Forming the Constitution, 105.

2 "My own character I shall not attempt to draw, but leave those who may choose to speculate on it, to consider it in any light that their fancy or imagination may depict. I am conscious of having discharged my duty as a Soldier through the course of the late revolution with honor and propriety; and my services in Congress and the Convention were bestowed with the best intention towards the interest of Georgia, and towards the general welfare of the Confederacy. I possess ambition, and it was that, and the flattering opinion which some of my Friends had of me, that gave me a seat in the wisest Council in the World, and furnished me with an opportunity of giving these short Sketches of the Characters who composed it." — Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev., iii., 334.

      Thursday June 7th 1787 — In Committee Of The Whole

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      Mr. Pinkney according to notice moved to reconsider the clause respecting the negative on State laws, which was agreed to, and tomorrow for fixed the purpose.

      The Clause providing for the appointment of the 2d branch of the national Legislature, having lain blank since the last vote on the mode of electing it, to wit, by the 1st branch, Mr. Dickinson now moved "that the members of the 2d branch ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures."

      Mr. Sherman seconded the motion; observing that the particular States would thus become interested in supporting the National Government and that a due harmony between the two Governments would be maintained. He admitted that the two ought to have separate and distinct jurisdictions, but that they ought to have a mutual interest in supporting each other.

      Mr. Pinkney. If the small States should be allowed one Senator only, the number will be too great, there will be 80 at least.

      Mr. Dickinson had two reasons for his motion. 1, because the sense of the States would be better collected through their Governments; than immediately from the people at large; 2. because he wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters, distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible; and he thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any other mode. The greatness of the number was no objection with him. He hoped there would be 80 and twice 80. of them. If their number should be small, the popular branch could not be balanced by them. The legislature of a numerous people ought to be a numerous body.

      Mr. Williamson, preferred a small number of Senators, but wished that each State should have at least one. He suggested 25 as a convenient number. The different modes of representation in the different branches, will serve as a mutual check.

      Mr. Butler was anxious to know the ratio of representation before he gave any opinion.

      Mr. Wilson. If we are to establish a national Government, that Government ought to flow from the people at large. If one branch of it should be chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the people, the two branches will rest on different foundations, and dissensions will naturally arise between them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the people as well as the other branch, the people might be divided into proper districts for the purpose & moved to postpone the motion of Mr. Dickinson, in order to take up one of that import.

      Mr. Morris seconded him.

      Mr. Read proposed "that the Senate should be appointed by the Executive Magistrate out of a proper number of persons to be nominated by the individual legislatures." He said he thought it his duty, to speak his mind frankly. Gentlemen he hoped would not be alarmed at the idea. Nothing short of this approach towards a proper model of Government would answer the purpose, and he thought it best to come directly to the point at once. — His proposition was not seconded nor supported.

      Mr. Madison, if the motion (of Mr. Dickinson) should be agreed to, we must either depart from the doctrine of proportional representation; or admit into the Senate a very large number of members. The first is inadmissible, being evidently unjust. The second is inexpedient. The use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system, & with more wisdom, than the popular branch. Enlarge their number and you communicate to them the vices which they are meant to correct. He differed from Mr. D. who thought that the additional number would give additional weight to the body. On the contrary it appeared to him that their weight would be in an inverse ratio to their number. The example of the Roman Tribunes, was applicable. They lost their influence and power, in proportion as their number was augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious: They were appointed to take care of the popular interests & pretensions at Rome, because the people by reason of their numbers could not act in concert; were liable to fall into factions among themselves, and to become a prey to their aristocratic adversaries. The more the representatives of the people therefore were multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the more liable they became to be divided among themselves either from their own indiscretions