The problem of demarcation in modern science. Vadim Shmal

is important to note that the Tractatus does not state that the only sentence that matters is the true sentence. It is possible to define sentences in languages in which it is impossible to say anything about the meaning of a sentence so that they can be used to define what is real, and Wittgenstein even argued that sentences in such languages make sense.

      The term «theory» is used by Wittgenstein in a completely different way. For him, theory is a formal system (in the sense of the «language of theory») in which a number of statements about the real are attributed to objects and properties in the model of the world.

      It is not immediately obvious that it is possible to define a «model of the world» in the sense in which Wittgenstein used the term, but he did. The «model of the world» that Wittgenstein defines in this context is not a physical model, but a logical model. (This can be viewed as the same as how some prefer to think of it as a model of a given mathematical theory.)

      A theory in theoretical language is a set of statements about the real that can be used to determine the reality of something.

      A good example of a theory is Einstein’s special theory of relativity, which, thanks to the use of a mathematical formal language, is perfectly suited to describe what happens to an observer in a special system of relativistic physics.

      If the model of the world doesn’t really explain everything about the world, then it may not be a very good model after all.

      Indeed, some say that the logical positivist system can actually explain more about the world than any theory it discusses. But if the system of logical positivism is not a very good model of the world, it can still be used to determine whether something is real.

      To use Wittgenstein’s terminology, the distinction between the real and the unreal for Wittgenstein is «visual.»

      For logical positivists, the world is «non-visual».

      Wittgenstein, however, does not regard the world as" non-visual, "and even if it were, it would not be a problem: it is entirely possible to describe the world in visual language. In any case, the world is a visual object, even if the universe it is in is not.

      The central theme of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is his view that language cannot distinguish between the real and the unreal, that the world is an understandable world, and that the meaning of a statement can be determined using this statement.

      Some critics have argued that these views do not «challenge» the traditional position that the world is understandable, but that they do challenge the old position that language cannot be used to distinguish the real from the unreal.

      Development of ontological relativism

      According to Alfred Jules Ayer, metaphysicians claim to have «a knowledge of reality that [transcends] the phenomenal world.» Ayer, a member of the Vienna Circle and a well-known English logical positivist, argued that it was impossible to make any statements about the world outside of direct sensory perception. If an empirical statement such as «The earth revolves around the sun,» Ayer argues, is a statement about the world outside the realm of sense perception, then that too cannot be explained.

      The Philosopher John F. Bennett formulated the «ontological anti-realistic" view of truth and truthfulness, which defies the «spirit of ontological relativism that permeates much of metaphysics» and against what Ayer, George Dyson and many other philosophers opposed to competing concepts of metaphysics in the 20- m and 21st centuries.

      Ontological realism in philosophy is the idea that objects exist independently of their behavior and relationships. Realism in this sense means that the objects in question and their relationships are real and do not depend on our beliefs and opinions. According to ontological realism, the truth of any statement about the relationship of an object, for example, «the table is actually a table,» does not depend on the person’s beliefs about the table, for example, «a table is probably a chair» or a person’s opinion about the relationship of a table to a chair, for example part of the table, «or even the relation of a chair to a table. For example, whether a person is sitting at a table depends on the statement «the table is the table,» which is a real statement. Ontological realism is usually associated with the positions of logical positivists. This school of thought emerged in the mid-1800s as a reaction to Cartesianism, which dominated the philosophy of science at the time.

      Bennett argued that in accordance with ontological realism, people cannot know about objects or their relationships, because the logical consequences of this will be contradictory, that is, the very concept of «truth» (as opposed to an opinion or assumption), going beyond the phenomenal world, is impossible… For example, people cannot know about a table, and therefore the very concept of a table is beyond experience. The logical consequence of this fact is that the right to deny the existence of an object cannot be justified. As Bennett puts it, «if [an object] has no ’informative power’ other than our relationship with the world, then we are able not only to know its truth, but also to insist on its truth with thoughts, our own and others». The logical consequence of ontological anti-realism is that ontological statements about the world are invalid.

      Bennett attributes ontological antirealism to logical positivists. For Bennett, positivists questioned the idea that a statement about an object’s relationship, such as «a table is actually a table,» is also a statement about that object, which Bennett calls an «ontological» statement. According to Bennett, ontological statements are too «abstract» to be true. For Bennett, an ontological statement about an object must represent the state of affairs with an object and must be able to justify a statement about an object. Thus, from Bennett’s point of view, a statement about the relationship of an object, such as «a table is actually a table», is also a true ontological statement, but its truth is incompatible with the truth of another ontological statement concerning the same object, that is, its relation to chair. Because of this incompatibility, statements about this object cannot be true if both statements are not true, which would be incompatible with the true nature of the object.