An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature. Nathaniel Culverwell

κινήσεως, καὶ ἐρημίας⁶ [the origin of motion and the absence of it]. And Empedocles, (as he is quoted by him) will needs exercise his Poetry and make some Verses upon Nature, and you would think at the first dash that they were in a good lofty straine, for thus he sings—φύσις οὐδενὸς ἐστὶν ἑκάστου, θνητω̑ν οὐδὲ τὶς οὐλομένη θανάτοιο γενέθλη.⁷ ’Twas not of a mortal withering off-spring, nor of a fading Genealogy; but yet truly his Poetical raptures were not so high as to elevate him above a body, for he presently sinks into ὕλη, he falls down into matter, and makes Nature nothing else but that which is ingenerable and incorruptible in material beings; just as the Peripateticks speak of their materia prima. But Plato who was more spiritual in his Philosophy, chides some of his contemporaries, and is extreamly displeased with them, and that very justly, for they were degenerated into a most stupid Atheisme, and resolved all beings into one of these three Originals, that they were either διὰ φύσιν, διὰ τύχην, διὰ τέχνην.⁸ They were either the workmanship of Nature, or of Fortune, or of Art. Now as for the first and chief corporeal beings, they made them the productions of Nature, that is, (say they) they sprung from eternity into being by their own impetus, and by their own vertue and efficacy, ἀπὸ τινὸς αἰτίας αὐτομάτης,⁹ like so many natural automata, they were the principles of their own being and motion, and this they [25] laid down for one of their axiomes. Τὰ μῃν μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν, καὶ τυχὴν τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην.¹⁰ All the Master-pieces of being, the most lovely and beautiful pictures were drawn by Nature, and Fortune; and Art only could reach to some poor rudiments, to some shadows, and weaker imitations, which you will be somewhat amazed at when you hear by and by what these τὰ σμικρότερα [weaker imitations] were.

      The foundation of being, that they said was Natural; the mutation and disposing of being, that they made the imployment of Fortune; and then they said the work of Art was to finde out Laws, and Morality, and Religion, and a Deity; these were the τὰ σμικρότερα [weaker imitations] they spake of before.

      But that Divine Philosopher does most admirably discover the prodigious folly of this opinion, and demonstrate the impossibility of it in that excellent discourse of his, in his 10 De Legibus. Where he does most clearly and convincingly shew, that those things, which they say were framed by Art; were in duration infinitely before that which they call Nature, that Ψυχὴ ἐστὶ πρεσβυτέρα σώματος:¹¹ that spirituals have the seniority of corporeals. This he makes to appear by their (1) πρωτοκινησία (2) αὐτοκινησία (3) ἀλλοκινησία, for these three though they be not expressely mentioned in him, yet they may very easily be collected from him.¹² Souls they move themselves, and they move bodies too, and therefore must needs be first in motion; so that νου̑ς, καὶ τέχνη, καὶ νόμος τω̑ν σκληρω̑ν, καὶ μαλακω̑ν, καὶ βαρέων καὶ κουφω̑ν πρότερα ἃν εἴη.¹³ Reason and Religion, Laws and Prudence must needs be before density and rarity, before gravity & levity, before all conditions and dimensions of bodies. And Laws and Religion they are indeed του ̑νου ̑γεννήματα¹⁴ [the products of the mind]; that is, the contrivances and productions of that eternal νου̑ς & λόγος [Mind and Reason] the wisdome of God himself.

      So that all that Plato will allow to Nature, amounts to no more then this, that it is not δημιουργὸς¹⁵ opifex rerum [the creator of things], but only Dei δημιουργου̑ντος famula & ministra [the handmaid and servant of the creating God]; As the eyes of a servant wait upon his master, and as the eyes of an handmaiden look up to her mistris, so wait her eyes upon the Lord her God.¹⁶ And he doth fully resolve and determine that God is the soul of the world, and Nature but the body; which must be took only in sensu florido, in a flourishing and Rhetorical sense: that God is the fountain of being, and Nature but the chanel; that he is the kernel of being, and Nature but the shell. Yet herein Plato was defective, that he did not correct and reform the abuse of this word Nature; that he did not scrue it up to an higher and more spiritual notion. For ’tis very agreeable to the choycest, and supremest being; and the Apostle tells us of ἡ θει̑α φύσις¹⁷ [the divine nature]. So that ’tis time at length to draw the veile from Natures face, and to look upon her beauty.

      [26] And first, ’tis the usual language of many, both Philosophers and others, to put Nature for God himself, or at least for the general providence of God; and this in the Schoolmens rough and unpolisht Latin, is stiled Natura naturans;¹⁸ thus Nature is took for that constant and Catholick Providence, that spreads its wings over all created beings, and shrouds them under its warme and happy protection. Thus that elegant Moralist Plutarch speaks more like to himself then in his former description. Πανταχου̑ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀκριβὴς, καὶ φιλότεχνος, ἀνελλιπὴς καὶ ἀπερίτμητος;¹⁹ Nature is in all things accurate and punctual, ’tis not defective nor parsimonious, nor yet sprouting and luxuriant: and consonant to this is that sure axiome, Natura nihil facit frustra²⁰ [nature does nothing in vain]. Thus God set up the world as a fair and goodly clock, to strike in time, and to move in an orderly manner, not by its own weights (as Durand would have it)²¹ but by fresh influence from himself, by that inward and intimate spring of immediate concourse, that should supply it in a most uniform and proportionable manner.

      Thus God framed this great Organ of the world, he tuned it, yet not so as that it could play upon it self, or make any musick by vertue of this general composure, (as Durand fansies it) but that it might be fitted and prepared for the finger of God himself, and at the presence of his powerful touch might sound forth the praise of its Creatour in a most sweet and harmonious manner.

      And thus Nature is that regular line,²² which the wisdome of God himself has drawn in being, τάξις γὰρ ἢ τάξεως ἔργον ἡ φύσις²³ [for nature is order or a work of order], as he speaks, whereas that which they miscall’d Fortune, was nothing but a line fuller of windings and varieties; and as Nature was a fixt and ordinary kinde of Providence, so Fortune was nothing but a more abstruse, and mysterious, and occult kinde of Providence, and therefore Fortune was not blinde, as they falsely painted and represented her; but they themselves were blinde and could not see into her. And in this sense that speech of that grave Moralist Seneca is very remarkable, Providentia, fatum, natura, casus, fortuna sunt ejusdem Dei varia nomina²⁴ [providence, fate, nature, chance, fortune are various terms for the same God].

      But then secondly, Nature as ’tis scattered and distributed in particular beings, so ’tis the very same with essence it self, and therefore spirituals, as they have their essence, so they have their Nature too, and if we gloried in names, ’twould be easie to heap up a multitude of testimonies in which these two must needs be ἰσοδυναμου̑ντα [synonymous].

      And thus Nature speaks these two things.

      1) It points out Originem entis [the origin of being], ’tis the very Genius of Entity, ’tis present at the nativity of every being, nay ’tis being it self. There is no moment in which you can imagine a thing to be, and yet to be without its Nature.

      [27] 2) It speaks Operationem entis [the action of being], and ’tis a principle of working in spirituals, as well as principium motus & quietis [the origin of motion and rest] in corporeals. All essence bubbles out,