Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina. Antonius C. G. M. Robben

Perón appointed Héctor José Cámpora as the presidential candidate. Perón could not lead the Peronist ticket because he was living in Spain and thus not a permanent resident of Argentina.⁹ Meanwhile, he played the roles of warmonger and peacemaker. He instructed the JP and the Montoneros to maintain pressure on the military government with mass demonstrations and guerrilla attacks, but at the same time promised to resolve the discord within Argentine society.¹⁰ Perón was playing with fire by encouraging the Peronist guerrilla groups to attack the Lanusse dictatorship, but believed that he would be able to control them once in power. Perón and Lanusse understood very well that hell would break loose if the elections were canceled or the victory of Cámpora was annulled.

      An important source of inspiration for the political involvement and Peronization of many young Argentines had been the documentary Political and Doctrinal Actualization for the Seizure of Power. This film was made between June and October 1971 by Fernando Solanas and Octavio Gettino, and consisted of an interview with Perón cast in fashionable revolutionary language. Frequent references to Mao Zedong and the liberal use of terms such as national liberation, Argentine socialism, imperialism, and revolutionary war from the mouth of the aged leader made a great impression on a young generation raised with the conservative speeches of Lieutenant-General Onganía.

      What also made the interview attractive was that Perón accorded the younger generation a leading role in the political transformation of Argentina.¹¹ This so-called generational rejuvenation (trasvasamiento generacional) was called upon by the Peronist Youth, and especially the Montoneros, to see themselves as the political and ideological heirs of Perón. This entitlement was formalized by the creation of a youth branch of the Peronist Organization—in addition to the political, women’s, and labor branches—assigning it twenty-five percent of the offices under electoral dispute. The candidates were mostly hand-picked by the Montonero leadership.¹² This unprecedented chance for a new generation of Peronists to exert political influence in Argentina gave a unique élan to an electoral campaign surrounded by incessant street demonstrations and frequent guerrilla operations.

       A Taste of Revolution

      Héctor Cámpora won the elections with nearly fifty percent of the vote.¹³ He attributed his victory to the incessant street mobilizations: “The reality is that Peronism had won over the street and that there wasn’t any space left for anybody else…. we were certain that our method was preferable: take direct contact with the people through mobilizations and popular gatherings.”¹⁴ The elections had returned the Peronist crowds to center stage after eighteen years of repression and proscription. These crowds, however, did not consist of the first-generation Peronists who had suffered the disenfranchisement but mainly of young, revolutionary Peronists who demanded their share of the victory. Miguel Bonasso wrote during these expectant days in his diary: “Happiness exists. I believe that this is the happiest moment in my life…. [because of] the unsurpassed sensation to participate in a collective project of real historic significance.”¹⁵

      The Plaza de Mayo was filled with an immense crowd on 25 May 1973, the day of Cámpora’s inauguration as president. The placards of the various labor unions were dwarfed by the display of banners by the Peronist Youth and the guerrilla organizations FAP, FAR, and Montoneros. Was this a sign that Perón’s special guerrilla formations were now laying down their arms and entering the democratic fold or did they wish to demonstrate their political strength and preparedness to grab power by force?

      If anything was an indication of the times ahead, then it was not the torching of several automobiles in downtown Buenos Aires or the hasty departure of most military officials by helicopter from the roof of the Casa Rosada, but the shouting and shoving match between orthodox and revolutionary Peronists. The chants of the left for a Socialist Fatherland were answered by the right with a call for a Peronist Fatherland. The mounting tensions between the left and right wings of the Peronist Organization were still contained by the electoral victory but they would soon ignite.¹⁶

      The revolutionary Peronists in general, and the JP and Montoneros in particular, sensed their influence on Cámpora, and succeeded in occupying many mid-level administrative positions in the national and provincial governments.¹⁷ They constituted the Revolutionary Tendency (Tendencia Revolucionaria) which had in Cámpora its most important official ally, but was ruled by the Montonero leadership.

      The right-wing Peronist union centrals and first-generation politicians may have had to admit to a defeat in the crowd competitions but they had won the struggle for supremacy within the Peronist Organization and in the new government. The appointments of Perón’s private secretary López Rega as Minister of Social Welfare, López Rega’s son-in-law Raúl Lastiri as president of the Chamber of Deputies, and the integrationist union leader Ricardo Otero as Minister of Labor, as well as the signing of a Social Pact on 8 June between the government, the employers’ organization CGE and the union central CGT, confirmed the growing influence of the right wing.

      A volatile contest had erupted between left and right within the Peronist movement. The tensions found their most concrete expression in the administrative and political seizure of hospitals, cemeteries, universities, high schools, scientific institutes, prisons, ministerial departments, holiday camps, cooperatives, radio and television channels, and state-owned enterprises such as the railroads. Ostensibly, these seizures were carried out to depose the authorities that had been appointed under the 1966–1973 military rule, but factionalism was responsible for their haste. Takeovers were carried out at gunpoint, and extensive security measures were mounted to prevent counter-takeovers.¹⁸

      The reception of Perón at Ezeiza airport on 20 June 1973 would be the ideal occasion for a showdown between the revolutionary and orthodox Peronists. Whichever wing succeeded in mobilizing the largest crowd would reap political power and would influence the ideological direction of the Peronist movement. The unshaken belief in the leader-crowd dynamic stood behind the efforts of both wings to try to dominate the historic reunion of Perón with the Peronist masses in one of the largest crowds ever to gather in Argentina.

       The Ezeiza Tragedy

      Perón was to arrive at Ezeiza international airport in the late-afternoon of 20 June 1973. Eighteen thousand pigeons would be released upon his arrival, one thousand for each year spent in exile. Since the previous day, people had been gathering near the highway overpass where the reception stage had been built. Small tents were raised in a makeshift encampment, and people passed the time singing the Peronist march and preparing barbecues. The day had been declared a holiday, and public transport was free throughout the country. At daybreak of June 20, hundreds of buses, trucks and cars jammed Avenida Ricchieri to Ezeiza airport. Most passengers abandoned their vehicles and continued on foot. The newspaper La Nación spoke of “genuine human rivers,” as if to express the tendency of crowds to grow without bounds.¹⁹ More than one, two, some claim even four, million people were converging on the reception stage from which Perón was to address the crowd.

      The mood was festive and expectant, but not free of tension. The contest between the right and left wings of the Peronist movement continued unabated. The organizing committee consisted of retired Lieutenant-Colonel Jorge Manuel Osinde as head of security and the four committee members José Rucci, Lorenzo Miguel, Norma Kennedy, and Juan Manuel Abal Medina, representing each of the four branches of the Peronist Organization.²⁰ This composition seemed reasonable from an organizational point of view, but was highly unbalanced from a factional and political perspective. The revolutionary youth organizations were outnumbered four-to-one with only Abal Medina as their representative, while all others pertained to the orthodox right wing. Furthermore, the orthodox wing also controlled the security of Perón’s reception.

      The ongoing contest between the two Peronist factions soon turns violent. The first incident takes place near the podium at 3:00 A.M. on June 20 when left-wing Peronists begin chanting “Perón, Evita, the Socialist Fatherland,” and the right-wing Peronists reply with “Perón, Evita, the Peronist Fatherland.” The shouting match provokes an exchange of gunfire that leaves three persons wounded. A second incident occurs at 10:00 A.M. In their urge to be as close as possible to Perón, a group of young revolutionary