The Law of Nations Treated According to the Scientific Method. Christian von Wolff

the curia, and open squares in cities. Here, too, to-day belong pastures in the country, forests fit for cutting, common groves. Here likewise are to be included temples and ecclesiastical property in city or country. All these things are in the mixed common holding of definite groups, inasmuch as the ownership is with a definite corporation, but the use is open to individuals who belong to the corporation. But since these rights can be changed by the act of men, by agreement between those to whom they belong, and because the use of the things belongs either to the whole or to the individuals, therefore things corporate can be still more minutely subdistinguished, and from this have arisen the difficulties which distract the interpreters of the Roman law. So by force of agreement there seem to be added to the positive common holding things which of themselves are to be referred to the mixed common holding, as when it is not allowed to individuals to drive into the common pastures more than a definite number of cattle, or hay growing in the common meadow is to be distributed to individuals in definite shares. But the mixed common holding suffers no change, if any one is allowed to hew down the quantity of wood which he needs, or mow down grass with a sickle in the common meadow in

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      accordance with his needs, or even drive into the common pasture as many cattle as he pleases. Likewise the common use of the temples has reference to the people as a whole, but the use of common meadows and pasture lands belongs to individuals. Nay, the use of those things also, which none except the people as a whole can have, belongs either directly or indirectly to the people as a whole. The temples are an example of the direct use, in which the people as a whole in general are free to attend sacred services; goods assigned to the support of the pastor of the church are an example of the indirect use, since the use of these goods only indirectly belongs to the people as a whole. A like distinction worthy of note occurs also in things public—a thing which we consider superfluous to pursue more at length. But now if you will really depend on our definitions, by which we have distinguished things occupied by a nation, no ambiguity or difficulty seems to be left. But if you shall be pleased to subdistinguish these more minutely, we shall not object. Nevertheless it will be difficult to find in the Latin language words suitable to characterize things so distinguished.

      § 89. Of the derivative way in which a corporation acquires things

      § 12, part 3, Jus Nat.

      § 11, part 3, Jus Nat.

      § 88.

      Any one can turn his own property into the property of a corporation, either directly or indirectly, either simply or under a definite condition, as shall seem best to him. For any one can transfer the ownership of his own property to another, whomsoever he shall desire, and in whatever way he shall desire. Therefore he can likewise transfer the ownership of his property to a certain definite group of men, or community, as shall seem best to him; consequently since things belong to a corporation, which come into such a mixed common holding either directly or indirectly, any one can turn his own property into the property of a corporation, either directly or indirectly, either simply or under a definite condition, as shall seem best to him.

      §§ 176, 177, part 2, Jus Nat.

      So an owner can give or sell, or when dying can bequeath his property to a corporation, nay, he can even appoint any corporation as heir. And so it is plain not only that the property of a corporation can be acquired by original acquisition, but also that a derivative method of acquiring the property of a corporation is allowed. Here, too, belongs

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      the case of some one providing for the building, at his own expense, of a fountain for common use in the forum or in another public square that belongs to a corporation.

      § 90. Of the alienation and pledge of property of a corporation

      § 484, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 507, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 88.

      The property of a corporation cannot be alienated from the corporation at will, nor can it be pledged, unless some pressing necessity exists or the evident advantage of the corporation recommends it. Since a particular church is a certain corporation or community, since, moreover, ecclesiastical property by nature belongs to a particular church in a certain definite place, that property belongs to a corporation. Therefore that the property of a corporation cannot be alienated or pledged at will is proved in the same manner as we have shown likewise in the case of ecclesiastical property. Which was the first point.

      §§ 510, 516, part 8, Jus Nat.

      §§ 514, 516, part 8, Jus Nat.

      That in case of pressing necessity it is allowable to sell or to pledge, is likewise plain in the same manner as we have proved the same in the case of ecclesiastical property. Which was the second point.

      § 511, part 8, Jus Nat.

      Finally, if the evident advantage of the corporation recommends the alienation or pledge of the property of a corporation, when nothing is done to the disadvantage of the corporation for the future, but rather there is due consideration for it; nothing prevents the alienation or pledge from being made, since in fact nothing stands in the way of the alienation or pledge, such as a disadvantage which may come to the corporation in the future, as is evident from the proof of the limitation of the right of the church in ecclesiastical property. Which was the third point.

      Although we discussed ecclesiastical property in universal public law, nothing as yet had been said of public property, which we were obliged to postpone to the law of nations. Therefore it was not feasible first to prove the things which must be held concerning the alienation and pledge of the property of a corporation, and then apply those same things to ecclesiastical property; but the general demonstration had to be applied to the particular case. Nor is this wrong in any way. So Euclid, when in his “Elements” he discussed the circle as a certain

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      sort of curve, makes plain in the instance of the circle what holds true of all curves, and, following his example, Apollonius proves the same things concerning particular conic sections.⁴ Moreover they were able likewise to prove the same things in general concerning curves and then to apply them to the circle and to conic sections as to species included under a genus, just as afterwards Barrow gave general proofs in his “Geometrical Lectures.”⁵ If there should have been reasons why there ought to be a consideration of a certain species before there was a consideration of the genus, it cannot be otherwise than that the things which could be proved in regard to the genus, would likewise be so proved in regard to the species that the general demonstration would be applied just as to the species. And hence it happens that something can be proved in regard to the genus in the same manner in which it has been proved in regard to the species. We think it well advised that such cautions be given for the sake of those who have a special liking for accurate method, and in order that the captious criticism of the superficial may be avoided, who seem to themselves not even to have discovered what boys find in a bean, if they censure those things which because of a lack of intelligence they do not adequately understand.

      § 91. Whether the consent of the ruler of the state is needed for alienation and pledge

      § 395, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 90.

      § 658, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.

      If necessity urges the alienation or pledge by a corporation of property belonging to it, or its evident advantage recommends it, that ought not to be done without the consent of the superior or ruler of the state. For since the right belongs to the ruler of a state to compel his subjects by force to regulate at least their external acts according to the law of nature, he also ought not to allow corporations to alienate or pledge corporate property at will, and since that may not be done except in case of extreme necessity or plain advantage, the ruler of the state ought to judge the necessity or advantage. Therefore if necessity urges or plain advantage recommends

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      that the property of a corporation be alienated or pledged by it, it is necessary that this be done with the consent of the superior; consequently