An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Francis Hutcheson

to account for the Diversity of Fancy ||^26aabout more complex Ideas of Objects, ||^27bin which we regard^b|| many Ideas of different Senses at [6] once; as ||^28cin^c|| some Perceptions of those call’d primary Qualitys, and some secondary, as explain’d by Mr. Locke:ⁱ for instance, in the different Fancys about Architecture, Gardening, Dress. Of the two former we shall offer something in Sect. VI. As to Dress, we may generally account for the Diversity of Fancys from a like Conjunction of Ideas: Thus^a||, if either from any thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of our Country or Acquaintance, the fancying of glaring Colours be look’d upon as an evidence of Levity, or of any other evil Quality of Mind; or if any Colour or Fashion be commonly us’d by Rusticks, or by Men of any disagreeable Profession, Employment, or Temper; these additional Ideas may recur constantly with that of the Colour or Fashion, and cause a constant Dislike to them in those who join the additional Ideas, altho the Colour or Form be no way disagreeable of themselves, and actually do please others who join no such Ideas to them. But there ||²⁹does not seem to be any|| Ground to believe such a Diversity in human Minds, as that the same ||³⁰simple|| Idea or Perception should give pleasure to one and pain to another, or to the same Person at different times; not to say that it seems a Contradiction, that the same ||³¹simple|| Idea should do so. [7]

      Complex Ideas.

      VIII. The only Pleasure of Sense, ||³²which|| ||³³our|| Philosophers seem to consider, is that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But there are ||³⁴vastly|| greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious. Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as possible; and more pleas’d with a Prospect of the Sun ||³⁵arising|| among settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Hemisphere, a fine Landskip, a regular Building, than with a clear blue Sky, a smooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diversify’d by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even these latter Appearances are not quite simple. So in Musick, the Pleasure of fine Composition is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever.

      

      Beauty.

      Harmony.

      IX. Let it be observ’d, that in the following Papers, the Word Beauty is taken for the Idea rais’d in us, and a Sense of Beauty for our Power of receiving this Idea. Harmony also denotes our pleasant Ideas arising from Composition of Sounds, and a good Ear (as it is generally taken) a Power of perceiving this Pleasure. In the following Sections, an Attempt is made [8] to discover “what is the immediate Occasion of these pleasant Ideas, or what real Quality in the Objects ordinarily excites them.”

      Internal Sense.

      X. It is of no consequence whether we call these Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, Perceptions of the External Senses of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I should rather chuse to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas, an Internal Sense, were it only for the Convenience of distinguishing them from other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing, which men may have without Perception of Beauty and Harmony. It is plain from Experience, that many Men have in the common meaning, the Senses of Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the simple Ideas separately, and have their Pleasures; they distinguish them from each other, such as one Colour from another, either quite different, or the stronger or fainter of the same Colour, ||³⁶when they are plac’d beside each other, altho they may often confound their Names, when they occur a-part from each other; as some do the Names of Green and Blue:|| they can tell in separate Notes, the higher, lower, sharper or flatter, when separately sounded; in Figures they discern the Length, Breadth, Wideness of each Line, Surface, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing and seeing at great distances as any men [9] whatsoever: And yet perhaps they shall ||³⁷find|| no Pleasure in Musical Compositions, in Painting, Architecture, natural Landskip; or but a very weak one in comparison of what others enjoy from the same Objects. This greater Capacity of receiving such pleasant Ideas we commonly call a fine Genius or Taste: In Musick we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense from the External one of Hearing, and call it a good Ear; and the like distinction we ||³⁸should|| probably acknowledge in other ||³⁹Objects||, had we also got distinct Names to denote these Powers of Perception by.

      

      Different from External.

      XI. ⁴⁰There will appear another Reason perhaps ||⁴¹afterwards||, for calling this Power of perceiving the Ideas of Beauty, an Internal Sense, from this, that in some other Affairs, where our External Senses are not much concern’d, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many respects, to that observ’d in sensible Objects, and accompany’d with like Pleasure: Such is that Beauty perceiv’d in Theorems, or universal Truths, in general Causes, and in some extensive Principles of Action.

      XII. Let ||^42aevery one here consider, how different we must suppose the Perception to be, with which a Poet is transported upon the Prospect of any of those Objects [10] of natural Beauty, which ravish us even in his Description; from that cold lifeless Conception which we ||^43bimagine in^b|| a dull Critick, or one of the Virtuosi, without what we call a fine Taste. This latter Class of Men may have greater Perfection in that Knowledge, which is deriv’d from external Sensation; they can tell all the specifick Differences of Trees, Herbs, Minerals, Metals; they know the Form of every Leaf, Stalk, Root, Flower, and Seed of all the Species, about which the Poet is often very ignorant: And yet the Poet shall have a ||^44cvastly^c|| more delightful Perception of the Whole; and not only the Poet but any man of a fine Taste. Our External ||^45dSenses^d|| may by measuring teach us all the Proportions of Architecture to the Tenth of an Inch, and the Situation of every Muscle in the human Body; and a good Memory may retain these: and yet there is still something further necessary, not only to make ||^46ea man^e|| a compleat Master in Architecture, Painting or Statuary, but even a tolerable Judge in these Works; or ||^47fcapable of receiving^f|| the highest Pleasure in contemplating them.^a|| Since then there are such different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the External Senses are the same; since the most accurate Knowledge of what the External Senses discover, ||⁴⁸often does|| not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a good Taste will en-[11]joy at once without much Knowledge; we may justly use another Name for these higher, and more delightful Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the Power of receiving such Impressions, an Internal Sense. The Difference of the Perceptions seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of a different Name, ||⁴⁹especially when we are told in what meaning the Word is applied.||

      

      Its Pleasures necessary and immediate.

      XIII.⁵⁰ This superior Power of Perception is justly called a Sense, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure ||⁵¹does not arise|| from any Knowledge of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; ||⁵²but strikes us at first with the Idea of|| Beauty: nor does the most accurate Knowledge increase this Pleasure of Beauty, however it⁵³ may super-add a distinct rational Pleasure from prospects of Advantage, or ||⁵⁴from|| the Increase of Knowledge.^*

      XIV.⁵⁵ And further, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any Prospect of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of Interest will [12] make an Object grateful, nor ||⁵⁶View of|| Detriment, distinct from immediate Pain in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole World as a Reward, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deform’d Object, or disapprove a beautiful one; Dissimulation may be procur’d by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct abstain from any pursuit of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform’d; but our Sentiments of the Forms, and our Perceptions, would continue invariably the same.

      This