Airpower in Action tells the story of the evolution of airpower and its impact upon the history of warfare. Through a critical examination of twenty-nine case studies in which the United States in various coalitions and Israel played significant roles, the book offers perspectives on the political purpose, strategic meaning, and military importance of airpower. The authors demystify some of airpower’s strategic history by extracting the most useful teachings to help military professionals and political leaders understand what airpower has to offer as a “continuation of politics by other means.”<p>Airpower in Action presents a spectrum of aerospace achievements, limitations, and potential that demonstrates how warfare has changed over the last few decades and why airpower has become a dominant factor in war. The case studies emphasize the importance of connecting policy and airpower: strategic effectiveness cannot substitute for poor statecraft. As the United States, its allies, and Israel have seen in their most recent applications of airpower, even the most robust and capable air weapon can never be more effective than the strategy and policy it is intended to support. By analyzing the operational history of the world’s most battle-tested air forces, the case studies can help military professionals understand the political context in which air operations must be assessed—beyond technological and statistical data—and develop an appreciation of the strategic value of airpower, rather than follow the tactical land-centric line of reasoning that still dominates military thinking.<p>As a whole, this study is intended to encourage military professionals to combine the insights gained from these historical events with their specific fields of expertise, and ultimately to incorporate their enhanced airpower competence into their discussions with political decision makers, nongovernmental organizations, and fellow officers of all services. The focus on lessons and prospects allows officers to reflect on their calling and to articulate military principles more effectively in the councils of defense planning. Thus, while the historical chapters are relevant in their own right, the potential lessons must become integral to both the theoretical and applied dimensions of the airpower profession. The real value of airpower does not depend on promises of tactical and technological excellence, but on airpower’s relevance to statecraft proper and its ability to secure strategic and political objectives at a cost acceptable to governments and the public. The future of airpower lies in the ability of its practitioners to connect it to national policy and to view airpower in its political-strategic rather than tactical-technological domains.<p>In sum, the U.S. and Israeli experiences show how and why airpower has become the political leaders’ “instrument of choice” for demonstrating national resolve. Airpower has become a symbol of American and Israeli strength, the supreme political muscle and ultimate trump card. This book should therefore be of interest to any nation that aspires to develop and operate airpower, or seeks to defend itself against it.
This book covers the history of the military profession in the Western World from the ancient Greeks to the present day. Drawing from military history, from sociology, and other disciplines, it goes beyond traditional insights to locate the military profession in the context of both literary and cultural history. The thesis of the book is that soldiers have made an unacknowledged contribution to the theory and practice of civilization, and that they will again be called upon to do so going forward in important ways. While this thesis is not original, the approach to upholding it is, particularly in the extent to which the book draws on the disciplines of the humanities to make its points.<p>The military profession, considered most comprehensively, might be considered as an interdisciplinary branch of the humanities. A soldier is made of the words of history, poetry, and the laws and language of his calling. To fulfill its future role, the military professionals of today must know, heed, and apply the examples and narrative of the most successful and exemplary military professionals of the past at their best.<p>Given the possibility of devastating conflicts or natural cataclysms in our century, the military profession might be called upon to preserve values of civilization even after the physical temple has been pulled down. The profession of arms is still something that civilization cannot exist without, and perhaps only its unique combination of strength and wisdom in matters of life and death will be sufficient to save us.
On Tactics is intended to be the remedy to the chaotic and thus far unformed realm of tactical theory and to answer questions like the one above. Part One of the book will establish a tactical system meant to replace the Principles of War checklist. First, the contextual role of tactics with regards to strategy and war will be established. This will necessarily lean on major strategic theories in order to illuminate the role of tactics. This section will be formed around the Physical, Mental, and Moral planes of battlefield interaction used by theorists such as J.F.C Fuller and John Boyd. Each plane will then be examined in turn, and many of the classic Principles of War will be discussed along with some new ones. It will present some standard methods that tacticians can use to gain an advantage on the battlefield using historical examples that illustrate each concept. These “tactical tenants” include maneuver, mass, firepower, tempo, surprise, deception, confusion, shock, and the role of the moral aspects of combat. Finally, Part One will circle back around by discussing the role of tactical victory- once achieved- in contributed to a strategy. Part One is short by design. It is intended to be both compelling and easily mastered for junior non-commissioned officers and company grade officers, while still rich enough to be interesting to both specialist and non-specialist academics. It is a book meant not just for bookshelves but also for ruck sacks and cargo pockets. <p>Part Two will build on Part One by exploring concepts with which the tactician must be familiar with such as the culminating point of victory, mission tactics and decentralized command and control, offensive and defensive operations, and the initiative. Part Three will conclude the book examining implications of the presented tactical systems to a variety of other issues in strategic studies.
