Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty. Hugo Grotius

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὑρει̑ν τη̑ς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ ἄλλην γἑνεσιν, ἢ τὴν ἐκ του̑ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τη̑ς κοινη̑ς φύσεως; “No beginning, no origin, can be assigned to justice other than its derivation from God and from the universal aspect of nature.”

      Therefore, since God fashioned creation and willed its existence, every individual part thereof has received from Him certain natural properties whereby that existence may be preserved and each part may be guided for its own good, in conformity, one might say, with the fundamental law inherent in its origin.^a From this fact the old poets and philosophers^b have rightly deduced that love, whose primary force and action are directed to self-interest, is the first principle of the whole natural order. Consequently, Horace^c should not be censured for [5′a] saying, in imitation of the Academics, that expediency might perhaps be called the mother of justice and equity. For all things in nature, as Cicero repeatedly insists, are tenderly regardful of self, and seek their own happiness and security. This phenomenon can be observed not only in the human race, but among the beasts also and even in connexion with inanimate objects, being a manifestation of that true and divinely inspired self-love^d which is laudable in every phase of creation. As for the φιλαυτία, which is classified as a vice—in other words, immoderate self-interest—it is an excess of such love. Thus Socrates (as quoted by Xenophon^e and Plato^f) and Diogenes,^g too, have correctly maintained that justice is a virtue which makes us useful to ourselves as well as to others, so that the just man will in no way inflict injury upon himself or upon any of his members, nor will he bring pain or distress upon himself. Plutarch^h expounds this doctrine admirably, illustrating it by means of a negative simile when he declares that justice is not like oil, which doctors describe as beneficial to the body externally but injurious internally, since the just man’s highest concern is for himself. Other authorities,^a distinguishing more subtly between terms, maintain that such concern is the function not so much of justice as of that love [for self] to which we are impelled by nature; but at the same time, they admit that in human affairs the first principle of a man’s duty relates to himself.

      In fact, all duty (according to the philosophers) consists in περὶ τά πως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἔμα̑ς, that is to say, in those things which in some way pertain to self. Such things, to be sure, fall under a twofold classification. For some concern us from the standpoint of good, others from the standpoint of evil, as is indicated, indeed, by the two mental attitudes of aversion and desire, attitudes implanted by nature not in man [5′ a′] alone, but in all living creatures.

      The particular aspect of duty that we are about to discuss, however, is bound up not with all goods and ills, but solely with those which men can either bestow upon or take from other men, including not only concrete goods and ills but also their external effects. For only these [transferable] things can enter into any comparison that seeks to establish how much a person owes to himself, and how much to his fellow man.

      Generally speaking, these good and evil things are likewise divided into two classes. The first and more important group consists of those which directly concern the body itself: for example, among the ills, death, mutilation of the members (which is akin to death) and disease; among the blessings, life with the body whole and healthy. The second group has to do with things existing outside of ourselves but neverthe-less beneficial or injurious, painful or pleasing, to us—such as, on the one hand, honour, riches, pleasure; and on the other hand, infamy, poverty, pain. Thus, when Plato^b says that justice is concerned with περὶ σώματος θεραπείαν, ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτη̑σιν, that is to say, with the care of the body and the possession of property, he includes under the head of “property” the results consequent upon its possession.

      Law I

      Law II

      Accordingly, from this combination of concepts, two precepts of the [6] law of nature emerge:² first, that It shall be permissible to defend [one’s own] life and to shun that which threatens to prove injurious;^a secondly, that It shall be permissible to acquire for oneself, and to retain, those things which are useful for life. The latter precept, indeed, we shall interpret with Cicero^b as an admission that each individual may, without violating the precepts of nature, prefer to see acquired for himself rather than for another, that which is important for the conduct of life. Moreover, no member of any sect of philosophers, when embarking upon a discussion of the ends [of good and evil],³ has ever failed to lay down these two laws first of all as indisputable axioms.^c For on this point the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Peripatetics are in complete agreement, and apparently even the Academics have entertained no doubt.

      The act of taking possession, and ownership

      Since we ourselves are corporeal entities, other bodies are naturally able to benefit or injure us. Thus the first law is put into practice through the repulsion of one body from another, and the second law, through the attachment of one body to another. To this end, the lower animals were given their corporeal members and we, our hands and feet, as instruments for the two functions of repelling and attaching. This function of attachment is a gift from God. For He who bestowed upon living creatures their very existence, bestowed also the things necessary for existence. Some of these things, indeed, are necessary to being, while others are necessary only to well-being; or, one might say that they relate respectively to safety and to comfort. In a universal sense, moreover, inferior things were given for use by their superiors. Plants and herbs, for example, were given to the beasts, and beasts—as well as all things in general—to man,^a inasmuch as man excels in worth all other created things. However, since God bestowed these gifts upon the human race, not upon individual men,^b and since such gifts could be turned to use only through acquisition of possession by individuals, it necessarily followed that τὸ ἐσφετερισμἑνον, “what had been seized as his own” by each person should become the property of that person. Such seizure is called possessio [the act of taking possession], the forerunner of usus [6′] [use], and subsequently of dominium [ownership].^c

      But God judged that there would be insufficient provision for the preservation of His works, if He commended to each individual’s care only the safety of that particular individual, without also willing that one created being should have regard for the welfare of his fellow beings,^d in such a way that all might be linked in mutual harmony as if by an everlasting covenant. Seneca^e has said: “You must needs live for others, if you would live for yourself.”

      Love, then, is twofold: love for oneself, and love for others. In the former aspect, it is known as “desire”; in the latter, as “friendliness.”^f While a certain form of friendliness is discernible even within inanimate objects, and more clearly so in the lower animals, this manifestation of love burns most brightly in man, as in one who is peculiarly endowed not only with the affections shared in common with other creatures but also with the sovereign attribute of reason: that is to say, as in a being derived from God Himself, who imprinted upon man the image of His own mind. Epicharmus calls attention to this point in the following verse:^g

      ὁ δἑ γε τἀνθρώπου λόγος πἑφυκ’ ἀπὸ του̑ θείου λόγου.

       Man’s reason from God’s reason takes its being.

      The primary law of nations

      Rule II

      To be sure, this rational faculty has been darkly beclouded by human vice; yet not to such a degree but that rays of the divine light are still clearly visible, manifesting themselves especially in the mutual accord of nations. For evil and falsehood are, in a sense and by their very nature, of infinite extent^a and at the same time internally discordant, whereas universal concord can exist only in relation to that which is good and true.^b Many persons, indeed, have chosen to call that very accord the secondary