A Methodical System of Universal Law. Johann Gottlieb Heineccius

his goods in his life, or in the prospect of death (§268), and then just as much is transferred to another, as he who alienates willed to transfer, (§279), it is plain the effects of dominion may be restricted by the pact and disposition of the former owner,^† and in this case the possessor can arrogate no more to himself than he received from the former owner, unless he in whose favour the restriction was made, voluntarily quit his right, cease to exist, or lose his right by a just cause. <239>

      SECTION CCCXIX

      A proprietor ought not to be hurt by any one in the use of his own.

      Hitherto we have only treated of rights arising from dominion or property. Now since right and obligation are correlates, and therefore a right being constituted an obligation is constituted (§7); the consequence is, that as many rights as dominion gives to an owner, just so many obligations does it lay others under with regard to the owner. Because therefore an owner hath the liberty of disposing (§306), they injure him who hinder him in disposing or enjoying the fruits of his own:^* They also do him damage who corrupt or spoil the fruits and accessions of his property. And in general, since he who intercepts or corrupts any thing that tends to the perfection or happiness of another certainly wrongs him (§82), but none ought to be wronged (§178); hence we may justly conclude, that none ought to have his free disposition of his own disturbed or hindered; that none ought to have his goods damaged; and therefore, if any thing of that kind be done, the author of the injury is bound to make reparation, and is moreover liable to punishment.

      SECTION CCCXX

      Nor directly nor indirectly intercept or hinder his possession.

      Seeing possession belongs to the rights of property (§306), the consequence is, that it is our duty to <240> suffer every one to possess his own quietly and unmolested, and not to deprive any one of his possession against his will directly or indirectly. And that if any one can be proved to have done any such thing, he is bound as an injurious person, to repair all the damage he has done, and is moreover liable to condign punishment.

      SECTION CCCXXI

      It is done directly by theft, rapine and violent ejection.

      One carries off another’s possession directly, either by open force, or by taking it away clandestinely. The latter is called theft. The former, if the thing be moveable, is called rapine; and if it be immoveable it is called force, or violent ejection. Theft is therefore taking away another’s goods in a clandestine manner, without the knowledge and against the will of the owner, to make profit of them.^*Rapine or robbery is bearing off a moveable thing by violence, against the owner’s will, to make profit of it: And force is ejecting one violently out of his possession of an immoveable thing. <241>

      SECTION CCCXXII

      Indirectly by defrauding.

      One is said to take away another’s possession indirectly, who by fraudulent words or deeds is the cause of his losing it; and this we call defraudation. Now since one is likewise hurt in this manner, but none ought to do to another what he would not have done to himself (§177); it is self-evident, that they are no less guilty than thiefs and robbers, who, by insidious words, cheat one out of his goods;^* or by moving boundaries, using false weights and measures, and other such knavish practices, adventure to take off any thing from one’s estate.

      SECTION CCCXXIII

      What is another’s ought to be restored to him.

      The last right which belongs to the lord of a thing, viz. the right of recovering it, must found <242> an obligation to restore what belongs to another to its owner. But hence we conclude, that every one, into whose hands any thing belonging to another comes without his fault, is obliged to take care that it be restored to its owner;^* and therefore, that it ought not to be hid or concealed, but that public notice ought to be given of it, that the owner may have it again, upon making his right to it appear, Deut. xxii. 1. l. 43. §4. D. de furt. and that the possessor ought to be much more ready to restore it, if the author claim it, or publickly advertise his having lost it. But in both cases equity requires partly that the restitution should not be made at the expence of an honest possessor, and partly that he may not be made richer at another’s cost (§312). <243>

      SECTION CCCXXIV

      What if the true owner do not appear.

      But if the true owner do not appear to claim a thing, it is understood to be no body’s, and therefore it justly falls to the honest possessor^* (§241). And tho’ those who have assumed to themselves the direction of consciences, commonly exhort to give things to the poor when the owner of them does not appear; yet he cannot be called unjust, who, making use of his right, takes to himself a thing morally free from dominion. See Nic. Burgund. ad consu. Flandr. l. 2. n. 1.²

      REMARKS on This Chapter

      We have not had occasion for some time to add to our Author, or to make any remarks on his reasonings. And indeed the reason why I choose to translate this Author into our language, is because there is seldom any occasion to add to what he says, and almost never any ground of disputing against him, so orderly, clear, just and full, is his method of proceeding in this most useful of all sciences. But because usucapion and prescription are usually treated of at greater length by writers on the laws of nature and nations than our Author does; and because this is a proper occasion to explain a little upon the distinctions that are commonly made <244> by moralists about the dictates of the law of nature and right reason, or conformity to them, let me subjoin the following observations.

      1. First of all, it is proper to observe the difference which the Roman law makes between prescription in general, and that kind of it which they distinguished by the name of usucapio. By usucapio they meant the manner of acquiring the property of things by the effect of time. And prescription had also the same meaning; but it signified moreover the manner of acquiring and losing all sorts of rights and actions, by the same effect of the time regulated by law. See l. un. C. de usucap. transf. & Inst. de usucap. and Domat’s civil law, in their natural order, T. 1. p. 485. But writers on the law of nature have now very seldom occasion to make use of the word usucapio; that of prescription being now common by usage, both to the manner of acquiring the property of things, and to that of acquiring and losing all sorts of rights by the effect of time. 2. The chief reasons assigned by the Roman law for the first introducing of property by prescription, are, as Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations hath observed, book 4. cap. 12. §5. “That in order to the avoiding of confusion, and cutting off disputes and quarrels, it is of great consequence to the public welfare, that the proprieties of things should be fixed and certain amongst the subjects, which would be impossible, should perpetual indulgence be allowed to the negligence of former owners, and should the new possessors be left in continual fear of losing what they held. (Ne scilicet quarundam rerum diu & fere semper incerta dominia essent, l. 1. ff. de usurp. & usucap.) Again, trade and commerce could not otherwise subsist in the world. For who would ever contract with another? who would ever make a purchase, if he could never be secured in the quiet possession of any thing conveyed to him? Nor would it be a sufficient remedy in this case, that if the thing should be thus challenged by a third party, the person from whom we receive it should be obliged to make it good; for after so long a course of time, thousands of accidents might render him incapable of giving us this satisfaction. And what grievous commotions must shake the commonwealth, if at so vast a distance of years, so many contracts were to be disannulled, so many successions were to be declared void, and so many possessors to be ejected? It was therefore judged sufficient to allow such a time, as large as in reason could be desired, during which the lawful proprietors might recover their own. But if through sloth and neglect they suffered it to slip, the Praetor might fairly reject their too late importunity. And tho’ it might so happen, that now and then a particular person lost his advantage of recovering his goods, utterly against his will and without his fault, only because he was unable to find out the possessor, yet the damage and inconvenience arising from that general statute to some few private men, is compensated by the benefit it affords to the public.” It was a judicious reflexion of Aratus of <245>