Dio's Rome, Volume 3. Cassius Dio Cocceianus

assassins, perhaps? Why, it wasn't even safe for them to live in the city. Some one of the party opposed to them? Everybody suspected those people. What other man was there surpassing him in esteem, excelling him in experience? Or are you vexed that we did not choose you? What kind of administration would you have given? What would you not have done when you got arms and soldiers, considering that you occasioned so many and so great instances of turmoil in your consulship as a result of these elaborate antitheses, which you have made your specialty, of which alone you were master. [-26-] But I return to my point that you were present when it was being voted and said nothing against it, but assented to all the measures as being obviously excellent and necessary. You did not lack opportunity to speak; indeed you roared out considerable that was beside the purpose. Nor were you afraid of anybody. How could you, who did not fear the armed warrior, have quailed before the defenceless man? Or how have feared him alone when you do not dread him in the possession of many soldiers! Yes, you also give yourself airs for absolutely despising death, as you affirm.

      "Since these facts are so, which of the two, senators, seems to be in the wrong, Antony, who is managing the forces granted him by us, or Caesar, who is surrounded with such a large band of his own? Antony, who has departed to take up the office committed to him by us, or Brutus, who prevents him from setting foot in the country? Antony, who wishes to compel our allies to obey our decrees, or they, who have not received the ruler sent them by us but have attached themselves to the man who was voted against? Antony, who keeps our soldiers together, or the soldiers, who have abandoned their commander? Antony, who has introduced not one of these soldiers granted him by us into the city, or Caesar, who by money persuaded those who had long ago been in service to come here? I think there is no further need of argument to answer the imputation that he does not seem to be managing correctly all the duties laid upon him by us, and to show that these men ought to suffer punishment for what they have ventured on their own responsibility. Therefore you also secured the guard of soldiers that you might discuss in safety the present situation, not on account of Antony, who had caused no trouble privately nor intimidated you in any way, but on account of his rival, who both had gathered a force against him and has often kept many soldiers in the city itself.

      [-27-] "I have said so much for Cicero's benefit, since it was he who began unfair argument against us. I am not generally quarrelsome, as he is, nor do I care to pry into others' misdeeds, as he continually gives himself airs for doing. Now I will tell you what advice I have to give, not favoring Antony at all nor calumniating Caesar or Brutus, but planning for the common advantage, as is proper. I declare that we ought not yet to make an enemy of either of these men in arms nor to enquire exactly what they have been doing or in what way. The present crisis is not suitable for this action, and as they are all alike our fellow-citizens, if any one of them fails the loss will be ours, or if any one of them succeeds his aggrandizement will be a menace to us. Wherefore I believe that we ought to treat them as friends and citizens and send messengers to all of them alike, bidding them lay down their arms and put themselves and their legions in our hands, and that we ought not yet to wage war on any one of them, but after their replies have come back approve those who are willing to obey us and fight against the disobedient. This course is just and expedient for us,—not to be in a hurry or do anything rashly, but to wait and after giving the leaders themselves and their soldiers an opportunity to change their minds, then, if in such case there be need of war, to give the consuls charge of it.

      [-28-] "And you, Cicero, I advise not to show a womanish sauciness nor to imitate Bambalio even in making war18 nor because of your private enmity toward Antony to plunge the whole city publicly again into danger. You will do well if you even become reconciled to him, with whom you have often enjoyed friendly intercourse. But even if you continue embittered against him, at least spare us, and do not after acting as the promoter of friendship among us then destroy it. Remember that day and the speech which you delivered in the precinct of Tellus, and yield a little to this goddess of Concord under whose guidance we are now deliberating, and avoid discrediting those statements and making them appear as if not uttered from a sincere heart, or by somebody else on that occasion. This is to the advantage of the State and will bring you most renown. Do not think that audacity is either glorious or safe, and do not feel sure of being praised just for saying that you despise death. Such men all suspect and hate as being likely to venture some deed of evil through desperation. Those whom they see, however, paying greatest attention to their own safety they praise and laud, because such would not willingly do anything that merited death. Do you, therefore, if you honestly wish your country to be safe, speak and act in such a way as will both preserve yourself and not, by Jupiter, involve us in your destruction!"

      [-29-] Such language from Calenus Cicero would not endure. He himself always spoke his mind intemperately and immoderately to all alike, but he never thought he ought to get a similar treatment from others. On this occasion, too, he gave up considering the public interest and set himself to abusing his opponent until that day was spent, and naturally for the most part uselessly. On the following day and the third many other arguments were adduced on both sides, but the party of Caesar prevailed. So they voted first a statue to the man himself and the right to deliberate among the ex-quaestors as well as of being a candidate for the other offices ten years sooner than custom allowed, and that he should receive from the City the money which he had spent for his soldiers, because he had equipped them at his own cost for her defence: second, that both his soldiers and those that had abandoned Antony should have the privilege of not fighting in any other war and that land should be given them at once. To Antony they sent an embassy which should order him to give up the legions, leave Gaul, and withdraw into Macedonia—and to his followers they issued a proclamation to return home before a given day or to know that they would occupy the position of enemies. Moreover they removed the senators who had received from him governorships over the provinces and resolved that others should be sent in their place. These measures were ratified at that time. Not long after, before learning his decision, they voted that a state of rebellion existed, changed their senatorial garb, gave charge of the war against him to the consuls and Caesar (a kind of pretorian office), and ordered Lepidus and Lucius Munatius Plancus, who was governing a portion of Transalpine Gaul, to render assistance.

      [-30-] In this way did they themselves furnish an excuse for hostility to Antony, who was without this anxious to make war. He was pleased to receive news of the decrees and forthwith violently reproached the envoys with not treating him rightly or fairly as compared with the youth (meaning Caesar). He also sent others in his turn, so as to put the blame of the war upon the senators, and make some counter-propositions which saved his face but were impossible of performance by Caesar and those who sided with him. He intended not to fulfill one of their demands, well aware that they too would not take up with anything that he submitted. He promised, however, that he would do all that they had determined, that he himself might have a refuge in saying that he would have done it, while at the same time his opponent's party would be before him in becoming responsible for the war, by refusing the terms he laid before them. In fine, he said that he would abandon Gaul and disband his legions, if they would grant these soldiers the same rewards as they had voted to Caesar's and would elect Cassius and Marcus Brutus consuls. He brought in the names of these men in his request with the purpose that they should not harbor any ill-will toward him for his operations against their fellow-conspirator Decimus.

      [-31-] Antony made these offers knowing well that neither of them would be acted upon. Caesar would never have endured that the murderers of his father should become consuls or that Antony's soldiers by receiving the same as his own should feel still more kindly toward his rival. Nor, as a matter of fact, were his offers ratified, but they again declared war on Antony and gave notice to his associates to leave him, appointing a different day. All, even such as were not to take the field, arrayed themselves in military cloaks, and they committed to the consuls the care of the city, attaching to the decree the customary clause "to the end that it suffer no harm." And since there was need of large funds for the war, they all contributed the twenty-fifth part of the property they owned and the senators also four asses19 per tile of all the houses in the city that they themselves owned or dwelt in belonging to others. The very wealthy besides donated no little more, while many cities and many individuals manufactured gratuitously weapons and other necessary accoutrements for a campaign. The public treasury was at

18

The MS. reading is not wholly satisfactory here. Bekker, by a slight change, would produce (after "Bambalio"): "nor by declaring war because of," etc.

19

The Greek word is [Greek: obolos] a coin which in the fifth century B.C. would have amounted to considerably more than the Roman as; but as time went on the value of the [Greek: obolos] diminished indefinitely, so that glossaries eventually translate it as as in Latin.