Patton’s Way is a unique approach to the legend of General George S. Patton, Jr. and his development and application of a unique approach to modern warfare.<p>Unlike Carlo D’Este’s Patton: Genius for War or Stanley Hirshson’s General Patton: A Soldier’s Life, Patton’s Way is not a biography. Instead, it argues that popular representations of Patton are built on misconceptions and incomplete understandings about his approach to warfare.<p>Morningstar begins with the mystifying contradiction between the historiographical criticism of Patton’s methods and popular appreciation for his successes. He identifies several schools of thought offering explanations ranging from Patton’s bull headed leadership to his gambling cavalry style. Yet, the author notes, they all fail to fully comprehend the real Patton.<p>It is the contention of this book that the secret to Patton’s success was a truly radical and purposely-crafted doctrine he developed over several decades of careful thought and practice. Morningstar identifies four core principals in Patton’s doctrine: targeting the enemy’s morale through shock; utilizing highly practiced combined arms mechanized columns; relying on mission tactics and flexible command and control; and employing multi-layered and synthesized intelligence systems to identify enemy capabilities and weak spots. These principals directly contradicted official U.S. Army doctrine in that they rejected the focus on tactical battle, the primacy of infantry, top-down command and control and detailed orders processes, and intelligence limited to supporting preconceived plans. Because Patton’s methods did not conform to doctrine, they were not well understood by his peers, resulting in misconceptions both then and now – misconceptions that led higher command to truncate Patton’s operations in Tunisia, Sicily, and France.<p>The author uses separate chapters to detail how Patton developed and applied each principal, before using the breakout from Normandy as a case study to illustrate Patton’s Way in application. The comparison of Patton’s success to the many instances of stagnation in the European Theater without Patton is startling but the author also recognizes other campaigns and how they related to Patton’s concepts.<p>In the Chapter 6 the author illustrates the ‘death and resurrection’ of Patton’s ideas in the US Army. Following World War II both Patton’s teachings and adherents were systematically removed from the Army operations. Political constraints led to a resurgence of attrition based doctrine and heavy firepower tactics in Korea and Vietnam. Only at the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, did Patton’s ideas take root only to blossom in the form of AirLand Battle doctrine towards the end of the century after a long and interesting route. The author ends by briefly describing the status of Patton’ ideas in the Army today.
Naval service is an apprenticed profession. Experienced sailors mentor their younger shipmates, passing down their hard-earned knowledge and skills, and working side-by-side to develop the next generation of sailors. This Wheel Book includes some of the best writing on mentoring in the sea services from the past 100 years, offering guidance to sailors who are looking to find a mentor, providing advice to junior officers who are trying to figure out how to mentor their sailors while simultaneously developing their own capabilities, and providing advice and examples for senior leaders who are seeking to encourage mentoring in their command without pushing too hard.
This collection of essays demonstrates the critical role of Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) in the development of maritime strategy and sea power theory in the early 20th century. His close connections with Alfred T Mahan and William S Sims helped reinforce the trans-Atlantic axis of sea power theory and naval education. Corbett worked closely with Admiral Lord Fisher (1840-1920) to enhance the strategic planning of the Royal Navy, and compiled the official history of the First World War.
Struggle at Sea is an operational history that records every naval engagement fought between major surface warships during the First World War. The book is organized into seven major chapters. The first introduces the technology, the weapons, the ships, and the doctrine that governed naval warfare in 1914. The next five chapters treat each year of the war and are subdivided into sections corresponding to major geographic areas. The elements of these geographic chapters are the battles themselves. This organization allows the massive sweep of action to be presented in a structured and easy to follow format. The book includes engagements fought by the Austro-Hungarian, British, French, German, Ottoman, and Russian Navies and covers actions fought in the Adriatic, Aegean, Baltic, Black, and North Seas as well as the Atlantic, India, and Pacific Oceans. A conclusion analyzes and summarizes the role of surface combat in the Great War and compares these actions to those fought in the major naval wars before and after.<p>Struggle at Sea is concerned with the questions of why battles occurred; how the different navies fought, and how combat advanced doctrine and affected the development and application of technology. Certain key or interesting battles are described in greater detail to give better insight into the period’s naval warfare. Moreover, every battle is placed in context. The result is a holistic overview of the war at sea as it affected all nations and all theaters of war. A work with this content and format has never been produced.<p>In addition to providing detailed descriptions of actions and setting them in their historical contexts, the book develops several themes. It shows that World War One was a war of navies as much as a war of armies. The Entente Powers would have lost the war had they lost control of the sea, while the Central Powers faced slow strangulation due to the Entente naval blockade. It shows that surface combat and the ability to impose surface combat power had a major impact on all aspects of the naval war and on the course of the war in general. This work also shows that systems developed in peace do not always work as expected; that some are not used as anticipated; and that others became unexpectedly important. There is much for today’s naval professional to consider in the naval conflict that occurred one hundred years ago.
