GCHQ. Richard Aldrich

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Название GCHQ
Автор произведения Richard Aldrich
Жанр Историческая литература
Серия
Издательство Историческая литература
Год выпуска 0
isbn 9780007357123



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The sought-after prize was elint from Soviet guided missiles being tested at Kapustin Yar. In 1954, trials had been held in Turkey to see if ground stations could intercept the signals, but the equipment was not sensitive enough, and in any case it was hard to collect signals during the early stages of rocket flight, since they were blocked by hills near the launch site. The only option was to get closer to the take-off sites and to monitor from altitude, which meant flights over the Black Sea or the Caspian Sea. The most desperate option was perilous missions by SIS’s Technical Collection Service, with human spies furnished with specially equipped suitcases, rather like the suitcase radios carried by wartime resistance workers, which were something of a liability, since close inspection would have revealed their true purpose.24 This was the unit that also specialised in gathering intelligence on the Soviet atomic programme.25

      The nearest miss probably occurred in 1955, when the RAF’s 192 Squadron identified the first MiG-15 with airborne radar by flying directly at the Soviet border in an area near the Caspian Sea. However, the slow-flying RB-29 Washington only narrowly escaped being shot down, and returned peppered with holes. The Squadron Commander, Group Captain Norman Hoad, was awarded an Air Force Cross for the discovery of this new Soviet airborne radar.26 Was the risk worth it? As a result of this incident, in mid-December 1955 some members of the Joint Intelligence Committee began to challenge the remorseless collection of elint on Soviet air-defence capabilities. To some it seemed both expensive and dangerous. However, Eric Jones, the Director of GCHQ, argued that in the realm of sigint it was possible neither to dart about from one subject to another, nor to concentrate on one only. He reminded them that it was the extremely thorough, if tedious, collection of ‘order of battle’ intelligence that had allowed them to pick up specialist guided weapons activity that was of extreme interest to all three services, revealing new Soviet missile developments. While this was true, one might argue that Jones was bound to defend ‘order of battle’ activity for institutional reasons. Struggling against high-grade Soviet cyphers that could not be broken, this was the best product he could squeeze out from the other available electronic sources. Moreover, it reflected GCHQ’s secret deal with the armed services, which wanted sigint to have a strong focus on assisting military operations. The RAF shared the costs of airborne collection, and as Jones remarked, more than half of GCHQ’s work was now in support of defence activity.27

      Britain’s most dangerous and dramatic Cold War sigint operations remain largely unknown. Some of the most perilous missions were not in the air along the Inner German Border, but at sea. During the early 1950s, GCHQ and the Royal Navy had developed a joint programme for the concerted monitoring of Soviet signals around Murmansk and other important naval bases within the Arctic Circle. This involved sending submarines into Soviet territorial waters, and in some cases actually inside Soviet harbours. The Red Fleet knew these activities were taking place, and often responded with depth charges, making such secret missions breathtakingly dangerous.

      The most important figures on these missions were the ‘sparkers’. These were radio communications operators who had been sent to the Royal Navy’s Signals School, located at the naval station HMS Mercury near Petersfield in Hampshire, for special training in sigint listening. Here, a secret unit called the Radio Warfare Special Branch cooperated with GCHQ and planned the naval dimension of Britain’s sigint operations. Its task was not only to record Soviet voice traffic and telegraphy, but also to listen out for elint, including transmission from new Soviet radars on high frequencies such as ‘S band’ and ‘X band’. In May 1953, ten new recruits passed through the basic radio course at Mercury and then, to their abundant horror, were told that they had ‘volunteered’ for duty on submarines. The Royal Navy had only recently lost the submarines HMS Truculent and HMS Affray in tragic accidents, so submarines were not a particularly popular assignment at the time. One of the more thoughtful individuals on this basic radio course, Tony Beasley, managed to dodge immediate deployment to submarines by volunteering for a sigint course with ‘Special Branch’ that included a long period ashore learning Russian at HMS Pucklechurch.

      By 1954, Beasley had managed to join the elite ranks of the Radio Warfare personnel, which had its own heavily guarded compound on the northern edge of HMS Mercury. Here he was first instructed in Soviet communication procedures in preparation for his language course. Although HMS Mercury was far from the Soviet Union, radio signals bounced off the ionosphere at night, so transmissions from as far afield as Baku and Tbilisi could be heard comfortably. Towards the end of the ten-week ‘special course’ Beasley began to study the arcane subject of Soviet radars and guidance systems, which constituted elint collection. He had found his forte in the mysterious world of electronic signatures and wavebands, and accordingly he was diverted away from the Russian course at HMS Pucklechurch to become more of an elint specialist. Soon he was serving on fishery-protection vessels, including HMS Truelove, Mariner and Pickle. Operating out of Norwegian harbours such as Tromsø, their fishery duties gave them a legitimate reason to be close to Soviet exercises in northern waters, allowing them to sit listening at their leisure, often using their own personal monitoring equipment which they put together ‘Heath Robinson style’.

      Late in 1954, Beasley and three of his comrades found themselves back at HMS Mercury, where they had been called in to see the head of the Radio Warfare Special Branch, Lieutenant Commander Harry Selby-Bennett. As experienced elint and comint operators, they had been selected for ‘special duties’. They were told to write six weeks’ worth of letters that would be posted to their families at intervals, but were given no information about where they were going, or even what they might do. Arriving at Portsmouth with their kitbags, they were transferred to a motor launch, still none the wiser about their mysterious task or their destination. One of the four suggested it might be a submarine, but the other three laughed out loud at the idea, since none of them had been through the stringent obligatory three-month submarine course at nearby Gosport, which included passing through the famous hundred-foot salt-water escape tower. Moments later they pulled alongside the vessel on which they were to serve for many months.

      ‘Never in a million years were we expecting a submarine,’ recalls Beasley. ‘We just could not believe it…Standing together like clockwork soldiers we were ushered towards the escape hatch, just forward of the conning tower and told to drop our holdalls down the steep ladder and follow. Time was of the essence.’ Their escort, Leading Seaman ‘Snowy’ Snow, was horrified to discover that none of his new charges had been trained for submarines, and regarded them as a danger to themselves and the rest of the crew. One of Beasley’s three fellow sparkers called out: ‘What’s the name of this iron coffin?’ The answer came back, ‘HMS Turpin.28

      HMS Turpin was a Group 3 T-class submarine which entered service at the end of the Second World War. In 1945 the Allies were aware that their submarine technology was well behind that of the German U-boats, especially Hitler’s legendary late-model Type-21s. The Group 1 and Group 2 submarines that had been built earlier in the war were scrapped, but like the ill-fated USS Cochino, the Turpin and seven other Group 3 T-class submarines were sent for what was termed ‘Super-T Conversion’, essentially an interim measure before new classes of submarine came on stream. Crucially, the later Group 3 submarines were of welded rather than riveted construction, making them more streamlined than their predecessors. Their hulls were now lengthened to accommodate more electronic equipment, in some cases a sigint listening room, together with additional electric motors and new batteries. The deck gun was removed and the conning tower replaced with a more modern design that enclosed the periscopes and masts. The radar and sonar were improved. All eight boats could now achieve a speed of over eighteen knots, giving them an excellent chance of evading any Soviet hunters.29

      Tony Beasley and his three ‘Telegraphist Special’ comrades were treated to a tour of the Turpin. Snowy explained that, together with all the recent conversions to bring it up to the standard of the most advanced German U-boats, extra rib supports had been fitted to the pressure hull