The Turkish Arms Embargo. James F. Goode

of the American press, and major newspapers featured articles and editorials on the subject. A column in the New York Post advocated “bombing of the poppy fields by the United States Air Force.” On a more realistic note, a May 4 New York Times editorial called for a de-escalation of the confrontation between the United States and Turkey, its NATO ally, over this sensitive issue. The editorial suggested a revision of the poppy ban, with the United States providing small-scale industrial projects for families that had abandoned their poppy crops.¹³

      It was too late, however, to apply such measures in the hope of resolving the crisis. On July 1 Prime Minister Ecevit publicly announced the end of the poppy ban. Turkish nationalism had won out over American threats.

      Staff at the US embassy thought Ecevit had been moving toward the US position, and Ambassador Macomber expressed his “bitter disappointment.” In a midnight meeting with the prime minister, Macomber used some very undiplomatic language, barely managing to control his anger. He complained that American diplomats had learned of this key development through a public broadcast. He asked Ecevit to reconsider this decision, which would do enormous damage to the US-Turkish security relationship. This decision, he warned, would bring relations to their lowest point since World War II and increase the odds that “US military assistance to Turkey was finished.” Congress, rather than the executive branch, would take action now. In parting, Macomber revealed that his government was considering recalling him to Washington for consultation to show its concern.¹⁴

      Confronted by the ambassador’s uncharacteristically strong language, Ecevit did not flinch. He stated boldly that “reconsideration was out of the question. He thought US-Turkish relations were deeper than the ambassador suggested. Although the decision was final, his government would be prepared to discuss effective methods of controlling the crop with the United States.” Turkish civilian leaders believed that a basic principle of Turkish independence was at stake, and they would take action regardless of the impact on their relations with the United States.¹⁵

      In Washington, the legislative campaign to punish Ankara made progress, much to the dismay of the National Security Council (NSC) staff. In the Senate, Mondale hoped to bring to the floor his amendment cutting off aid to Turkey; in the House, hearings on the Wolff resolution, which also called for President Nixon to suspend aid to Turkey, were scheduled before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The latter took place on July 16, and many of those testifying used the occasion not only to challenge the recent Turkish decision but also to raise broader questions about Turkey and the US-Turkish relationship. The sponsor of the resolution, Congressman Wolff, spoke first. He claimed that there would be “100 to 200 tons of excess production that will find its way into the veins of the kids of this Nation.” He went on to say, “Gentlemen, which is more important, our commitment to Turkey or your commitment to your constituents?”¹⁶

      When asked why the United States had approved an increase in India’s opium production, committee member Robert Steele (R-CT) explained that India could control its production because of the British origin of its bureaucracy, which made it more efficient and effective than the Turkish bureaucracy, which was a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. He observed that Indian officials were eager to track down even the smallest amount of leakage into the illicit market, whereas Turkish officials just did not seem to care. No one questioned his superficial and misleading analysis, which fit prevailing stereotypes.¹⁷

      Representative Rangel used the occasion to raise doubts about the entire US-Turkish relationship. He believed that the security benefit the United States derived from its bases in Turkey had been exaggerated. “We are doing them a favor by being there,” he argued. “The strategic value of Turkey to the United States is a myth,” especially when Turkey reciprocates by bringing “human suffering and misery upon the American people.” Rangel and his colleagues accused the Nixon administration of failing to respond adequately to this threat from Turkey. The New York City congressman then reflected on a recent meeting with Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger’s assistant at the NSC. Scowcroft, he remarked, appeared to be completely ignorant of the fact that Ankara was considering lifting the opium ban, even though “it was on the front page of all of our major newspapers.” The hearings allowed for all kinds of criticism, some of it well reasoned, but much of it misguided.¹⁸

      In light of these developments, the NSC staff urged Kissinger to act immediately to forestall congressional action. Such punitive steps, they believed, would seriously weaken the ability to work with Turkey to prevent heroin smuggling into the United States. Senator Mondale agreed to revise his amendment to the DEA budget bill, calling not for an immediate cutoff of aid to Turkey but rather the suspension of aid after January 1975 unless the president could certify that the Turks had taken effective safeguard measures. This version of the amendment passed the Senate by a lopsided vote of 81 to 8.¹⁹

      Thus, only days before the Cyprus crisis, key members of Congress were considering punishing the Turks for their unhelpful behavior. The groundwork had already been laid for a strong response. Ecevit’s decision to resume poppy cultivation had antagonized many in Congress, and it seemed likely that his critics would judge Ankara’s future actions with this most recent unpleasant experience clearly in mind.

      Although historians have generally considered the opium issue a minor one in US-Turkey relations in the 1970s, one can reasonably argue that without it, the Turkish arms embargo would not have been imposed. A considerable number of legislators were willing to punish Turkey solely for its reckless and defiant policy on cultivation of the opium poppy. It required the twin issues of drugs and the illegal use of US weapons in Cyprus to persuade a greater number to vote for an embargo. Had members of Congress been faced with only a single challenge from Ankara, they might have been less likely to oppose the White House.²⁰

      3

      Making Turkey Pay

      Concurrently with the opium crisis came the Cyprus imbroglio. On the morning of Monday, July 15, 1974, Cypriot National Guardsmen, led by their Greek officers, attacked the presidential residence in Nicosia. The objective was to kill the president, Archbishop Makarios III, and establish a new government under Nikos Sampson, a champion of enosis, or union with Greece; Sampson was also a known terrorist who had personally killed Turkish Cypriots. Makarios narrowly escaped and eventually made his way to London. The Sampson government lasted only eight days before local and international criticism—and a Turkish invasion—forced him from office. Glafkos Clerides, a more moderate Greek Cypriot and the speaker of the House of Representatives, became acting head of state. Sampson’s fall triggered a backlash against the military junta in Athens, which had instigated the coup (code-named Aphrodite) in the mistaken belief that a successful takeover of Cyprus would restore its tarnished image at home. Instead, the Nicosia debacle led to collapse of the Regime of the Colonels and restoration of popular rule after seven years of a harsh right-wing dictatorship in the birthplace of democracy. Exiled conservative political leader Constantine Karamanlis (1907–1998) was invited home from exile in Paris to form a government, pending parliamentary elections.

       International Responses

      Although the coup proved a dismal failure, it set in motion larger events that could not easily be reversed. The Turkish mainland lay only 65 kilometers from the northern shores of Cyprus, whereas Greece was more than 800 kilometers away. The Turkish government kept a careful eye on developments on the nearby island, where approximately 20 percent of the population (180,000) was Turkish. This Turkish minority had established enclaves across the island, where residents lived largely walled off from their Greek Cypriot neighbors.

      In cities such as Paphos in the southwestern part of the island, the Turkish community lived behind a wall topped by blue UN watchtowers. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus had been established in 1964 during a time of increasing tensions between the Greek and Turkish communities. Turkish Cypriots taxed themselves and maintained their own education system. Young Turkish and Greek Cypriots grew up almost completely separated from each other. Groups of Turkish men and boys ventured into the Greek part of the city only on Fridays to purchase necessities not available on their side, but they did not linger there. The Makarios government in Nicosia had shown little interest in reversing