Advancing the Human Self. Ewa Nowak

46 “We begin not with thoughts but with our body’s engagements with the earth – with intercorporeal activities,” Kenneth Liberman, “An inquiry into the intercorporeal relations between humans and the Earth,” in: Suzanne L. Cataldi and William S. Hamrick (Eds.), Merleau-Ponty and the environmental philosophy, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2007, p. 41.

47 Francisco J. Varela, Evan T. Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, The embodied mind, Evanston, The MIT Press, 1991.

48 Evan T. Thompson, Francisco J. Varela, “Radical embodiment: neural systems and consciousness,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2001, vol. 5, no. 10, p. 420.

49 E. T. Thompson, F. J. Varela, “Radical embodiment,” p. 65.

50 E. T. Thompson, F. J. Varela, “Radical embodiment,” p. 64.

51 M. Merleau-Ponty, The phenomenology of perception, p. 65.

52 M. Merleau-Ponty, The phenomenology of perception, p. 73.

53 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The incarnated subject. Malebranche, Biran and Bergson on the union of body and soul, trans. P. B. Milan, New York, Humanity Books, 2001, p. 34.

54 M. Merleau-Ponty, The phenomenology of perception, p. 71 (this quotation will also reappear in the chapter “The Evolution of Body Concept” in this volume, which describes the ‘stages’ of ‘bodily constitution’ to show how its identities evolve to achieve what is called today ‘posthuman’).

55 H. Jonas, Leben und Organismus, p. 339.

56 Klaus Kornwachs, “Stanislav Lem: Summa technologiae,” in: Ch. Hubig, A. Huning, G. Ropohl (Hg.), Nachenken über Technik, Berlin, Edition Sigma, 2013, p. 233.

57 Dan P. McAdams, Ruthellen Josselson, Amia Lieblich, Introduction to: Identity and story, Washington DC, APA, 2006, p. 3.

58 D. P. McAdams, R. Josselson, A. Lieblich, Introduction to: Identity and story, p. 4.

59 David Kaplan (Ed.), Reading Ricoeur (Introduction), Albany, State University of New York Press, 2008, p. 2.

60 Paul Ricoeur, “Devenir capable, être reconnu,” Esprit 2005, vol. 7, trans. Ch. Turner. L’Institut Français du Royaume-Uni, p. 1.

61 Doro Wiese, The powers of the false. Reading, writing, thinking beyond truth and fiction, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2014, p. 24.

62 D. Thomä, Erzähle dich selbst, p. 154.

63 In which the illusion effect requires distance to reality (macht sich jene Kohärenz vom faktischen Lebenslauf los), D. Thomä, Erzähle dich selbst, p. 153.

64 P. Ricoeur, “Devenir capable,” p. 2.

65 P. Ricoeur, “Devenir capable,” p. 2.

66 Paul Ricoeur, “Life in quest of narrative,” in: D. Wood (Ed.), On Paul Ricoeur, London, New York, Routledge, 1991, pp. 20–33.

67 P. Ricoeur, “Life in quest of narrative,” pp. 20–33.

68 For the strong connection between action and speech see Arendt: “Action and speech are so closely related because the primordial and specifically human act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer: ‘Who are you?’ This disclosure of who someone is, is implicit in both his words and his deeds (…). This disclosure of ‘who’ in contradistinction to ‘what’ somebody is – his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide – is implicit in everything somebody says and does. It can be hidden only in complete silence and perfect passivity,” Hannah Arendt, The human condition, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958, pp. 178–179; and Merleau-Ponty: “Language is a life, is our life and the life of the things (…) language is not a mask over Being, but – if one knows how to grasp it with all its roots and all its foliation – the most valuable witness to Being,” even when silent, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The visible and the invisible, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1968, pp. 125–126.

69 P. Ricoeur, “Life in quest …” p. 142.

70 Some authors argue that “only narrative truth is attained in psychotherapy,” Eugene Winograd, “The authenticity and utility of memories,” in: Ulric Nesser, Robyn Fivush (Eds.), The remembering self: Construction and accuracy in the self-narrative, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 244. On the other side, “biographers are well aware that people may “improve” their stories of the past for social reasons.” By Wittgenstein the “love of a good story frequently got the better of his concern for accuracy,” Michael Ross, Roger Buehler, “Creative remembering,” in: U. Nesser, R. Fivush (Eds.), The remembering self, p. 214.

71 Paul Ricoeur, Time and narrative III, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 246.

72 Christina Toren, “How do we know what is true,” in: Rita Astuti, Jonathan Parri, Charles Stafford (Eds.), Questions of anthropology, Oxford, New York, Berg Publishers, 2007, p. 310.

73 Daniel Dennett, “The origins of selves,” Cogito 1989, vol. 21, p. 169, also, “Why everyone is novelist?,” The Times Literary Supplement September 1988, pp. 16–22; and Nicholas Humphrey, Daniel Dennett, “Speaking for our selves: an assessment ofmultiple personality disorder,” Raritan 1989, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 68–98.

74 Daniel Dennett, Consciousness explained, London, Penguin Books, 1992, p. 418.

75 Although persons with traumatic experiences desperately miss their past identities, having new ones. “I want to write of the pain I am feeling right now, of the lukewarm tears that will not stop coming into my eyes – for what? For my lost breast?