The Making of a Mediterranean Emirate. Ramzi Rouighi

witnesses and was decapitated.

      These events were apparently memorable to later historians, who narrated them in lavish detail. But for us, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra’s usurpation of the Ḥafṣid name demonstrates two important aspects of the political situation after the death of (the first) al-Mustanṣir: the importance of access to an army; and the importance of membership in the Ḥafṣid dynasty. Without fulfilling those two requirements, it was impossible to survive as the ruler of Tunis. In their struggles against each other, all the urban-based elites—Tunisans, Andalusis, and Almohads—had found themselves incapable of overpowering the others without external military help, whether African or European. The gradual demilitarization of the Almohad sheikhs and the elimination of the Andalusi militia only strengthened the hand of Bedouins.

       The Emir of Bijāya and His Backers

      The end of the first regional emirate came at the hand of Bijāya’s wealthy merchants. In 1284–85, a delegation of Bijāyans, headed by the prominent Andalusi Ibn Sayyid al-Nās, went on a mission to Tilimsān to convince the Ḥafṣid emir Abū Zakariyā b. Abī Isḥāq to be their ruler.

      [Ibn Sayyid al-Nās] went to Tilimsān to urge Abū Zakariyā to claim his lordship [over Bijāya]. [After convincing Abū Zakariyā], he borrowed money from Bijāya’s merchants and spent it to acquire the instruments and symbols of kingship (ubbahat al-mulk) on his behalf. He also gathered clients and followers [in his name].²⁹

      The merchants’ money had bought Bijāya its own independent emir and, although the sources do not tell us this, probably secured them a good return on their investment in the form of official support for trade.³⁰ Their involvement in politics helped put an official stamp on the commercial orientation of the city.

      As the main organizer and leader of this operation, Ibn Sayyid al-Nās reaped great benefits. As soon as Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā (r. 1285–1301) took over the reins of power, he appointed Ibn Sayyid al-Nās to the position of ḥājib, the highest in his administration. Commenting on Ibn Sayyid al-Nās’s performance in the position he too had held, Ibn Khaldūn ranked it higher than that of the legendary ḥājib of al-Mustanṣir (r. 1249–77). But in an aside characteristic of his style, Ibn Khaldūn also explained that Ibn Sayyid al-Nās’s task may have been facilitated by the absence of influential Almohad sheikhs in Bijāya who could have challenged him.³¹ This remark may merely indicate Ibn Khaldūn’s jealousy toward the man whose shoes he later filled. Nonetheless, it suggests that the Almohads did not represent a significant political group in the city. In Bijāya, the Almohads had lost the influence they had held in the half-century since the Ḥafṣids had taken over the city. The Ḥafṣid strategy of undermining their power by appointing Andalusis had worked better and faster in Bijāya than in Tunis.³² The influence of Andalusis in Bijāya was such that when the Andalusi Ibn Sayyid al-Nās died, his secretary, another Andalusi, replaced him.³³

      But the power of a few individuals can hardly be taken to mean that in the 1280s, Andalusis formed a unified party. Even a perfunctory survey of the sources demonstrates that Andalusis were fully engaged in politics against other Andalusis, and that there was hardly such a thing as Andalusi solidarity. If anything, powerful Andalusi individuals led opposing factions against Andalusis and non-Andalusis alike, with the purpose of gaining influence over the Ḥafṣid rulers or ingratiating themselves with them. But this did not prevent members of the old families of Bijāya from attributing the loss of influence they felt to the Andalusis, from feeling that Andalusis discussed political matters in threatening ways, and that they often acted in consort. Prominent Bijāyans of the “old” families such as the judge Abū al-‘Abbās al-Ghubrīnī (1246–1304) were not among the leaders of the independence movement, even if they supported it. Certainly, it would have been difficult for the Andalusis to achieve Bijāya’s autonomy without their participation and support. But together, the two groups formed a powerful enough coalition that it succeeded in bringing about a local emirate, and in maintaining it for decades to come.

