The Great World War 1914–1945: 1. Lightning Strikes Twice. John Bourne

business. More than anything else, this explains why shooting skills were arguably more important than flying ability.

      In the First World War the French ‘ace’ René Fonck used to spend a great deal of time while on the ground practising his shooting. Although he used a shotgun or a rifle, the principles were the same. He ended the war with an official tally of 75 victories, a total that, in fact, may have been even higher. Fonck was also renowned for his ability to dispatch an enemy aircraft using remarkably few rounds of ammunition. In the Second World War the British ‘aces’ ‘Johnnie’ Johnson and Robert Stanford Tuck, both of whom went game shooting, were able to score highly (at least 38 and 29 victories respectively) as a result of their experience of judging both distance and movement so as to bring their guns to bear on a moving target. The closer the range, the less danger of miscalculation. Even with practice, be it gained from hunting birds or in the more official surroundings of a gunnery school, the shooting ability of the top-scorers relied heavily upon developed instinct. Gunther Rail, the third-highest scoring German pilot of the Second World War, with 275 victories, noted:

      ‘I had no system of shooting as such. It is definitely more in the feeling side of things that these skills develop. I was at the front [for] five and a half years and you just get a feeling for the right amount of lead [ie angle of deflection].’¹²

      A predecessor from the Great War, Captain Frederick Libby, was of the same opinion, claiming that, ‘Aerial gunnery is ninety per cent instinct and ten per cent aim.’¹³

      The truly successful fighter pilot therefore combined situational awareness with good judgement of distance and an ability to aim his guns to best effect. Possessing above average flying ability was helpful, but not essential. No matter how skilled a shot, fighter pilots nevertheless required more than all this. Their equipment, training and tactics also had a major role to play.

      The development of air fighting in the Great War naturally demanded the consideration of both strategy and tactics. On the strategic level, the policies developed by the Allies, particularly the Royal Flying Corps, have received more attention than those of the German air service, while the tactical axioms developed by men such as Manfred Von Richthofen, Oswald Boelcke and Max Immelmann have been regarded more highly than those of the Allies. This is slightly misleading, as any study of what might be generically called ‘pithy quotes by fighter pilots’ from either World War demonstrates that there were master tacticians on both sides. The crucial point to be made is that the essential rules of air fighting remained very similar in both conflicts; furthermore, there were not a great many of them. Thus from the First World War we have Manfred Von Richthofen noting ‘the aggressive spirit, the offensive, is the chief thing everywhere in war and the air is no exception’; while a whole conflict later, ‘Johnnie’ Johnson stressed that ‘the only proper defence is offence.’¹⁴ Although this gives the impression that the tactical development of the air forces progressed on similar lines, the RAF entered the Second World War at a tactical disadvantage.

      The prescribed methods of flying and fighting laid down by Fighter Command manuals and routine orders predicated the use of either the three-aircraft section (or ‘vic’) and the line astern of four machines, with different types of attack profile being employed against fighters and bombers. The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, utilising its experience in the Spanish Civil War, adopted the more flexible ‘schwarme’ or ‘finger four’. This formation, named in its English translation after the position of the fingers of a hand laid flat on a table to demonstrate the rough positioning of the aircraft within it, developed the notion of the ‘wingman’. The aircraft in the four could, and did, divide into two sections, with each pilot certain that he was covered by his wingman. Although the pairs of aircraft usually had a designated (or de facto) lead and wing, if the wingman found himself engaged in a fight, he could usually rely upon his section lead to follow him, watching for any enemy aircraft that might try to engage. In spite of the fact that the ‘finger four’ was rapidly proven to be more effective than either the ‘vic’ or line astern, British pilots found that it was difficult to change a tactical system that had been carefully built up and protected by the entrenched bureaucracy of the inter-war years. This caused difficulties. The two wingmen in the ‘vic’ had to spend most of their time keeping formation, giving them little time to scan the sky for enemy aircraft, while the line astern simply enabled the enemy to work their way along the line.

      Most RAF units circumvented the problem of tactical ossification in high command by ignoring the official way of doing things and using the best method, although this could lead to trouble from higher authority if discovered.¹⁵ That the German method was far better is beyond doubt: the three-aircraft section left one of the aircraft without any cover for his rear quarter. When the problem of hidebound command was overcome – partly through the promotion of combat-experienced flyers to staff and command positions – the RAF was finally able to put the ‘finger four’ to good effect.

      In a replication of the First World War, the Luftwaffe began to move towards defensive operations over occupied territory while the Allies took the war to them. This was, of course, first meant to be done through the use of bombers, but when it became apparent that the unescorted bomber was vulnerable, the emphasis of the offensive was transferred to the fighter arm. Thus, strategy laid down in 1916 re-emerged, putting the fighter pilot in the vanguard of aerial operations, even though pre-Second World War theory had given prominence to the bomber. The offensive use of fighters owes most to the thoughts of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Trenchard (in 1916, a Brigadier-General). Trenchard contended that:

      ‘The moral effect produced by a hostile aeroplane is… out of all proportion to the damage which it can inflict.

      The mere presence of a hostile machine in the air inspires those on the ground with exaggerated forebodings with regard to what a machine is capable of doing.

      The sound policy then which should guide all warfare in the air would seem to be this: to exploit this moral effect of the aeroplane, but not to let him exploit it on ourselves. Now this can only be done by attacking and continuing to attack.’¹⁶

      Furthermore, Trenchard argued that:

      ‘…An aeroplane is an offensive and not a defensive weapon. Owing to the unlimited space in the air… it is impossible for aeroplanes to prevent hostile aircraft from crossing the line if they have the initiative and determination to do so.’¹⁷

      For the remainder of the war, the British more than any other air service remained wedded to the doctrine of the offensive. The policy was designed to ensure that the RFC’s army co-operation machines could operate without interference from the enemy; the safest means of doing this was to keep the enemy well behind the front lines. The disparity in losses between fighters and army co-operation machines suggests that the offensive policy worked, but it was extremely costly. Additionally, there were instances of patrols sent out over enemy lines and not meeting any opposition, but suffering losses as a result of mechanical failure or anti-aircraft fire.¹⁸

      Arthur Gould Lee, an RFC veteran, felt that Trenchard viewed the offensive in terms of gaining territory:

      ‘…for a British plane to be one mile across the trenches was offensive: for it to be ten miles across was more offensive… While we thus dissipated our strength, more often than not merely beating the empty air, the Germans… concentrated forces superior in numbers or equipment and engaged our scattered line patrols in turn, and our Distant Offensive Patrols as and when it suited them. The result was that in 1917, British air losses were at times nearly four times as great as the German.’¹⁹

      The Germans appeared to remain content to engage the RFC over their own lines, and never adopted offensive operations on the same scale. Of Manfred Von Richthofen’s 80 credited victories, 62 were destroyed over German lines or No Man’s Land. RFC ‘aces’ obtained most, if not all, of their ‘kills’ well over enemy territory.

      The Great War first demonstrated a point that remained true in the Second World War, namely that the defensive fighter force had a number of advantages when compared to an air force pursuing an offensive. Pilots who were shot down on the defending side were able to crash land or (in