One of this century’s most significant events, China’s maritime transformation is already making waves. Yet China’s course and its implications, including at sea, remain highly uncertain—triggering intense speculation and concern from many quarters and in many directions. It has never been more important to assess what ships China can supply its navy and other maritime forces with, today and in the future.<p>China’s shipbuilding industry has grown more rapidly than any other in modern history. Commercial shipbuilding output jumped thirteen-fold from 2002-12. Beijing has largely met its goal of becoming the world’s largest shipbuilder by 2015. Yet progress is uneven, with military shipbuilding leading overall but with significant weakness in propulsion and electronics for military and civilian applications alike. Moreover, no other book has answered three pressing questions: What are China’s prospects for success in key areas of naval shipbuilding? What are the likely results for China’s navy? What are the implications for the U.S. Navy?<p>To address these critical, complex issues, this volume brings together some of the world’s leading experts and linguistic analysts, often pairing them in research teams. These sailors, scholars, analysts, industry experts, and other professionals have commanded ships at sea, led shipbuilding programs ashore, toured Chinese vessels and production facilities, invested in Chinese shipyards and advised others in their investment, and analyzed and presented important data to top-level decision-makers in times of crisis. In synthesizing their collective insights, the book fills a key gap in our understanding of China, its shipbuilding, its navy, and what it all means.<p>Their findings will fascinate and concern you. While offering different perspectives, they largely agree on several important points. Through a process of “imitative innovation,” China has been able to “leap frog” some naval development, engineering, and production steps and achieve tremendous cost and time savings by leveraging work done by the U.S. and other countries. China’s shipbuilding industry is poised to make the PLAN the second largest Navy in the world by 2020, and—if current trends continue—a combat fleet that in overall order of battle (i.e., hardware-specific terms) is quantitatively and even perhaps qualitatively on a par with that of the U.S. Navy by 2030. Already, Chinese ship-design and -building advances are helping the PLAN to contest sea control in a widening arc of the Western Pacific.<p>China continues to lack transparency in important respects, but much is knowable through the interdisciplinary research approach pioneered by the Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute in the series “Studies in Chinese Maritime Development,” of which this is the sixth volume.
This collection of essays was first published in 1974, and the fact that it remains relevant today is a testament to Marder’s legacy as arguably the greatest naval historian of the 20th century. Readability is part of what made Marder such an excellent historian, and it is displayed perfectly in this collection. Focusing less on abstract forces and more on human influence, Marder creates a book as accessible to the layman as it is interesting to the historian.
This book is written to be a comprehensive guide to cybersecurity and cyberwar policy and strategy, developed for a one- or two-semester class for students of public policy (including political science, law, business, etc.). Although written from a U.S. perspective, most of its contents are globally relevant.It is written essentially in four sections. The first (chapters 1 – 5) describes how compromises of computers and networks permit unauthorized parties to extract information from such systems (cyber-espionage), and/or to force these systems to misbehave in ways that disrupt their operations or corrupt their workings. The section examines notable hacks of systems, fundamental challenges to cybersecurity (e.g., the lack of forced entry, the measure-countermeasure relationship) including the role of malware, and various broad approaches to cybersecurity.The second (chapters 6 – 9) describes what government policies can, and, as importantly, cannot be expected to do to improve a nation’s cybersecurity thereby leaving leave countries less susceptible to cyberattack by others. Among its focus areas are approaches to countering nation-scale attacks, the cost to victims of broad-scale cyberespionage, and how to balance intelligence and cybersecurity needs.The third (chapters 10 – 15) looks at cyberwar in the context of military operations. Describing cyberspace as the 5th domain of warfare feeds the notion that lessons learned from other domains (e.g., land, sea) apply to cyberspace. In reality, cyberwar (a campaign of disrupting/corrupting computers/networks) is quite different: it rarely breaks things, can only be useful against a sophisticated adversary, competes against cyber-espionage, and has many first-strike characteristics.The fourth (chapters 16 – 35) examines strategic cyberwar within the context of state-on-state relations. It examines what strategic cyberwar (and threats thereof) can do against whom – and how countries can respond. It then considers the possibility and limitations of a deterrence strategy to modulate such threats, covering credibility, attribution, thresholds, and punishment (as well as whether denial can deter). It continues by examining sub rosa attacks (where neither the effects nor the attacker are obvious to the public); the role of proxy cyberwar; the scope for brandishing cyberattack capabilities (including in a nuclear context); the role of narrative and signals in a conflict in cyberspace; questions of strategic stability; and norms for conduct in cyberspace (particularly in the context of Sino-U.S. relations) and the role played by international law.The last chapter considers the future of cyberwar.