The Battle for Algeria. Jennifer Johnson

police record, applied to work in one of the Algiers locations, but an Algiers prefect questioned his political allegiance. Benzine had been arrested in 1949 for distributing Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) tracts, and, even though he had not been formally charged with a crime, the prefect thought this provided sufficient evidence that he could not be trusted.⁸¹ Benzine’s current position at the Office of Public Transport and ability to speak Arabic and Kabyle were insufficient to influence a favorable recommendation. Instead, the prefect labeled him “a propagandist of separatist ideology,” with a “hostile” attitude “toward the French cause.”⁸² The official overlooked Benzine’s useful language skills and social connections in the area based on an event six years prior that may not have had any bearing on his ability to perform a job well.

      Abdelkader Zerrouki, originally from Orléansville who moved to Tlemcen after the 1954 earthquake, was another young male whose application was rejected based on his alleged political leanings. In Zerrouki’s file, Orléansville subprefect Platt wrote that he received “good information about the candidate’s conduct and morality.”⁸³ However, Platt noted that the applicant’s father, M’hamed Zerrouki, “is a very active UDMA [Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien] militant,” and he believed that Abdelkader “was a member of the UDMA in Orléansville,” whose “politics aligned with those of his father.”⁸⁴ Platt’s general observations about the Zerrouki family led him to conclude that Abdelkader was not a suitable candidate for hire.

      Half of the applicants were women, and they were typically recommended for employment. As with their male counterparts, the reviewer vetted their political histories, but unlike many of the men’s applications, the women’s background checks did not reveal a past of organized political activity. In fact, many of the female hopefuls were approved because they “did not express any political opinion,” nor did they generate any concern “regarding their behavior and morality.”⁸⁵ They were considered politically neutral and deemed less likely to bring their politics to work.

      In the spring and summer of 1956, hospitals across the country received another batch of applications from doctors in Algeria and in France who requested personnel positions. In several instances, letters accompanied the file, asking that the application undergo further review. The available material did not provide conclusive information about each case, but some of the applicants were refused employment based on technical credentials. For example, Dr. Xavier Maurin applied for a surgical position at the Oran Civil Hospital in May 1956, but Robert Lacoste denied him the job in July 1956 because Maurin had only passed two of the three required exams.⁸⁶ This small series of applications revealed that people were applying for medical jobs in Algeria in 1955 and 1956, but a group of officials were not compelled to hire them. Moreover, it is troubling that candidates with viable skills sought out professional positions two years into the war and were passed over.

      The SAS also recruited Algerian women to contribute to pacification and sought individuals who could assist them in practical matters such as translating Berber and Arabic and distributing medicine and emergency goods to their communities. If Algerians saw their own working alongside the French, they might be more inclined to receive medical treatment and send their children to school. The SAS drew upon a tested imperial strategy and relied on auxiliaries to promote medical programs and services.⁸⁷ In the past, they served as crucial linchpins between the indigenous population and colonial doctors, and the SAS recycled the idea in the 1950s.

      One major SAS objective was to concentrate on women and the female domain in rural areas, and the Équipe Médico-Sociale Itinérante (EMSI) and Adjointe Sanitaire et Sociale Rurale Auxiliaire (ASSRA) were created in the spring and fall of 1957, respectively, with this aim. In confidential instructional manuals and correspondence, army officials acknowledged that finding trained personnel and providing medical care were “indispensable” first steps “in establishing contact with the Algerians,” but that ultimately “medicine was secondary.”⁸⁸ The “real objective” of these programs, notes Marnia Lazreg, “was to use sociomedical assistance as a medium through which to make contact with women, that is to say, to know, inform, educate, organize and guide them in preparation for their acceptance of the most French solution to the Algerian problem.”⁸⁹ The EMSI and ASSRA staff were not benign agents of social change as the French tried to present them. They were responsible for diffusing French propaganda, educating women about emancipation, and carrying out psychological warfare.⁹⁰ As we will see in the next chapter, the FLN and its health-services division used Algerian women for similar ends.

      French government and military officials made frequent mention of SAS recruiting and mobilization challenges that they struggled to address throughout the war. For instance, in 1959, French general Jacques Allard admitted to a serious physician deficit.⁹¹ He estimated that one doctor was needed for every ten thousand inhabitants, and, at the time, there were only 220 French civil physicians in the entire country for a total population well over nine million. According to Allard’s calculations, the medical sector needed nearly six hundred more doctors to meet the demand.⁹² The military knew that even with six hundred more doctors participating in the Assistance Médicale Gratuite (AMG), a companion program created in 1956, and the SAS throughout Algeria, it would still require more staff to fill hospital positions in urban areas. The army counted on seven hundred reserve doctors to help alleviate the physician shortage. These statistics provide some perspective into the many recruitment challenges the SAS encountered and the dire need for more trained personnel willing to participate in the medical campaigns. Without them, Soustelle’s intentions of winning over the countryside could not be realized. If the SAS and AMG units did not have sufficient staff, their visits would become irregular; the lines for consultations would be longer. Those waiting for hours to see the doctor might not make it to the front of the line, and, as one general in Oran noted, this could “diminish [the unit’s] effectiveness” in the area.⁹³ Without continuity and sufficient medicine to distribute, personnel risked losing any inroads they had made with Algerians during previous visits and hampered their chances at fostering support for Algérie française.

      Government officials devised new recruitment strategies that ranged from asking friends to temporary contracts. If current medical professionals told a friend or family about their work, perhaps they would be able to convince them that their service was needed. Colonial administrators considered altering the terms and conditions of medical contracts for they thought that shorter contracts might encourage people to work for state-sponsored programs. They debated the merits of a recruitment day and suggested making a tour in Algeria mandatory for sixth-year medical students in France, framing it in terms of national service and duty. They even alluded to financially rewarding doctors for performing more consultations.⁹⁴ All of these ideas could not mask the fact that the medical pacification programs were in trouble and in immediate need of reinforcements.

      In response to this acute problem, the colonial administration amended medical decrees governing who was allowed to practice the profession and expanded the parameters to include foreign doctors, a group previously submitted to intense scrutiny when seeking employment in Algeria.⁹⁵ The French minister for Algerian affairs issued several legal amendments, beginning with the 23 October 1958 ordinance and followed by the decrees of 28 March 1960 and 9 April 1960, which stipulated that French nationals in the medical and pharmaceutical professions who had practiced in Tunisia, Morocco, or Indochina were now eligible to practice in France and Algeria.⁹⁶ Another decree issued on 19 April 1961 made additional concessions by authorizing foreign doctors with foreign diplomas to practice medicine in Algeria.⁹⁷ French officials received applications from doctors in Spain and Morocco, and in many instances they were recommended to come to Algeria; the 19 April 1961 decree was often cited as justification for their approval.⁹⁸ The scarcity of medical personnel was never eliminated during the war. However, French officials, realizing the potential advantages of medical pacification, increasingly broadened the health-care field by accepting individuals to serve their cause.

      Another way the medical campaigns tried to compensate for insufficient staff and equipment was to improve coordination between military and civilian physicians who were already practicing in the country and did not require additional training. But the two groups, though linked conceptually,