Rouble Nationalization – the Way to Russia’s Freedom. Nikolay Starikov
Читать онлайн.| Название | Rouble Nationalization – the Way to Russia’s Freedom |
|---|---|
| Автор произведения | Nikolay Starikov |
| Жанр | История |
| Серия | |
| Издательство | История |
| Год выпуска | 2011 |
| isbn | 978-5-459-01703-8 |
But let us go back to the question of what Hitler would have done had Stalin's response been some five hours later. The answer is that he would have continued negotiating. But not with Russians. With whom then? There is only one answer to this: with the English. It is an historical fact that on 21st August, 1939 the German ruler asked London to have a meeting with Goering on 22nd August and received a positive answer.[128] In those fateful August days there were two aeroplanes at the Berlin airfield. One of them, the Fuhrer's personal Junkers, was waiting for the Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, in order to take him to Moscow. And the other plane was a Lockheed A-12 of the British secret service.[129] Hermann Goering was ready to board it and fly to London. Both flights and both visits were planned for the same day, 23rd August, 1939. Goering's flight was organised personally by the head of the British intelligence in order to avoid publicity.
Fatman, which was Goering's nickname, was to meet not just anybody but Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. And the whole arrangement was kept under a veil of complete secrecy. He was to fly not straight to London but first land at a small airfield near a town called Bonvington in Herefordshire. From there Goering was to be delivered straight to Chequers, the official residence of the British Prime Minister. It was planned to dismiss Chamberlain's staff for the sake of secrecy, and replace all its members with officers of the British secret service. It was also planned to disconnect all the phones…[130]
This was not the first occasion when, at crucial political moments, one of the leaders of the Third Reich would fly to London in order to make arrangements in real time and in person. For example, when German troops invaded Austria in spring, 1938, Ribbentrop was in the British capital. The excuse not to make this visit official was found in the process. Ribbentrop, who used to be the German ambassador in London, now became the head of the Foreign Ministry. And in this new position he just wanted to see his all friends and throw something akin to a farewell party.[131] As a result, England recognised the Anschluss (annexation) of Austria to Germany despite having a treaty with Austrians in which the British promised to protect their independence.
In August 1939 only one flight could take place. And it is exactly where Hitler's envoy would fly and which country the Fuhrer chooses to make an arrangement with that the flight was for.[132] Having no response from Stalin was supposed to prod Hitler into negotiating with the English. The German leader simply did not have any other options. This is why we can state that the supposed lack of response from Stalin could have meant an entirely different scenario for Europe. And this scenario would have been even more tragic for Russia, as straight after defeating Poland the German troops would have turned up at the Russian borders and the Russian Army would have had to fight the Wehrmacht on its own and two years earlier and France or England would not have been obliged to reinforce Russia.
Who would have found it profitable if a war between Russia and Germany had started in September 1939? England. Who would have found it profitable to pit two peoples against one another in order to then join the battle second when the rivals had bled white? England. And a nine-hour delay in delivering the urgent and important letter is an historical fact which no one can deny. So, who could have tried to impede negotiations between Germany and Russia through holding up a message from one head of state to the other? The answer is obvious. There is one thing I do not understand: why has no one else tried to answer this fascinating question before, since answering it makes a lot of things clear. Even too clear. This was a question of national importance and Great Britain used the help of the secret service apart from all diplomatic sources…
Who could have provided the 'extra' six hours for Stalin's letter? English agents in German institutions. What institution exactly is not really that important; Foreign Ministry, intelligence, ciphers, Ribbentrop's deputies. If you want to know who exactly was responsible, get hold of German archives; they must have the answer. Such a blunder could not have remained unpunished. Either the German secret service or Ribbentrop himself must have reacted to this obvious sabotage. There must have been a reaction – severe but concealed. Within a month someone must have drowned, died in a car crash or of a sudden heart attack. Quietly. With no publicity. With nothing but a portrait at work with a black ribbon. Some crying colleagues. A true Aryan. Blind Death has taken him away. With a pension for the heartbroken widow.
I do not know what happened to the British agent who put everything at stake performing the task of his bosses in London; I do not know his name. But I do know names and surnames of other real foreign agents who were in Germany back then.
