International naval cooperation encompasses the interaction of the U.S. Naval Services with the navies and militaries of treaty allies and partners nations in support of mutual defense. In addition, the term can be used to define other bilateral and multilateral defense and diplomatic activities affecting naval affairs, such as international law, rules of engagement, and arms control.Activities in support of mutual defense include bilateral and multilateral exercises, international programs such as cooperative acquisition and foreign military sales, combined training, and efforts towards increased interoperability. This volume presents an introductory discussion and selections from Naval Institute books and articles that concern these and other aspects of international naval cooperation.All naval professionals—without exception—encounter, directly participate, or play a supporting role in naval cooperation. Most apparent roles are those of foreign liaison assignments or service on alliance staffs, such as NATO staffs. But coalition operations have become the norm, and fighting alongside foreign navies is an expected aspect of current and future naval warfare.International military and naval cooperation is a specifically defined element of current U.S. national security strategy and codified in joint and Service doctrine. Obviously, an understanding of the subject is necessary in order to carry out the strategy.As part of the Naval Institute Wheel Book series, International Naval Cooperation is intended to provide a basic familiarization to all aspects of the subject and detailed understanding of relevant recent issues and development. Since there current exists no formal training on the subject for naval professionals—with the exception of certain specialized personnel—the book is designed to bridge the existing gap in knowledge. Such knowledge is as important for sea-going officers and sailors as those serving on staffs—perhaps more so, since it is at sea that cooperation brings practical results.In articles, interviews and speeches, recent Chiefs of Naval Operations have pointed to the need for high levels of pre-operational understanding and trust between allies and naval partners by using the admonition “you cannot surge trust.” Knowledge of naval cooperative programs is the first step towards being able to build such trust. And this book builds that knowledge.
HMS Ramillies was the last battleship to join the Grand Fleet in 1917 and survived to fight in the Second World War. Although the ship did not make headlines, she was actively employed from start to finish, and even survived being torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. In this respect she was typical rather than extraordinary but, like any large ship, to her crew she was unique – she was certainly the only ship in British naval history whose captain wore a grass skirt into battle (honoring a Maori belief that the ship would come to no harm while he did so; Ramillies survived the war). This book, produced with the full cooperation of the HMS Ramillies Association, is a tribute to the ship in words and photographs, deftly assembled from a combination of interviews with surviving crew members, and carefully researched diaries and written accounts by those connected with the ship, including HRH the Duke of Edinburgh for whom Ramillies was his first ship. Many personal photo albums were unearthed to provide previously unpublished illustrations, which add a further dimension to a vivid picture of naval life in an almost-forgotten era.
The launch in 1906 of HMS Dreadnought, the world’s first all-big-gun battleship, rendered all existing battle fleets obsolete while at the same time wiping out the Royal Navy’s numerical advantage. Britain urgently needed to build an entirely new battle fleet of these larger, more complex and more costly vessels. In this she succeeded spectacularly: in little over a decade fifty such ships were completed, almost exactly double what Germany achieved. This heroic achievement was made possible by the country’s vast industrial nexus of shipbuilders, engine manufacturers, armament firms and specialist armor producers, whose contribution to the creation of the Grand Fleet is too often ignored.
Col. Wesley Fox is a Medal of Honor recipient who wrote two widely respected accounts of his wartime experiences in the Marine Corps. His books, Marine Rifleman: Forty-Three Years in the Corps and Courage and Fear: A Primer, are both considered classic war memoirs.Drawing on over four decades of leadership experience, both during two wars and peacetime, Fox insists that a good leader must focus on building an organization based on the bonds of comradeship. Successful leaders are those who are actively concerned with the health, happiness, and daily lives of those who follow them. He contends that those who have such leaders will be better prepared to cope with any challenge because they are part of a group built on loyalty and trust. Fox defines the six essential elements of successful leadership as care, personality, knowledge, motivation, commitment, and communication. He presents a chapter on each element, recounts how his views of leadership were forged, and offers impressive examples of leadership displayed by his fellow Marines. While drawn directly from his military experience, Fox contends that these six elements apply to all who want to pursue effective leadership. His book is certain to inspire and motivate both civilians and members of the military.