       Behind the Local Emirate

      The coming together of powerful Andalusis and “old” Bijāyans enabled the formation of an independent Ḥafṣid emirate in Bijāya. The event was noted in Tunis, where the ruler immediately formed an alliance with the ‘Abd al-Wādids of Tilimsān to defeat Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā and end his rule over the city.³⁴ But the alliance’s attacks on the city failed. Worse for Tunis, Bijāya’s successful resistance led many cities in the region, such as Qasanṭīna, to defect and join the new emirate.

      As they joined Bijāya, these urban elites showed that they did not favor a regional configuration in principle—only if they were the ones behind it. Such regional politics would have to wait until the late fourteenth century. Once Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā died, his son Abū al-Baqā’ (r. 1301–9) briefly unified Ifrīqiyā from Bijāya, but his feat was quickly undone in a rebellion led by his own brother, Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr, the emir of Qasanṭīna (1310/11).³⁵ Abū Bakr defeated Abū al-Baqā’ and his supporters among the Ṣanhāja and took over Bijāya in 1312, but he stayed there only long enough to appoint the Andalusi Ibn Ghamr ḥājib and then leave the city to him. At this point, Bijāya was nominally ruled from Qasantīna rather than Tunis, but it was functionally as independent as it had been before—a Ḥafṣid emirate under Ibn Ghamr’s rule.³⁶

      Here again, the strength of the Bedouins came into play. The ascendance of Andalusis like Ibn Ghamr displeased powerful Bedouins near Bijāya since their power rested on the Ḥafṣid emirs’ military dependence on them. As Ibn Khaldūn put it:

      Ya‘qūb b. Khulūf was known as Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, the leader of Ṣanhāja. Ṣanhāja [soldiers constituted] the army of the sultan and were settled near Bijāya. [Ibn Khulūf] had an important position in the government and [obtained] wealth from wars and [from] defending [the city] against its enemies. Both the emir Abū Zakariyā and his son [Abū al-Baqā’] used to leave him in charge of Bijāya when they traveled…. So Ibn Khulūf demanded that the sultan [Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr] dismiss Ibn Ghamr.³⁷

      Ibn Khulūf and other Bedouin chiefs were crucial to the maintenance of local Ḥafṣid emirates such as that of Bijāya. Deriving strength from their military contribution, they made political demands that the Ḥafṣid emirs had to consider. Although Abū Bakr did not accede to Ibn Khulūf’s demands, Bedouins were clearly not alien to the urban scene and its politics. Unlike those over which the Ḥafṣids had little or no control and, who often raided villages and towns under Ḥafṣid rule, these Bedouins formulated political demands within the boundaries of Ḥafṣid power. They were allies and their support was politically crucial.

      Until his death in 1319, Ibn Ghamr was the effective ruler of Bijāya, even if he governed in the name of Ḥafṣid legitimacy. But challenges to his influence did not abate, and many came from Bedouins. Ibn Talīlan, the chief of the Kutāma, and Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. Thābit, chief of the Banū Thābit, both led battles against him. Ibn Ghamr was successful in eliminating his opponents, only to see them run to the ‘Abd al-Wādid ruler of Tilimsān urging him to invade Ifrīqiyā. The ‘Abd al-Wādids’ two campaigns in 1313 and 1315 against Ifrīqiyā penetrated deep, through the lands of the Banū Thābit south of Bijāya and around Qasanṭīna, and even reached Būna. They were incapable, however, of taking any of the important cities and had to retreat to Tilimsān.³⁸

      A year before Ibn Ghamr’s death, in 1318, Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr became ruler in Tunis and began imposing the unification of Ifrīqiyā. When Ibn Ghamr died in 1319, Abū Bakr appointed the younger of his own sons, Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā, as governor of Bijāya, and chose a certain Ibn al-Qālūn as his ḥājib.³⁹ Soon after, this ḥājib was replaced by another, also named Ibn Sayyid al-Nās.⁴⁰ So successful was this Ibn Sayyid al-Nās in ingratiating himself with the Ḥafṣid ruler of Tunis that he was then called on to assume the same post in the capital. Treating the office of ḥājib like his property, before he left for Tunis Ibn Sayyid al-Nās appointed his successor in Bijāya. Although there were