Story two
About a Russian agent
This man was not just an agent; he was considered the most valuable agent of the USSR in Nazi Germany. A book about him is actually called 'His Majesty the Agent'[133]. With a capital letter as they use for royalty. And this is not for nothing – Willy Lehmann was indeed a very precious agent. For as many as twelve years he supplied very sensitive information to Moscow under the pseudonym of Breitenbach, while working not just for an agency but for the Gestapo. 'Willy Lehmann took the initiative and offered his services himself… Lehmann spent twelve years working for Soviet intelligence. During that period he did not make a single professional mistake, nothing that could have attracted any suspicion',[134] says the author of the book, Theodore Gladkov, about the agent. Having started working with Soviet intelligence even before the Nazis came to power, he passed on the last piece of sensitive information on 19th June, 1941. On that day, Lehmann reported the exact and accurate day of the German invasion of the USSR.[135] After that, contact with him was broken.
As a result, there was a very strange situation: there was a very precious agent but no contact with him. 'By spring 1942 the Centre managed to restore contact with none of their agents in Berlin'[136]. That means there was physically no one who could have contacted Lehmann. Then it was decided to send some liaisons over the front line. Two agents were sent to Berlin and both were arrested by Willy Lehmann's colleagues' from the Gestapo. One of them held on to the last and died under torture; the other one started collaborating with the Nazis. A radio game started. Later on, the arrested Soviet agent insisted that he had given a coded sign that he was working under control which, allegedly, had not been noticed by the radio operators of the Centre. On 4th December, 1941 a password and terms of contact with Breitenbach were sent to the receiver controlled by the Gestapo…
In December, after the 11th, the telephone rang in Lehmann's apartment. Late at night. There was nothing special in it for an agent. It might have been an urgent call. In his many years of service, it had happened many times… A service Horch was already waiting for him. He opened the door, dived into the car, and immediately handcuffs clicked on his wrists… There was no warrant for his arrest. He was to be delivered, and that is it… No one knew of Lehmann's case except for the head of Gestapo, Mueller and a few more people. Lehmann was doomed. He was denied even a mockery of a trial from the very beginning, even with a predetermined death penalty… And there was nothing but a short message in the internal Nazi 'Bulletin on 29th January, 1943 which said that 'Willy Lehmann gave his life for the Fiihrer and the Reich. The only truth in this message must have been the month of his death – December 1942.'[137]
In a very quiet, peaceful, family-like manner. He gave his life for the Fiihrer and the Reich. Well, why trouble the public? Why cause puzzlement and anxiety? Nothing happened to Lehmann's wife. Could it have been different
For some reason those who write about the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact make it sound like Hitler, once he had signed the treaty, was ready to be 'friends' with Russia forever. For a man as cynical as Hitler, a treaty was nothing but a paper. And he was not going to adhere to it forever from the very beginning. He could have easily exchanged it or traded it for more preferences from his beloved Britain. This is what happened in reality. By 25th May Hitler had already sent Dalerus, who was a Swedish manufacturer, a relative and a friend of Goering's, to London. And up until 1st September, 1939 active work on diplomatic channels was taking place. But the English decided that Hitler's word was worth nothing and therefore declared war against him: in actual fact, they were not pursuing any war, and promised to stop it provided that Hitler would fulfil his obligations and attack Russia. And they kept pushing Hitler until he finally gave London satisfaction on 22 June 1941.
Those who are at least a little bit familiar with the principles of the English policy are bound to know that the main principle is to fight using others. Britain has always tried to 'get rid of its rivals with the help of other countries. Spain was weakened by the revolt in the Netherlands then Holland was defeated on land by the French. When France became the main rival of the Anglo-Saxons, she was eliminated' by Russian troops in 1812-1814. The principle did not change later. In the First World War the two enemies of England – Germany and Russia – mutually destroyed each other. The same principle was going to be applied to the Second World War. The following fact is rather telling: on 27th April, 1939 the law on universal military service was passed in Great Britain. But it remained on paper even after the world conflict had started. It is enough to say that 24-year-old Brits were only asked to arrive at recruiting stations as late as March 1940 – that is six months (!) after London declared war on Germany (on 3 September 1939). (Maysky I.M. Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat. Tashkent, 1980. P.387). When Hitler was destroying Poland, the English were dropping leaflets over German territory. Over the first month of the war they dropped 18 million leaflets. This was how the British helped Poland. The English wanted to stay 'second' and avoid fighting themselves.
http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=353153.
Apparently, Lehmann's supervisors had diplomatic cover and were deported from Germany together with all Soviet diplomats. This by itself provides food for thought. We were so convinced that there was no threat coming from Germany that there were no other ways of contacting this agent!
http://kp.ru/daily/24478.3/635042.
http://kp.ni/daily/24478.3/635042.