The declaration of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 presented American foreign policy officials with two dilemmas: how to deal with the communist government on the mainland and what to do about Chiang Kai-shek’s holdout Nationalist regime on Taiwan. By early 1950 these questions were pressing hard upon U.S. civilian and military planners and policy makers, for it appeared that the Red Army was preparing to invade the island. Most observers believed that nothing short of American military intervention would preclude a communist victory on Taiwan. How U.S. officials grappled with the question of what to do about Taiwan is at the heart of this study.Prior to the publication of this book, much of the historical literature on this critical period in U.S. policy toward China concentrated on the question of relations with the new regime in Beijing. A focus on those debates has largely overshadowed the concomitant policy debates that centered around the question of how to deal with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. As this study shows, the two issues were inextricably linked and developing a Taiwan policy was no less difficult or controversial. Heavily informed by an analysis of declassified U.S. government documents and other primary sources, this history strongly suggests that had North Korea not invaded the south in June 1950 the U.S. would not have intervened to save Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan from near-certain invasion.Beyond the narrative itself, this volume is also a case study into the complex and sometimes messy processes by which foreign policy is made. It explores the tensions that existed within the Truman administration between the State Department and various newly-created entities such as the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council. Indeed, the history of policymaking for China and Taiwan in 1949-50 is also a case study in the early development of the post-war interagency system. It also underscores the tensions between the Executive and Legislative branches in the development of foreign policy.The study also brings to light little-discussed and often uncomfortable issues in Taiwan history, some of which still have relevance to politics on the island even today. These include the legacies of the Japanese colonial experience, the post-war Nationalist occupation, and the early stirrings of the “Formosan” independence movement, to name just a couple.Today, U.S. policy toward Taiwan remains a highly-charged and fundamentally divisive issue in U.S.-China relations — especially the security dimensions of that policy. And even today U.S. Taiwan policy is still subject to partisan politics in Washington as well as in Taipei. For those who still grapple with this issue, this volume presents the roots of the dilemma and essential background reading.
The classic collection of articles from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, now in ebook form.
This fresh look at America’s first sea warrior avoids the hero worship of past biographies and provides a more complete understanding of his accomplishments. Writing from the perspective of a naval officer with more than thirty years of experience and a seaman with a lifetime of sailing know-how, Callo examines Jones’ extraordinary career by going beyond his legendary naval achievements to establish him as a key player in the American Revolution. Analyzing his relationships with important civilian leaders of the Revolution, such as Benjamin Franklin, the author demonstrates how Jones’ handling of those often difficult dealings contributed to the nation’s concept of civilian control of the military. In this acclaimed biography, Jones is shown to be not only a highly-skilled and relentless commander, but the first serving American naval officer to emphasize the role the Navy could play in the rise of the United States as a global power.
A collection of esssays on 12 officers who helped to build the foundation of the U.S. Naval tradition.
For years, the Marine Corps has touted the prescience of Lieutenant Colonel “Pete” Ellis, USMC, who predicted in 1921 that the United States would fight Japan and how the Pacific Theater would be won. Now, for the first time, those predictions and other works by the “amphibious prophet” are available in print.Included is two works by Ellis on naval and amphibious operations, including Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, the study of tactics and operations in the Pacific Ocean that the United States Navy and Marine Corps would use to win the war against Imperial Japan. Ellis describes the form and functions of a modern Marine Corps designed to win its Nation’s battles. Ellis’ ideas about how the Marine Corps should fight are still in use throughout the world today.Ellis’ ideas on amphibious operations are well known, but his ideas on counterinsurgency and conventional war have been overshadowed and forgotten. Ellis wrote two articles based on his warfighting experiences in the Philippines and as part of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe during World War I. These articles, last published in the early 1920’s, are both republished in this book and show Ellis as a prescient thinker who was ahead of his time. Ellis identifies concepts that the U.S. military struggles with even today, and that other thinkers would not identify for decades after Ellis’ death.Also included are six essays by the editor, introducing the ideas of Pete Ellis and putting them in a modern context. As the United States turns its focus to the Pacific, Ellis’ ideas can inform policymakers on the dynamics of strategy and warfare in the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean. Edited by Captain B. A. Friedman, USMC, 21st Century Ellis reveals the strategic insights of Pete Ellis for then and now.
How does one engage in the study of strategy? Strategy: The Study of Strategy from Archidamus to Airpower, argues that strategy is not just concerned with amassing knowledge; it is also about recognizing our imperfect understanding of the environment, and respecting the complex nature of adaptation to the unforeseen or unexpected. In essence, the strongest strategists are those who commit to an education that cultivates a more holistic and adaptive way of thinking.With that thought in mind, the authors of Strategy offer ways of thinking strategically about a variety of subject matters, from classical history to cyber power. Each contributing chapter author is a current or former professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies in Montgomery, AL, widely considered the DoD’s premier school of strategy. Each earned a PhD in either history or political science. All contributors are prolific and widely respected in their fields. Practitioners in the profession of arms, perhaps more than anyone else, must think strategically about the application of power on land, at sea, and in the air, space and cyberspace. In addition to the exploration of various sub-disciplines regarding strategy’s role in the employment of power, and perhaps more importantly, Strategy illuminates different approaches to thinking about strategy, which have implications beyond the profession of arms. Therefore, the authors examine the learning and teaching of strategic concepts. The book does not provide a blueprint for how to teach or learn strategy (in fact, the authors contend that such a blueprint would be short-sighted and perhaps even dangerous). On the contrary, the work explores how one should think about the study of strategy through an appreciation of both context and uncertainty.Thus, the book not only contributes to a greater understanding of the strategic aspects of the employment of power, but also widens the aperture in recognizing different ways to explore new concepts. The authors contend that only through a willingness to explore different approaches do budding strategists make the most of their journey.